Narrative:

Taxi instructions were as follows: 'cleared to runway 35.' I repeated it. At this point I assumed I was clear to the end of 35--my first mistake. As I started I heard ground controller giving instructions to an small aircraft Y in the pattern. I came to one intersection and saw runway 31-13 and passed it, then went to the next intersection. As I approached I heard on the ground frequency the same controller tell the small aircraft Y that he was cleared for touch and go, but not to cross a certain point, which I missed. But by hearing this, it confirmed my belief that I could cross 35. There were more xmissions for awhile. I saw the small aircraft Y on final and he looked pretty far out which again made me think that the controller meant for me to go across. I started on the runway, still no transmission. Half way across still no transmission. 2/3 of the way across ground controller told small aircraft Y to go around. I was almost off 35 and the small aircraft Y wasn't quite to the threshold. Then ground told me I just crossed the active west/O permission. Technically I just busted far 91.87 hotel. I realize that I assumed too much during taxi, but feel that one controller shouldn't handle ground and tower operations, especially at an airport with several intersecting runways. Why did the controller wait so long to call my mistake if I was such a danger. Are no ground controllers supposed to monitor ground traffic? I was raised at a one runway, uncontrolled field and now operate out of a one runway, controled field. Perhaps better controled field training would have helped me. I feel that ATC and pilots should work as a team and look out for each other. If one sees a mistake developing, call it to attention as soon as possible--don't wait till already happened.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA-SMA UNAUTH RWY CROSSING CAUSES SECOND GA-SMA TO GO AROUND.

Narrative: TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE AS FOLLOWS: 'CLRED TO RWY 35.' I REPEATED IT. AT THIS POINT I ASSUMED I WAS CLR TO THE END OF 35--MY FIRST MISTAKE. AS I STARTED I HEARD GND CTLR GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO AN SMA Y IN THE PATTERN. I CAME TO ONE INTXN AND SAW RWY 31-13 AND PASSED IT, THEN WENT TO THE NEXT INTXN. AS I APCHED I HEARD ON THE GND FREQ THE SAME CTLR TELL THE SMA Y THAT HE WAS CLRED FOR TOUCH AND GO, BUT NOT TO CROSS A CERTAIN POINT, WHICH I MISSED. BUT BY HEARING THIS, IT CONFIRMED MY BELIEF THAT I COULD CROSS 35. THERE WERE MORE XMISSIONS FOR AWHILE. I SAW THE SMA Y ON FINAL AND HE LOOKED PRETTY FAR OUT WHICH AGAIN MADE ME THINK THAT THE CTLR MEANT FOR ME TO GO ACROSS. I STARTED ON THE RWY, STILL NO XMISSION. HALF WAY ACROSS STILL NO XMISSION. 2/3 OF THE WAY ACROSS GND CTLR TOLD SMA Y TO GO AROUND. I WAS ALMOST OFF 35 AND THE SMA Y WASN'T QUITE TO THE THRESHOLD. THEN GND TOLD ME I JUST CROSSED THE ACTIVE W/O PERMISSION. TECHNICALLY I JUST BUSTED FAR 91.87 HOTEL. I REALIZE THAT I ASSUMED TOO MUCH DURING TAXI, BUT FEEL THAT ONE CTLR SHOULDN'T HANDLE GND AND TWR OPS, ESPECIALLY AT AN ARPT WITH SEVERAL INTERSECTING RWYS. WHY DID THE CTLR WAIT SO LONG TO CALL MY MISTAKE IF I WAS SUCH A DANGER. ARE NO GND CTLRS SUPPOSED TO MONITOR GND TFC? I WAS RAISED AT A ONE RWY, UNCTLED FIELD AND NOW OPERATE OUT OF A ONE RWY, CTLED FIELD. PERHAPS BETTER CTLED FIELD TRNING WOULD HAVE HELPED ME. I FEEL THAT ATC AND PLTS SHOULD WORK AS A TEAM AND LOOK OUT FOR EACH OTHER. IF ONE SEES A MISTAKE DEVELOPING, CALL IT TO ATTN ASAP--DON'T WAIT TILL ALREADY HAPPENED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.