Narrative:

We were descending into mci in clear conditions on a routine flight. Once we advised mci approach that we had the field in sight we were cleared for a visual approach to 19L. While we were descending through 4;000 ft MSL I informed the first officer I would be off comm 1 momentarily to reconfirm that I had chimed the flight attendants earlier as we were passing through 10;000 ft; since I could not remember. Flight attendant #1 told me I had chimed them earlier and they were secured and safe for landing. As I was returning to comm 1; I noticed that the first officer was descending towards the traffic pattern altitude of 2;600 ft MSL near the outer marker (1;500 ft AGL); however 1;500 ft MSL was mistakenly dialed into the altitude preselect instead of 2;600 ft MSL. As soon as we realized what was happening we corrected our flight path and returned to the correct altitude of 2;600 ft MSL; which would have been the correct traffic pattern altitude for mci. We had flown through 2;600 ft MSL and were at about 2;100 ft MSL (1;000 AGL) before we were able to correct our altitude. At about the same time we were correcting our altitude; mci tower informed us that they were receiving a low altitude alert and informed us to correct our altitude immediately. We told them we were correcting our altitude and resumed the flight with a stabilized approach and landing without further incident. We taxied to the gate and I asked the tower controller if he needed to speak with us or needed any other information and he replied in the negative. I asked the first officer what altitude he had dialed in; and he informed me he had mistakenly put 1;500 ft MSL instead of 1;500 ft AGL; which would have been the correct altitude of 2;600 ft MSL for a visual approach beginning at the outer marker. This type of mistake can be avoided in the future by better communication between both pilots. Before I had gone off comm 1 temporarily; I should have double checked what altitude the first officer was planning to descend to for the beginning of his visual approach. I should have also reconfirmed the altitude that was set for the traffic pattern before we commenced the final descent from the outer marker inbound. I also should have avoided calling to double check that I had originally chimed the flight attendants; or at the very least; accomplished it sooner then I did. In the end we maintained a stabilized approach during the last 1;000 ft and at no time were safety margins reduced; however it was a classic example of how even a routine flight in perfect weather conditions can be suddenly complicated at the very end by simple distractions. As the captain of the flight it is my responsibility to oversee all aspects of the flight. I understand how easy it is for mistakes to happen and how important it is for us to maintain our situational awareness and vigilance at all times. Both the first officer and I discussed the flight and final outcome to great extent on the return leg. We both realized there were important lessons to be learned and were both very grateful and humbled; for the learning experience.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ700 Captain describes a low altitude event during a visual approach to MCI. While the Captain confirms that the cabin is secure with the flight attendants the First Officer descends to 1;000 FT AGL prior to the FAF. The Tower issues a low altitude alert at the same time the crew becomes aware of the continued descent. A normal landing ensues.

Narrative: We were descending into MCI in clear conditions on a routine flight. Once we advised MCI Approach that we had the field in sight we were cleared for a visual approach to 19L. While we were descending through 4;000 FT MSL I informed the First Officer I would be off COMM 1 momentarily to reconfirm that I had chimed the flight attendants earlier as we were passing through 10;000 FT; since I could not remember. Flight Attendant #1 told me I had chimed them earlier and they were secured and safe for landing. As I was returning to COMM 1; I noticed that the First Officer was descending towards the traffic pattern altitude of 2;600 FT MSL near the outer marker (1;500 FT AGL); however 1;500 FT MSL was mistakenly dialed into the altitude preselect instead of 2;600 FT MSL. As soon as we realized what was happening we corrected our flight path and returned to the correct altitude of 2;600 FT MSL; which would have been the correct traffic pattern altitude for MCI. We had flown through 2;600 FT MSL and were at about 2;100 FT MSL (1;000 AGL) before we were able to correct our altitude. At about the same time we were correcting our altitude; MCI Tower informed us that they were receiving a low altitude alert and informed us to correct our altitude immediately. We told them we were correcting our altitude and resumed the flight with a stabilized approach and landing without further incident. We taxied to the gate and I asked the Tower Controller if he needed to speak with us or needed any other information and he replied in the negative. I asked the First Officer what altitude he had dialed in; and he informed me he had mistakenly put 1;500 FT MSL instead of 1;500 FT AGL; which would have been the correct altitude of 2;600 FT MSL for a visual approach beginning at the outer marker. This type of mistake can be avoided in the future by better communication between both pilots. Before I had gone off COMM 1 temporarily; I should have double checked what altitude the First Officer was planning to descend to for the beginning of his visual approach. I should have also reconfirmed the altitude that was set for the traffic pattern before we commenced the final descent from the outer marker inbound. I also should have avoided calling to double check that I had originally chimed the flight attendants; or at the very least; accomplished it sooner then I did. In the end we maintained a stabilized approach during the last 1;000 FT and at no time were safety margins reduced; however it was a classic example of how even a routine flight in perfect weather conditions can be suddenly complicated at the very end by simple distractions. As the Captain of the flight it is my responsibility to oversee all aspects of the flight. I understand how easy it is for mistakes to happen and how important it is for us to maintain our situational awareness and vigilance at all times. Both the First Officer and I discussed the flight and final outcome to great extent on the return leg. We both realized there were important lessons to be learned and were both very grateful and humbled; for the learning experience.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.