Narrative:

I was working the saint john's sector, which was recently formed by resectoring airspace previously known as daytona low sector. At the time of the incident, traffic was picking up to the point that we had just told the supervisor to stop automatic departures. We took a departure from daytona approach, an small transport, climbing to 11000', the top of dab's airspace. The small transport was on a 290 degree heading from omn as per letter of agreement. To keep him from lingering in dab approach's airspace, I climbed him to 13000'. We then received 2 handoffs from mco approach. By letter of agreement, mco is supposed to hand departures off 7 mi latitude sep and 250 KTS. The first departure, an large transport, and the second departure, an light transport, are only 3-5 mi apart. Both level at 12000' orl approachs top altitude. The large transport checked on first and I climbed him. He was on a northwest heading from approach. The light transport checked on and I noticed that he was catching the large transport. I asked the light transport if he was speed restr by approach and he replied, 'negative.' I immediately restr him to 250 KTS and advised him of further climb momentarily. His route of flight would take him northbound on J53, the same arwy that the small transport would join. As we were fairly busy, I had other things to take care of. A couple of mins later I looked and noticed that the large transport flight was clear of the light transport, but I hadn't climbed him yet. As he was overtaking the small transport, I knew that I needed to top him. At the time, there was no mode C on the small transport. I climbed the light transport to FL290. Unfortunately his speed had not reduced sufficiently and he caught the small transport. At the time I issued climb clearance, my tracker informed me that they might be a problem, so I turned the light transport to a 290 degree heading and the small transport to a 360 degree heading. Small transport's mode C then showed 13000'. I asked the light transport if he was out of 14000' and he replied that he was out of 13800'. The computer showed 3.8 mi's and 600'. Needless to say, my control actions could have been performed in a timelier manner. However, I feel that there were other factors involved. When orl departures are handled as per LOA, they can be climbed immediately and are usually no factor for dab approach departures. We are still getting used to working this new sector and everyone in the area feels that it is very difficult to work effectively. The combination of jets, propellers and turboprops in this area is one of the major problems we have to contend with.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR ALLOWED SECOND ACFT TO OVERTAKE FIRST ACFT RESULTING IN A LOSS OF SEPARATION. OPERATIONAL ERROR.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE SAINT JOHN'S SECTOR, WHICH WAS RECENTLY FORMED BY RESECTORING AIRSPACE PREVIOUSLY KNOWN AS DAYTONA LOW SECTOR. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, TFC WAS PICKING UP TO THE POINT THAT WE HAD JUST TOLD THE SUPVR TO STOP AUTOMATIC DEPS. WE TOOK A DEP FROM DAYTONA APCH, AN SMT, CLBING TO 11000', THE TOP OF DAB'S AIRSPACE. THE SMT WAS ON A 290 DEG HDG FROM OMN AS PER LETTER OF AGREEMENT. TO KEEP HIM FROM LINGERING IN DAB APCH'S AIRSPACE, I CLBED HIM TO 13000'. WE THEN RECEIVED 2 HDOFS FROM MCO APCH. BY LETTER OF AGREEMENT, MCO IS SUPPOSED TO HAND DEPS OFF 7 MI LAT SEP AND 250 KTS. THE FIRST DEP, AN LGT, AND THE SECOND DEP, AN LTT, ARE ONLY 3-5 MI APART. BOTH LEVEL AT 12000' ORL APCHS TOP ALT. THE LGT CHKED ON FIRST AND I CLBED HIM. HE WAS ON A NW HDG FROM APCH. THE LTT CHKED ON AND I NOTICED THAT HE WAS CATCHING THE LGT. I ASKED THE LTT IF HE WAS SPD RESTR BY APCH AND HE REPLIED, 'NEGATIVE.' I IMMEDIATELY RESTR HIM TO 250 KTS AND ADVISED HIM OF FURTHER CLB MOMENTARILY. HIS ROUTE OF FLT WOULD TAKE HIM NBOUND ON J53, THE SAME ARWY THAT THE SMT WOULD JOIN. AS WE WERE FAIRLY BUSY, I HAD OTHER THINGS TO TAKE CARE OF. A COUPLE OF MINS LATER I LOOKED AND NOTICED THAT THE LGT FLT WAS CLR OF THE LTT, BUT I HADN'T CLBED HIM YET. AS HE WAS OVERTAKING THE SMT, I KNEW THAT I NEEDED TO TOP HIM. AT THE TIME, THERE WAS NO MODE C ON THE SMT. I CLBED THE LTT TO FL290. UNFORTUNATELY HIS SPD HAD NOT REDUCED SUFFICIENTLY AND HE CAUGHT THE SMT. AT THE TIME I ISSUED CLB CLRNC, MY TRACKER INFORMED ME THAT THEY MIGHT BE A PROB, SO I TURNED THE LTT TO A 290 DEG HDG AND THE SMT TO A 360 DEG HDG. SMT'S MODE C THEN SHOWED 13000'. I ASKED THE LTT IF HE WAS OUT OF 14000' AND HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS OUT OF 13800'. THE COMPUTER SHOWED 3.8 MI'S AND 600'. NEEDLESS TO SAY, MY CONTROL ACTIONS COULD HAVE BEEN PERFORMED IN A TIMELIER MANNER. HOWEVER, I FEEL THAT THERE WERE OTHER FACTORS INVOLVED. WHEN ORL DEPS ARE HANDLED AS PER LOA, THEY CAN BE CLBED IMMEDIATELY AND ARE USUALLY NO FACTOR FOR DAB APCH DEPS. WE ARE STILL GETTING USED TO WORKING THIS NEW SECTOR AND EVERYONE IN THE AREA FEELS THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO WORK EFFECTIVELY. THE COMBINATION OF JETS, PROPS AND TURBOPROPS IN THIS AREA IS ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBS WE HAVE TO CONTEND WITH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.