Narrative:

The incident occurred while performing contracted skydive operations. The flight was conducted in all VFR conditions within a 4 mile radius of the airport. The flight to altitude was uneventful and I released all the jumpers at an altitude of 13;000. On the way down; however; I noticed a fluctuation in engine power from the right engine. Moments later; the power returned. I contacted my dispatcher and requested the mechanic to meet me when I got down.I turned onto about a four mile final with the landing gear down and locked but flaps still up. At that point I saw the right engine fuel pump annunciator light come on. Moment later I felt the plane surge heavily and begin to slow. I powered up with both throttle levers to arrest the loss of airspeed. The airplane immediately began to bank right and continued to do so despite counter control input. I determined the right engine was not producing power.at that point I was well short of the runway at about 500 ft AGL (or less); with the airspeed decreasing to around 80 KTS. I immediately brought both throttles back to idle. This stopped the uncommanded turn and I was able to nose over a bit and select an open field east of the runway. I pushed the nose down to maintain my airspeed (still at 80 KTS); and seconds later; was able to clear some trees into a soybean field. As I cleared the tree I selected the flap lever down but there was no time to verify its operation.I flared and landed in the soybeans. The roll out was short and surprisingly smooth. While still rolling I feathered both engines and moved the condition levers to cut off. After coming to rest I declared an emergency with the local unicom and requested assistance. The call was answered by the skydive operations dispatcher. I then shut everything off; got out and determined that the airplane had suffered no damage. I also determined that there were only trace amounts of fuel in each fuel cell. On pre-flight I was told by the pilot operating the plane the day before; that 40 gallons were flown off of the full nacelle tanks which contain 120 total usable. I visually confirmed that there was approximately half tanks of fuel; although this is very difficult to judge accurately. The fuel gauges in the cockpit also indicated 3/4 tank fuel on each side. After the off field landing I went back into the cockpit to check the fuel gauges again and they both still indicated 1/4 tank of fuel. Eventually the aircraft was towed back to the airport for maintenance and [a more thorough] inspection.in retrospect I can see my efforts to determine the fuel on board before the flight were inadequate; which lead to a fuel starvation event which nearly produced a low altitude VMC roll which would undoubtedly have ended me. I am still uncertain as to the exact discrepancy between perceived fuel and actual fuel onboard; and I may never reconcile this. What is certain is in the future I will err much further on the side of caution; especially when it comes to fuel management.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The pilot of a King Air skydiving flight failed to insure adequate fuel on board for his mission and the engines succombed to fuel starvation on final forcing an ultimately successful forced landing in a soybean field short of the runway.

Narrative: The incident occurred while performing contracted skydive operations. The flight was conducted in all VFR conditions within a 4 mile radius of the airport. The flight to altitude was uneventful and I released all the jumpers at an altitude of 13;000. On the way down; however; I noticed a fluctuation in engine power from the right engine. Moments later; the power returned. I contacted my Dispatcher and requested the Mechanic to meet me when I got down.I turned onto about a four mile final with the landing gear down and locked but flaps still up. At that point I saw the right engine fuel pump annunciator light come on. Moment later I felt the plane surge heavily and begin to slow. I powered up with both throttle levers to arrest the loss of airspeed. The airplane immediately began to bank right and continued to do so despite counter control input. I determined the right engine was not producing power.At that point I was well short of the runway at about 500 FT AGL (or less); with the airspeed decreasing to around 80 KTS. I immediately brought both throttles back to idle. This stopped the uncommanded turn and I was able to nose over a bit and select an open field east of the runway. I pushed the nose down to maintain my airspeed (still at 80 KTS); and seconds later; was able to clear some trees into a soybean field. As I cleared the tree I selected the flap lever down but there was no time to verify its operation.I flared and landed in the soybeans. The roll out was short and surprisingly smooth. While still rolling I feathered both engines and moved the condition levers to cut off. After coming to rest I declared an emergency with the local UNICOM and requested assistance. The call was answered by the Skydive Operations Dispatcher. I then shut everything off; got out and determined that the airplane had suffered no damage. I also determined that there were only trace amounts of fuel in each fuel cell. On pre-flight I was told by the pilot operating the plane the day before; that 40 gallons were flown off of the full nacelle tanks which contain 120 total usable. I visually confirmed that there was approximately half tanks of fuel; although this is very difficult to judge accurately. The fuel gauges in the cockpit also indicated 3/4 tank fuel on each side. After the off field landing I went back into the cockpit to check the fuel gauges again and they both still indicated 1/4 tank of fuel. Eventually the aircraft was towed back to the airport for maintenance and [a more thorough] inspection.In retrospect I can see my efforts to determine the fuel on board before the flight were inadequate; which lead to a fuel starvation event which nearly produced a low altitude VMC roll which would undoubtedly have ended me. I am still uncertain as to the exact discrepancy between perceived fuel and actual fuel onboard; and I may never reconcile this. What is certain is in the future I will err much further on the side of caution; especially when it comes to fuel management.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.