Narrative:

At time of incident we were landing on runway 28L at sfo. WX was clear. A widebody transport was holding between runways 28L and 28R. We had just begun a power reduction for landing flare as we passed behind the widebody transport. The tower timed it perfectly and cleared the widebody transport into position on runway 28R just as we passed behind its #2 engine (tail engine). The widebody transport added power and we were blown off centerline, but were able to complete a safe landing. A light airplane in the same situation would either have flipped over or been blown into the aircraft holding short of runway 28L. I called the tower about their timing and was told 3 times that there was 'nothing operationally wrong' with their actions. Deliberately putting an aircraft in jeopardy is 'operationally wrong' in my opinion! Being 'operationally correct' would be of little solace had an accident occurred! In hindsight we could have stayed higher and landed 3000-4000' down the runway, and option that is not always available due to runway length or condition. However, it seems to me the 5-10 seconds delay in the tower's instructions to the widebody transport would have been much more appropriate. Certainly the tower should have advised the widebody transport that an aircraft was landing behind him. Tower procedures should be changed to prevent a tower controller from giving an aircraft instructions that require substantial power applications (especially a heavy with the high tail engine) when an aircraft is landing behind him!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB HOLDING BETWEEN RWYS CLEARED POSITION, ADDS POWER AS LNDG TRAFFIC CROSSES THRESHOLD.

Narrative: AT TIME OF INCIDENT WE WERE LNDG ON RWY 28L AT SFO. WX WAS CLR. A WDB WAS HOLDING BTWN RWYS 28L AND 28R. WE HAD JUST BEGUN A PWR REDUCTION FOR LNDG FLARE AS WE PASSED BEHIND THE WDB. THE TWR TIMED IT PERFECTLY AND CLRED THE WDB INTO POS ON RWY 28R JUST AS WE PASSED BEHIND ITS #2 ENG (TAIL ENG). THE WDB ADDED PWR AND WE WERE BLOWN OFF CENTERLINE, BUT WERE ABLE TO COMPLETE A SAFE LNDG. A LIGHT AIRPLANE IN THE SAME SITUATION WOULD EITHER HAVE FLIPPED OVER OR BEEN BLOWN INTO THE ACFT HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 28L. I CALLED THE TWR ABOUT THEIR TIMING AND WAS TOLD 3 TIMES THAT THERE WAS 'NOTHING OPERATIONALLY WRONG' WITH THEIR ACTIONS. DELIBERATELY PUTTING AN ACFT IN JEOPARDY IS 'OPERATIONALLY WRONG' IN MY OPINION! BEING 'OPERATIONALLY CORRECT' WOULD BE OF LITTLE SOLACE HAD AN ACCIDENT OCCURRED! IN HINDSIGHT WE COULD HAVE STAYED HIGHER AND LANDED 3000-4000' DOWN THE RWY, AND OPTION THAT IS NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE DUE TO RWY LENGTH OR CONDITION. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO ME THE 5-10 SECS DELAY IN THE TWR'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE WDB WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE APPROPRIATE. CERTAINLY THE TWR SHOULD HAVE ADVISED THE WDB THAT AN ACFT WAS LNDG BEHIND HIM. TWR PROCS SHOULD BE CHANGED TO PREVENT A TWR CTLR FROM GIVING AN ACFT INSTRUCTIONS THAT REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL PWR APPLICATIONS (ESPECIALLY A HEAVY WITH THE HIGH TAIL ENG) WHEN AN ACFT IS LNDG BEHIND HIM!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.