Narrative:

Just after takeoff I noticed that the landing gear seemed to be taking a long time to retract. Shortly after that we got a lg/lever disagree EICAS message. I called for the checklist and directed the pilot not flying to run it while I continued to be pilot flying and I assumed the radio duties. I informed ATC that we had a problem; that we would need to run some checklists and we would like to be vectored around rather than continue on course as we might have to return to the departure airport. The checklist procedure did not resolve the problem so I passed control of the aircraft to the first officer as I wanted to review the procedure myself and contact dispatch and maintenance. Maintenance could offer no additional suggestions so we had to return to the departure airport. I thought that; even though the lg/lever disagree checklist did not refer to the abnormal landing gear extension checklist in the case of a retraction issue; it might be prudent to go through this checklist just to be doubly sure that the gear was indeed down even though all indications were that it was down. Maintenance did not seem enthusiastic about this idea but could offer no reason why I should not so I began the checklist. The third step in the abnormal landing gear extension checklist refers to the gear electrical override switch. When I looked at the gear electrical override switch I found it was in the gear/doors position rather than in the normal position as it should have been. After placing the switch in the normal position the landing gear operated normally. Even though the problem was now resolved we elected to return as; after consultation with maintenance; we decided that we did not have enough fuel to go to our filed destination. Well; in short; the event occurred because a checklist; specifically the cockpit safety scan did not get run but there is more to it than that. This aircraft had come into this airport with another gear problem. The write-up was lg air/ground fail after gear extension. When the first officer; who got to the aircraft before me; got to it he found that maintenance was already on the plane and that the gpu was connected to the plane and the battery switches were in the automatic position. (This was determined while talking to the assistant chief pilot after we returned.) I do not want to put words in the first officer's mouth but perhaps he felt that as aircraft power was already established (apparently by maintenance) there was no need to do the cockpit safety scan. This is possible because in aom v.1 where it introduces the cockpit safety scan it seems to state that the purpose of the cockpit safety scan is 'to ensure that all aircraft systems are configured to safely allow electrical power application to the aircraft buses.' power was already established when he arrived. Perhaps this threw his flow off. For my part; when I arrived later I guess I just figured that as power to the aircraft was already established; the checklists to get to that point must have been done. Well; for my part from now on; I guess I will have to ask what has been done when I get to the plane second.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An EMB145 EICAS alerted LG/LEVER DISAGREE after the landing gear was retracted so during checklist completion for an air return; the GEAR ELECTRICAL OVERRIDE SWITCH was found in the unexpected GEAR/DOOR position because of previous maintenance.

Narrative: Just after takeoff I noticed that the landing gear seemed to be taking a long time to retract. Shortly after that we got a LG/LEVER DISAGREE EICAS message. I called for the checklist and directed the pilot not flying to run it while I continued to be pilot flying and I assumed the radio duties. I informed ATC that we had a problem; that we would need to run some checklists and we would like to be vectored around rather than continue on course as we might have to return to the departure airport. The checklist procedure did not resolve the problem so I passed control of the aircraft to the First Officer as I wanted to review the procedure myself and contact Dispatch and Maintenance. Maintenance could offer no additional suggestions so we had to return to the departure airport. I thought that; even though the LG/LEVER DISAGREE Checklist did not refer to the Abnormal Landing Gear Extension Checklist in the case of a retraction issue; it might be prudent to go through this checklist just to be doubly sure that the gear was indeed down even though all indications were that it was down. Maintenance did not seem enthusiastic about this idea but could offer no reason why I should not so I began the checklist. The third step in the Abnormal Landing Gear Extension Checklist refers to the gear electrical override switch. When I looked at the gear electrical override switch I found it was in the GEAR/DOORS position rather than in the NORMAL position as it should have been. After placing the switch in the NORMAL position the landing gear operated normally. Even though the problem was now resolved we elected to return as; after consultation with Maintenance; we decided that we did not have enough fuel to go to our filed destination. Well; in short; the event occurred because a checklist; specifically the Cockpit Safety Scan did not get run but there is more to it than that. This aircraft had come into this airport with another gear problem. The write-up was LG AIR/GND FAIL after gear extension. When the First Officer; who got to the aircraft before me; got to it he found that Maintenance was already on the plane and that the GPU was connected to the plane and the battery switches were in the AUTO position. (This was determined while talking to the assistant Chief Pilot after we returned.) I do not want to put words in the First Officer's mouth but perhaps he felt that as aircraft power was already established (apparently by Maintenance) there was no need to do the Cockpit Safety Scan. This is possible because in AOM v.1 where it introduces the Cockpit Safety Scan it seems to state that the purpose of the Cockpit Safety Scan is 'to ensure that all aircraft systems are configured to safely allow electrical power application to the aircraft buses.' Power was already established when he arrived. Perhaps this threw his flow off. For my part; when I arrived later I guess I just figured that as power to the aircraft was already established; the checklists to get to that point must have been done. Well; for my part from now on; I guess I will have to ask what has been done when I get to the plane second.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.