Narrative:

I was training a controller with a good bit of time on position. He is prior military controller who worked at a training base. Traffic was light, 3 aircraft in radar pattern and 2 aircraft outbnd to the center. I made some suggestions as to how he could work out the sequence in the pattern, but advised him to watch speeds, rate of turns, etc, which could be affected by the low ceilings. The trnee either did not recognize or he just didn't take action when he directed X to turn and descend inside of Y. I pointed out the potential problem and told him what to do. He wasted several transmission and didn't make the one he needed to. I corrected the situation but standard sep didn't exist. I believe the error occurred for several reasons. The call signs of the aircraft didn't indicate they were both flts instead of single ships, nor did the flight leaders identify them as flts. Therefore, we had less time to react and their performance was different (we don't use strips). I expected the trnee to handle the situation and then to make the needed transmission when told to and he didn't. I wasn't briefed on this trnee having any specific problems when it turns out he was having some problems calling the sequence and transposing call signs, both of which he did. I reported the problem to the supervisor. The aircraft came within .83 mi at the same altitude. MTR X track was in coast before and during incident. No altitude was available when the tracks of the aircraft were plotted (it didn't appear that close on radar). I feel that the call signs should indicate flts in a training situation, or in general, aircraft leaders need to say that they're a flight in calling all control positions. I'm not sure the error could have been avoided unless I had worked the traffic. In any training situation you can never fully be in control as an instrument. Trnees have to be able to make these types of decisions to be safe and competent controllers. All instrs go by their instincts as to whether they can trust the trnee in a clinch. I was very wrong here in my instincts. All trainers should be fully briefed as to the progress of a trnee, not just told that they're doing 'ok.' you expect them to be able to do more as they get more time. If you don't have all the facts, you can make a bad judgement. With these type aircraft you don't have much time to react.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION BETWEEN 2 MIL TRAINER ACFT (MTR). OPERATIONAL ERROR.

Narrative: I WAS TRNING A CTLR WITH A GOOD BIT OF TIME ON POS. HE IS PRIOR MIL CTLR WHO WORKED AT A TRNING BASE. TFC WAS LIGHT, 3 ACFT IN RADAR PATTERN AND 2 ACFT OUTBND TO THE CENTER. I MADE SOME SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW HE COULD WORK OUT THE SEQUENCE IN THE PATTERN, BUT ADVISED HIM TO WATCH SPDS, RATE OF TURNS, ETC, WHICH COULD BE AFFECTED BY THE LOW CEILINGS. THE TRNEE EITHER DID NOT RECOGNIZE OR HE JUST DIDN'T TAKE ACTION WHEN HE DIRECTED X TO TURN AND DSND INSIDE OF Y. I POINTED OUT THE POTENTIAL PROB AND TOLD HIM WHAT TO DO. HE WASTED SEVERAL XMISSION AND DIDN'T MAKE THE ONE HE NEEDED TO. I CORRECTED THE SITUATION BUT STANDARD SEP DIDN'T EXIST. I BELIEVE THE ERROR OCCURRED FOR SEVERAL REASONS. THE CALL SIGNS OF THE ACFT DIDN'T INDICATE THEY WERE BOTH FLTS INSTEAD OF SINGLE SHIPS, NOR DID THE FLT LEADERS IDENT THEM AS FLTS. THEREFORE, WE HAD LESS TIME TO REACT AND THEIR PERFORMANCE WAS DIFFERENT (WE DON'T USE STRIPS). I EXPECTED THE TRNEE TO HANDLE THE SITUATION AND THEN TO MAKE THE NEEDED XMISSION WHEN TOLD TO AND HE DIDN'T. I WASN'T BRIEFED ON THIS TRNEE HAVING ANY SPECIFIC PROBS WHEN IT TURNS OUT HE WAS HAVING SOME PROBS CALLING THE SEQUENCE AND TRANSPOSING CALL SIGNS, BOTH OF WHICH HE DID. I RPTED THE PROB TO THE SUPVR. THE ACFT CAME WITHIN .83 MI AT THE SAME ALT. MTR X TRACK WAS IN COAST BEFORE AND DURING INCIDENT. NO ALT WAS AVAILABLE WHEN THE TRACKS OF THE ACFT WERE PLOTTED (IT DIDN'T APPEAR THAT CLOSE ON RADAR). I FEEL THAT THE CALL SIGNS SHOULD INDICATE FLTS IN A TRNING SITUATION, OR IN GENERAL, ACFT LEADERS NEED TO SAY THAT THEY'RE A FLT IN CALLING ALL CONTROL POSITIONS. I'M NOT SURE THE ERROR COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED UNLESS I HAD WORKED THE TFC. IN ANY TRNING SITUATION YOU CAN NEVER FULLY BE IN CTL AS AN INSTR. TRNEES HAVE TO BE ABLE TO MAKE THESE TYPES OF DECISIONS TO BE SAFE AND COMPETENT CTLRS. ALL INSTRS GO BY THEIR INSTINCTS AS TO WHETHER THEY CAN TRUST THE TRNEE IN A CLINCH. I WAS VERY WRONG HERE IN MY INSTINCTS. ALL TRAINERS SHOULD BE FULLY BRIEFED AS TO THE PROGRESS OF A TRNEE, NOT JUST TOLD THAT THEY'RE DOING 'OK.' YOU EXPECT THEM TO BE ABLE TO DO MORE AS THEY GET MORE TIME. IF YOU DON'T HAVE ALL THE FACTS, YOU CAN MAKE A BAD JUDGEMENT. WITH THESE TYPE ACFT YOU DON'T HAVE MUCH TIME TO REACT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.