Narrative:

I just took over R5. There were a lot of things to be done. Right away; ito approach called me and told me that aircraft X; an SR20; departure from ito; was not going to be able to make the MOCA of 6;500 ft at okala; can he just radar vector him? I asked him what his MVA is because mine is 6;000 ft. He said 5;400 ft. I told him to radar vector him until our boundary on a 310 heading since it's a lower MVA. When ito called me back at the boundary; aircraft was above 6;000 ft (my mia) I told him to switch him to me. As soon as I got him; I told him to turn left to join V22 to V2. He read it back correctly. He was less than 1 mile right of V22 when I gave him that clearance. I was busy with vectoring for practice approaches at koa with jets; when I noticed aircraft's MSAW went off. He was left of course and I advised him. He was now in my 8;000 ft mia. He said that he did go to V22 and now is going to V2. I restated that he was cleared via V22 to join V2 and to climb quickly. When he leveled at 8;000 ft I cleared him direct upp. It was busy on R5. I needed to tell the supervisor to open up my d-side. They needed to juggle a few bodies to get me the d-side. Another problem is with the pilot. If he knew on the ground that he was not going to make the MOCA; he should have informed us or requested a route on the ground that he could comply with. I think if I wasn't as rushed; I may have given a more thorough clearance to ito approach to issue to aircraft rather than tell him to switch him to me at the boundary. This worked; but I may have spent more time to give him more attention to make sure he understood his clearance. I thought he did; but he really didn't. If I had a d-side to have dealt with that coordination with ito; it might have been more clear and less on the fly; while trying to deal with my practice approaches and multiple air carriers flying in to koa.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HCF Controller described a below MVA event resulting from an apparent aircraft performance issue. The reporter noted that this performance limitation should have been reported by the flight crew before the flight.

Narrative: I just took over R5. There were a lot of things to be done. Right away; ITO Approach called me and told me that aircraft X; an SR20; departure from ITO; was not going to be able to make the MOCA of 6;500 FT at OKALA; can he just RADAR vector him? I asked him what his MVA is because mine is 6;000 FT. He said 5;400 FT. I told him to RADAR vector him until our boundary on a 310 heading since it's a lower MVA. When ITO called me back at the boundary; aircraft was above 6;000 FT (my MIA) I told him to switch him to me. As soon as I got him; I told him to turn left to join V22 to V2. He read it back correctly. He was less than 1 mile right of V22 when I gave him that clearance. I was busy with vectoring for practice approaches at KOA with jets; when I noticed aircraft's MSAW went off. He was left of course and I advised him. He was now in my 8;000 FT MIA. He said that he did go to V22 and now is going to V2. I restated that he was cleared via V22 to join V2 and to climb quickly. When he leveled at 8;000 FT I cleared him direct UPP. It was busy on R5. I needed to tell the Supervisor to open up my D-Side. They needed to juggle a few bodies to get me the D-Side. Another problem is with the pilot. If he knew on the ground that he was not going to make the MOCA; he should have informed us or requested a route on the ground that he could comply with. I think if I wasn't as rushed; I may have given a more thorough clearance to ITO Approach to issue to aircraft rather than tell him to switch him to me at the boundary. This worked; but I may have spent more time to give him more attention to make sure he understood his clearance. I thought he did; but he really didn't. If I had a D-Side to have dealt with that coordination with ITO; it might have been more clear and less on the fly; while trying to deal with my practice approaches and multiple air carriers flying in to KOA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.