Narrative:

Rollout braking poor. Multiple releases med brakes armed. Started out of reverse but had to re-initiate to ensure stopping prior to end. Braking extremely poor at end. During this critical phase of second reversing cak tower issued following instructions and question in one transmission: 'turn right at end. How was braking? Hold short of runway 23.' this instruction (as per cak tape) was acknowledged simply 'axrb,' in actuality not understood by virtue of both pilots' total concern with stopping on the runway. Upon clearing runway, still on tower, I gave poor braking report. First officer switched to ground control. At this time in vicinity of taxi H checked in with ground and received instruction of 'taxi to ramp,' as per tape. Extremely slow back-taxi due to icy conditions, windy snow showers. Approximately 2000' from H to runway 23 on B. Ample time to re-iterate and get confirmatory reply of not to cross runway 23. Simultaneous event: saw small transport executing go around and heard ground issue 'hold position axrb' instruction. Note by virtue of extremely slow taxi, aircraft stopped immediately with no sudden deceleration, but nose of aircraft was over runway 23, although nose gear was not. Small transport made controled go around with a gentle off setting left turn to south of centerline, approximately 100' AGL. Taxied to gate. No further incident. Tower instructions were given during extremely critical landing rollout. Hold short instructions were never read back. Ground cleared us to ramp. Visibility variable due to snow showers. Concentration on surface conditions. Surprise of an aircraft on approach to runway 23 with 90 degree crosswind. Supplemental information from acn 102715: I was working ground control at cak with snow plows when medium large transport called to taxi to his gate. It was my impression that local private medium large transport on my frequency released to his gate, when actually local told medium large transport to hold short of runway 23 and stay on his frequency. Not knowing this, I told medium large transport to taxi to his gate. Small transport was on final runway 23. The problem was discovered when I noticed small transport on final and told medium large transport to hold short when he started to cross runway 23 to the gate.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC BETWEEN ACR-MLG CROSSING RWY AND ACR-SMT ABANDONING APCH AND ON GO AROUND.

Narrative: ROLLOUT BRAKING POOR. MULTIPLE RELEASES MED BRAKES ARMED. STARTED OUT OF REVERSE BUT HAD TO RE-INITIATE TO ENSURE STOPPING PRIOR TO END. BRAKING EXTREMELY POOR AT END. DURING THIS CRITICAL PHASE OF SECOND REVERSING CAK TWR ISSUED FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND QUESTION IN ONE XMISSION: 'TURN RIGHT AT END. HOW WAS BRAKING? HOLD SHORT OF RWY 23.' THIS INSTRUCTION (AS PER CAK TAPE) WAS ACKNOWLEDGED SIMPLY 'AXRB,' IN ACTUALITY NOT UNDERSTOOD BY VIRTUE OF BOTH PLTS' TOTAL CONCERN WITH STOPPING ON THE RWY. UPON CLRING RWY, STILL ON TWR, I GAVE POOR BRAKING RPT. F/O SWITCHED TO GND CTL. AT THIS TIME IN VICINITY OF TAXI H CHKED IN WITH GND AND RECEIVED INSTRUCTION OF 'TAXI TO RAMP,' AS PER TAPE. EXTREMELY SLOW BACK-TAXI DUE TO ICY CONDITIONS, WINDY SNOW SHOWERS. APPROX 2000' FROM H TO RWY 23 ON B. AMPLE TIME TO RE-ITERATE AND GET CONFIRMATORY REPLY OF NOT TO CROSS RWY 23. SIMULTANEOUS EVENT: SAW SMT EXECUTING GAR AND HEARD GND ISSUE 'HOLD POS AXRB' INSTRUCTION. NOTE BY VIRTUE OF EXTREMELY SLOW TAXI, ACFT STOPPED IMMEDIATELY WITH NO SUDDEN DECELERATION, BUT NOSE OF ACFT WAS OVER RWY 23, ALTHOUGH NOSE GEAR WAS NOT. SMT MADE CTLED GO AROUND WITH A GENTLE OFF SETTING LEFT TURN TO S OF CENTERLINE, APPROX 100' AGL. TAXIED TO GATE. NO FURTHER INCIDENT. TWR INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN DURING EXTREMELY CRITICAL LNDG ROLLOUT. HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS WERE NEVER READ BACK. GND CLRED US TO RAMP. VISIBILITY VARIABLE DUE TO SNOW SHOWERS. CONCENTRATION ON SURFACE CONDITIONS. SURPRISE OF AN ACFT ON APCH TO RWY 23 WITH 90 DEG XWIND. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 102715: I WAS WORKING GND CTL AT CAK WITH SNOW PLOWS WHEN MLG CALLED TO TAXI TO HIS GATE. IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT LCL PVT MLG ON MY FREQ RELEASED TO HIS GATE, WHEN ACTUALLY LCL TOLD MLG TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 23 AND STAY ON HIS FREQ. NOT KNOWING THIS, I TOLD MLG TO TAXI TO HIS GATE. SMT WAS ON FINAL RWY 23. THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED WHEN I NOTICED SMT ON FINAL AND TOLD MLG TO HOLD SHORT WHEN HE STARTED TO CROSS RWY 23 TO THE GATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.