Narrative:

Prior to pushback the pilot of one of my flights requested a takeoff alternate via ACARS. I was pressed by other simultaneous tasks and executed a rapid scan of possible alternates. ZZZ looked to me as one of the best and I amended the release via ACARS with the captain to include it as a takeoff alternate. I also provided him the current metar and taf. After the flight took off and I completed all the other pressing tasks that required my action I reviewed the weather information that I provided and realized that ZZZ did not have legal alternate minimums because of a 200 foot ceiling forecast for the time of arrival. Also the last metar showed below minimum ceiling.the major threat element I can identify for this incident was the extremely high workload. I had to work 81 flights in a day that was complicated by persistent low visibility conditions in most of texas; with an early company ground stop; ground delay programs at three major destination and consequent major delays and other disruptions. It is extremely difficult and challenging to maintain situational awareness when you have 10 or more flights enroute; more flights on the ground facing long ground delays; adverse weather that is constantly changing; and on top of that you need to plan; replan; and amend flights at the rate of sometimes 10 per hour. I know how to select alternates; and the only reason for my oversight in this case was fatigue and stress caused by excessive workload. To me this is a major threat and this is the main reason I am reporting it.the solution is really up to the company. On the day of the incident two dispatch desks were closed; I don't know if by choice or by necessity. If we had been fully staffed the workload would have been lower; thus reducing the probability of error. As long as the average number of flights assigned to a morning shift remains in the 70s or higher; I think our ability to perform our duties as required by the regulations and policies will continue to be impaired; and that will impact the quality of our service and ultimately the safety of our operation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Dispatcher for a major air carrier addressed his concern that excessive workloads and fatigue contributed to errors he made in providing a takeoff alternate for one of the flights for which he shared responsibility. He believes the excessive workload is largely the result of too many flights and too few dispatchers to fulfill their responsibilities effectively.

Narrative: Prior to pushback the pilot of one of my flights requested a takeoff alternate via ACARS. I was pressed by other simultaneous tasks and executed a rapid scan of possible alternates. ZZZ looked to me as one of the best and I amended the release via ACARS with the Captain to include it as a Takeoff Alternate. I also provided him the current METAR and TAF. After the flight took off and I completed all the other pressing tasks that required my action I reviewed the weather information that I provided and realized that ZZZ did not have legal alternate minimums because of a 200 foot ceiling forecast for the time of arrival. Also the last METAR showed below minimum ceiling.The major threat element I can identify for this incident was the extremely high workload. I had to work 81 flights in a day that was complicated by persistent low visibility conditions in most of Texas; with an early company ground stop; ground delay programs at three major destination and consequent major delays and other disruptions. It is extremely difficult and challenging to maintain situational awareness when you have 10 or more flights enroute; more flights on the ground facing long ground delays; adverse weather that is constantly changing; and on top of that you need to plan; replan; and amend flights at the rate of sometimes 10 per hour. I know how to select alternates; and the only reason for my oversight in this case was fatigue and stress caused by excessive workload. To me this is a major threat and this is the main reason I am reporting it.The solution is really up to the company. On the day of the incident two dispatch desks were closed; I don't know if by choice or by necessity. If we had been fully staffed the workload would have been lower; thus reducing the probability of error. As long as the average number of flights assigned to a morning shift remains in the 70s or higher; I think our ability to perform our duties as required by the regulations and policies will continue to be impaired; and that will impact the quality of our service and ultimately the safety of our operation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.