Narrative:

This is the first time that I have worked a local control position since the agency ordered me to monitor RNAV departure aircraft to ensure that they are in compliance/conformance with their departure procedure. Facility management installed new 'optional' map overlays on our racds that depict the departure paths of our RNAV departures. By means of pre-duty briefing item and then by face-to-face briefing with my supervisor; I was instructed that it was the local controller's responsibility to monitor the departure track of RNAV aircraft to ensure compliance/conformance with their RNAV SID. During that briefing I asked the supervisor what constituted in compliance and/or in conformance with the RNAV SID; he responded that he didn't know. I asked how much of the radar return had to be in contact with the depicted line to be on the route; again he did not know. The supervisor went on to say that the conformance requirement was one mile; but that he didn't know if that mile was centered on the airway or either side of it. Side note; if parallel departures are both 1/2 mile off the wrong side of their airway; they are touching; if they go a mile; they will have passed. Tonight a CRJ7 departed on the FERRA2 departure which is one of the routes we call an inside track on this flow (south). Approximately 1 mile off the departure end I noticed that the crj was still east of his depicted route and advised the pilot of such. He didn't seem too concerned. Three miles or so south I decided to issue traffic on an aircraft that was ahead and to the left of crj because I didn't want to keep him on my frequency all the way to ZZZ. He did not say that he had the traffic in sight; but I switched him to departure anyway. I notified the departure controller that the crj was east of course. The crj's radar target didn't touch the line depicting his route until he was about a mile from the first turn at bpark. I had to spend so much time watching the racd and making sure that the crj was going the right way; or at least didn't turn toward the east side; that I was not able to adequately scan the rest of my movement area. Fortunately it wasn't busy. I may never fly again. Recommendation; the agency should stop trying to apply band-aids to the RNAV off the ground concept turn these airplanes away from one another and let them get a little air under them before requiring them to switch over to computer guidance. This is clearly another example to the FAA not having a plan; and covering a deficiency in the system by saying 'now that we have created procedures that take the 'control' out of 'air traffic control;' it is now the responsibility of the air traffic controller to make sure these planes don't collide.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DFW Controller voiced concern regarding the new requirement to monitor RNAV departures to ensure they correctly track on RACD mapping; reporter claiming this new responsibility is a distraction from other duty responsibilities.

Narrative: This is the first time that I have worked a Local Control position since the Agency ordered me to monitor RNAV departure aircraft to ensure that they are in compliance/conformance with their departure procedure. Facility management installed new 'optional' map overlays on our RACDs that depict the departure paths of our RNAV departures. By means of pre-duty briefing item and then by face-to-face briefing with my Supervisor; I was instructed that it was the Local Controller's responsibility to monitor the departure track of RNAV aircraft to ensure compliance/conformance with their RNAV SID. During that briefing I asked the Supervisor what constituted in compliance and/or in conformance with the RNAV SID; he responded that he didn't know. I asked how much of the RADAR return had to be in contact with the depicted line to be on the route; again he did not know. The Supervisor went on to say that the conformance requirement was one mile; but that he didn't know if that mile was centered on the airway or either side of it. Side note; if parallel departures are both 1/2 mile off the wrong side of their airway; they are touching; if they go a mile; they will have passed. Tonight a CRJ7 departed on the FERRA2 Departure which is one of the routes we call an inside track on this flow (south). Approximately 1 mile off the departure end I noticed that the CRJ was still east of his depicted route and advised the pilot of such. He didn't seem too concerned. Three miles or so south I decided to issue traffic on an aircraft that was ahead and to the left of CRJ because I didn't want to keep him on my frequency all the way to ZZZ. He did not say that he had the traffic in sight; but I switched him to Departure anyway. I notified the Departure Controller that the CRJ was east of course. The CRJ's RADAR target didn't touch the line depicting his route until he was about a mile from the first turn at BPARK. I had to spend so much time watching the RACD and making sure that the CRJ was going the right way; or at least didn't turn toward the east side; that I was not able to adequately scan the rest of my movement area. Fortunately it wasn't busy. I may never fly again. Recommendation; the Agency should stop trying to apply band-aids to the RNAV off the ground concept Turn these airplanes away from one another and let them get a little air under them before requiring them to switch over to computer guidance. This is clearly another example to the FAA not having a plan; and covering a deficiency in the system by saying 'Now that we have created procedures that take the 'control' out of 'Air Traffic Control;' it is now the responsibility of the Air Traffic Controller to make sure these planes don't collide.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.