Narrative:

Last leg of a 2 day trip into dca; per current ATIS anticipated lda 19 to dca. Visibility was about 10 miles; but ceiling had varied between 1;600 ft and 2;400 ft. For about 2 months; the RNAV rnp 19 approach had been notamed unusable; but that NOTAM was not included in our paperwork. About 150 miles out captain queried dispatch via free text to confirm RNAV rnp 19 availability as it was our preferred approach and requested an anp. Dispatch responded with an anp value of .11. We fully briefed both approaches. When switched to approach we noted that the river visual 19 was in use. Queried approach controller on status of RNAV rnp 19; controller responded that it was still unusable. Apparently there is a tree that extends into the protected approach area. Since weather was reported VFR we decided to backup the river visual with vertical guidance from the RNAV rnp 19. Downwind I commented that there were multiple thin cloud layers and that the approach may not work. Captain concurred. I mentally went through map sequence. Since there is no published missed approach procedure; the brief was essentially to emphasize P56 avoidance. On final approaching hixit it initially looked like we would be able to descend VMC throughout the approach. We were configured early with landing checklist complete. Shortly after hixit; we noted a layer that would prevent continuing VMC; broke off the approach and executed a map. I togaed; disconnected the autopilot and began a climb; called for flaps 15; positive rate and gear up. At some point I called for 'set speed 200' but now not certain when I called it. Captain notified ATC who questioned the reason for the map; told us to turn toward the airport and gave us some initial altitude (I think 1;800 ft). Captain told him unable to maintain VMC and controller then cleared us to climb to 3;000 ft and gave us two heading changes in succession. At some point the captain called my airspeed fast and retracted the flaps but not before I exceeded the limit. I noted 240 KTS with flaps 15. I disconnected the autothrottles (a/T's) and reduced power. This description does not adequately communicate the confusion and I admit to being task saturated with poor situational awareness (sa) momentarily. We were vectored to an uneventful lda 19 approach and landing and made the appropriate over speed entry in the log book. The flap over speed was caused by my momentary loss of sa during the missed approach. In replaying the event a dozen times I became increasingly concerned with a bunch of 'whys' that did not directly impact my south/a but contributed to the overall confusion. Though this was the first real life map I have ever flown in this aircraft type; I have had similar chaotic missed approaches at dca in other aircraft. 1. Why was the RNAV rnp 19 not available if it wasn't notamed? 2. Why did we get conflicting information on its status from NOTAMS; dispatch; and the controller? 3. Why does dca ATC insist on using visual approaches when weather is marginal and/or weather in the area? Note a number of other aircraft were using the visual and we presume the layer moved in just before we commenced the approach. 4. Why is there no published missed approach for visual approaches. To me this is a huge issue system wide. It is truly a lot to ask for a busy controller to create a missed approach escape path and for pilots to immediately assimilate multiple altitude and heading assignments; especially with P56 in the dca area. 5. Why do we have to disconnect a key automation feature of our sophisticated aircraft when we need it the most; during a high work load missed approach? 6. We are taught to toga with a missed approach. After the flight the captain noted; and I concur; that this creates a high pitch up attitude that makes aircraft control more difficult; certainly appropriate in the final stages of an approach; but not on long final. 7. The question often arises in human factors of why pilots are so reluctant to executemissed approaches. They are clearly one of the highest workload maneuvers we do and despite the training in the simulator; we get very little real world practice. Real world maps rarely look like simulator maps. I hope these thoughts are helpful in preventing future such events.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier crew executed an IMC go around after failing to remain VMC on the DCA River Visual and; because no missed approach procedure was specified; were extremely task saturated keeping up with the aircraft and ATC's instructions.

Narrative: Last leg of a 2 day trip into DCA; per current ATIS anticipated LDA 19 to DCA. Visibility was about 10 miles; but ceiling had varied between 1;600 FT and 2;400 FT. For about 2 months; the RNAV RNP 19 approach had been NOTAMed unusable; but that NOTAM was not included in our paperwork. About 150 miles out Captain queried Dispatch via free text to confirm RNAV RNP 19 availability as it was our preferred approach and requested an ANP. Dispatch responded with an ANP value of .11. We fully briefed both approaches. When switched to approach we noted that the River Visual 19 was in use. Queried Approach Controller on status of RNAV RNP 19; Controller responded that it was still unusable. Apparently there is a tree that extends into the protected approach area. Since weather was reported VFR we decided to backup the River Visual with vertical guidance from the RNAV RNP 19. Downwind I commented that there were multiple thin cloud layers and that the approach may not work. Captain concurred. I mentally went through MAP sequence. Since there is no published missed approach procedure; the brief was essentially to emphasize P56 avoidance. On final approaching HIXIT it initially looked like we would be able to descend VMC throughout the approach. We were configured early with landing checklist complete. Shortly after HIXIT; we noted a layer that would prevent continuing VMC; broke off the approach and executed a MAP. I TOGAed; disconnected the autopilot and began a climb; called for flaps 15; positive rate and gear up. At some point I called for 'set speed 200' but now not certain when I called it. Captain notified ATC who questioned the reason for the MAP; told us to turn toward the airport and gave us some initial altitude (I think 1;800 FT). Captain told him unable to maintain VMC and Controller then cleared us to climb to 3;000 FT and gave us two heading changes in succession. At some point the Captain called my airspeed fast and retracted the flaps but not before I exceeded the limit. I noted 240 KTS with flaps 15. I disconnected the autothrottles (A/T's) and reduced power. This description does not adequately communicate the confusion and I admit to being task saturated with poor situational awareness (SA) momentarily. We were vectored to an uneventful LDA 19 approach and landing and made the appropriate over speed entry in the log book. The flap over speed was caused by my momentary loss of SA during the missed approach. In replaying the event a dozen times I became increasingly concerned with a bunch of 'whys' that did not directly impact my S/A but contributed to the overall confusion. Though this was the first real life MAP I have ever flown in this aircraft type; I have had similar chaotic missed approaches at DCA in other aircraft. 1. Why was the RNAV RNP 19 not available if it wasn't NOTAMed? 2. Why did we get conflicting information on its status from NOTAMS; Dispatch; and the Controller? 3. Why does DCA ATC insist on using visual approaches when weather is marginal and/or weather in the area? Note a number of other aircraft were using the visual and we presume the layer moved in just before we commenced the approach. 4. Why is there no published missed approach for visual approaches. To me this is a huge issue system wide. It is truly a lot to ask for a busy controller to create a missed approach escape path and for pilots to immediately assimilate multiple altitude and heading assignments; especially with P56 in the DCA area. 5. Why do we have to disconnect a key automation feature of our sophisticated aircraft when we need it the most; during a high work load missed approach? 6. We are taught to TOGA with a missed approach. After the flight the Captain noted; and I concur; that this creates a high pitch up attitude that makes aircraft control more difficult; certainly appropriate in the final stages of an approach; but not on long final. 7. The question often arises in human factors of why pilots are so reluctant to executemissed approaches. They are clearly one of the highest workload maneuvers we do and despite the training in the simulator; we get very little real world practice. Real world MAPs rarely look like simulator MAPs. I hope these thoughts are helpful in preventing future such events.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.