37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1029240 |
Time | |
Date | 201208 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | MD-83 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Pneumatic Ducting |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
During preflight the first officer noticed the tail compartment temperature high light illuminated. APU was running with packs on. We closed the pneumatic crossfeed valve levers and turned the packs off and the light went out. Maintenance performed a complete inspection with no findings; attributed the light to the hot weather and signed off the writeup. I briefed the first officer on emergency actions if the light should recur on departure. APU was shut down immediately after engine start to preclude any residual heat build up. At 500 feet AGL after takeoff; the tail compartment temperature high light again illuminated. We accomplished the immediate action items; declared an emergency with tower and requested an immediate return to the airport at 3;000 feet MSL; right hand pattern to land on the longest of the northbound runways. The light illuminated only intermittently at this point; possibly in conjunction with throttle movement. As we climbed through 2;700 MSL; tower cleared us to 2;000 feet and advised us that we had been given the right runway for landing. I told tower we wanted the longer center runway as previously requested. 30 seconds later; tower came back and said unable. With no time to argue; I acquiesced and continued to perform the remaining necessary actions to prepare the aircraft and crew for landing. The landing was uneventful except for the fact that the right reverser did not deploy. Total flight time was nine minutes. We cleared the runway and had arff inspect the aircraft; with no visible indications [of fire] found. We elected to taxi the aircraft back to the terminal with the packs off; because that seemed to be where the problem was originating. It was a long taxi to the gate and the cabin and cockpit became extremely hot. A few passengers felt slightly ill after arrival at the terminal; because of the heat. The emergency actions following the event went exactly as we practice in the simulator; except for the coordination with ATC. I decided to contact the tower to find out why we were not allowed to land on the much longer center runway. I was told by a supervisor that because we wanted an immediate landing; that was the fastest way to accomplish this. He said that if we had insisted on xxc; it would have meant 7 to 8 more minutes of airborne time to coordinate space for us on final. We were on a short flight with the aircraft landing weight below our max landing weight; making the shorter runway not a significant factor. I tried to walk [the supervisor] through a scenario of an aircraft departing near max takeoff weight; hot day; on fire; etc.; and needing the longer runway. He insisted it would still require the seven to eight minutes of extra time [to coordinate with other traffic]. I ended the conversation by telling him that if I am ever in that situation; I will be landing on the longer runway; with a short final of my choosing - I think he hung up on me.this situation runs completely counter to my over 20 years of training. Every training cycle; we practice an engine failure; fire; etc.; on takeoff from [one runway] and expeditiously return to [the runway of our choice]. It has been ingrained that once we declare an emergency; the sky is ours and everyone will get out of the way. It never occurred to me that I would have to devote precious time to arguing clearances with ATC. Aviate - navigate - communicate! I thought the communicate part was letting the cabin crew and ATC know your plans and coordinating actions to get the aircraft; crew and passengers safely on the ground. I hope we can clear this up and reiterate the captain's authority to do everything possible to ensure a safe outcome in any emergency situation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: When the MD83's TAIL COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE HIGH LIGHT illuminated shortly after takeoff the flight crew declared an emergency and requested an immediate landing on the departure airport's longest Northbound runway. ATC advised they were unable to clear traffic for an immediate landing on that runway and cleared them to land immediately on a parallel runway instead. The reporter took umbrage at their refusal after the event was resolved.
Narrative: During preflight the First Officer noticed the TAIL COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE HIGH LIGHT illuminated. APU was running with packs on. We closed the pneumatic crossfeed valve levers and turned the packs off and the light went out. Maintenance performed a complete inspection with no findings; attributed the light to the hot weather and signed off the writeup. I briefed the First Officer on emergency actions if the light should recur on departure. APU was shut down immediately after engine start to preclude any residual heat build up. At 500 feet AGL after takeoff; the TAIL COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE HIGH LIGHT again illuminated. We accomplished the immediate action items; declared an emergency with Tower and requested an immediate return to the airport at 3;000 feet MSL; right hand pattern to land on the longest of the northbound runways. The light illuminated only intermittently at this point; possibly in conjunction with throttle movement. As we climbed through 2;700 MSL; Tower cleared us to 2;000 feet and advised us that we had been given the right runway for landing. I told tower we wanted the longer center runway as previously requested. 30 seconds later; tower came back and said unable. With no time to argue; I acquiesced and continued to perform the remaining necessary actions to prepare the aircraft and crew for landing. The landing was uneventful except for the fact that the right reverser did not deploy. Total flight time was nine minutes. We cleared the runway and had ARFF inspect the aircraft; with no visible indications [of fire] found. We elected to taxi the aircraft back to the terminal with the packs off; because that seemed to be where the problem was originating. It was a long taxi to the gate and the cabin and cockpit became extremely hot. A few passengers felt slightly ill after arrival at the terminal; because of the heat. The emergency actions following the event went exactly as we practice in the simulator; except for the coordination with ATC. I decided to contact the Tower to find out why we were not allowed to land on the much longer center runway. I was told by a Supervisor that because we wanted an immediate landing; that was the fastest way to accomplish this. He said that if we had insisted on XXC; it would have meant 7 to 8 more minutes of airborne time to coordinate space for us on final. We were on a short flight with the aircraft landing weight below our Max Landing Weight; making the shorter runway not a significant factor. I tried to walk [the Supervisor] through a scenario of an aircraft departing near Max Takeoff Weight; hot day; on fire; etc.; and needing the longer runway. He insisted it would still require the seven to eight minutes of extra time [to coordinate with other traffic]. I ended the conversation by telling him that if I am ever in that situation; I will be landing on the longer runway; with a short final of my choosing - I think he hung up on me.This situation runs completely counter to my over 20 years of training. Every training cycle; we practice an engine failure; fire; etc.; on takeoff from [one runway] and expeditiously return to [the runway of our choice]. It has been ingrained that once we declare an emergency; the sky is ours and everyone will get out of the way. It never occurred to me that I would have to devote precious time to arguing clearances with ATC. Aviate - Navigate - Communicate! I thought the Communicate part was letting the cabin crew and ATC know your plans and coordinating actions to get the aircraft; crew and passengers safely on the ground. I hope we can clear this up and reiterate the Captain's authority to do everything possible to ensure a safe outcome in any emergency situation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.