Narrative:

The captain complained of being tired and seemed a bit distant as we departed on our 3.5 hour flight to ord. In the following description, the captain was the PF and the deviations occurred with the autoplt engaged. Upon descent into the ord area we were cleared to cross a rfd DME fix at FL240 at 250 KIAS. The captain, experienced in this aircraft type, seemed a bit slow at entering the descent data into the computer, but did manage to program the computer to begin the descent on time. However, a 110 KT tailwind caused the aircraft to descend at a rate that would not allow for a significant speed reduction by the fix. On 2 separate occasions prior to reaching the fix I informed the captain that it appeared the crossing restriction would not be met at our present rate of descent. The captain made only a slight facial expression that indicated he heard my comments, but employed no corrective action to restriction ahead. We crossed the fix 50 KIAS fast at FL240, eventually reaching 250 KIAS some distance past the fix. We were issued a second clearance by the same controller to cross a new DME fix at 11000' at 250 KIAS. The captain again had difficulty and was slow in entering the descent data into the computer and I soon realized that we were getting too close to the fix to comply with the crossing restriction. As the aircraft began the descent out of FL240, no speed brakes were used and the computer, not being programmed for the large tailwind, descended the aircraft at a rate totally inappropriate for the higher than normal gndspd. This time I made 3 separate declarations that I did not believe we would be able to comply with this new speed/altitude restriction. The captain acknowledged my comments but did little initially to increase the rate of descent. Only after several seconds did he deploy speed brakes and increase the rate of descent. At this point, however, we were hopelessly behind the correct descent profile. I then asked the captain, at both 8 DME and 5 DME from the fix, if he would like me to advise ATC of our inability to comply with the restriction. Both queries were met with a negative response and we crossed the fix 40 KIAS fast and approximately 2000' high. ATC made no comments to us at any time that we did not meet their restriction. Actions by the captain during the rest of the trip, not waking in the morning for the next day's departures until called by a fellow crew member, and other lapses in performance, led me to believe that perhaps the captain was troubled by problems outside his job and was not mentally involved in his present tasks. In my opinion, the use of sick time by a pilot is quite appropriate in this case, or would have been appropriate had the captain chosen to use it. Besides the obvious dangers of flying when both a physical and mentally fit condition cannot be met, the not so obvious problem is the increased workload that an already busy pilot on a 2-M aircraft must now absorb. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: this was first trip with this PIC and the PNF was reluctant to be more assertive not really knowing the man. Finally by the end of the trip he realized all was not normal and has contacted the professional standards committee which was worked with the PIC and the factors which were affecting his performance were faced and are being remedied.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB UNDERSHOT ALTS ON DESCENT AND MISSED SPEED RESTRICTIONS TO EXTENT PNF BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT PF.

Narrative: THE CAPT COMPLAINED OF BEING TIRED AND SEEMED A BIT DISTANT AS WE DEPARTED ON OUR 3.5 HR FLT TO ORD. IN THE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTION, THE CAPT WAS THE PF AND THE DEVIATIONS OCCURRED WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED. UPON DSCNT INTO THE ORD AREA WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS A RFD DME FIX AT FL240 AT 250 KIAS. THE CAPT, EXPERIENCED IN THIS ACFT TYPE, SEEMED A BIT SLOW AT ENTERING THE DSCNT DATA INTO THE COMPUTER, BUT DID MANAGE TO PROGRAM THE COMPUTER TO BEGIN THE DSCNT ON TIME. HOWEVER, A 110 KT TAILWIND CAUSED THE ACFT TO DSND AT A RATE THAT WOULD NOT ALLOW FOR A SIGNIFICANT SPEED REDUCTION BY THE FIX. ON 2 SEPARATE OCCASIONS PRIOR TO REACHING THE FIX I INFORMED THE CAPT THAT IT APPEARED THE XING RESTRICTION WOULD NOT BE MET AT OUR PRESENT RATE OF DSCNT. THE CAPT MADE ONLY A SLIGHT FACIAL EXPRESSION THAT INDICATED HE HEARD MY COMMENTS, BUT EMPLOYED NO CORRECTIVE ACTION TO RESTRICTION AHEAD. WE CROSSED THE FIX 50 KIAS FAST AT FL240, EVENTUALLY REACHING 250 KIAS SOME DISTANCE PAST THE FIX. WE WERE ISSUED A SECOND CLRNC BY THE SAME CTLR TO CROSS A NEW DME FIX AT 11000' AT 250 KIAS. THE CAPT AGAIN HAD DIFFICULTY AND WAS SLOW IN ENTERING THE DSCNT DATA INTO THE COMPUTER AND I SOON REALIZED THAT WE WERE GETTING TOO CLOSE TO THE FIX TO COMPLY WITH THE XING RESTRICTION. AS THE ACFT BEGAN THE DSCNT OUT OF FL240, NO SPD BRAKES WERE USED AND THE COMPUTER, NOT BEING PROGRAMMED FOR THE LARGE TAILWIND, DSNDED THE ACFT AT A RATE TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE HIGHER THAN NORMAL GNDSPD. THIS TIME I MADE 3 SEPARATE DECLARATIONS THAT I DID NOT BELIEVE WE WOULD BE ABLE TO COMPLY WITH THIS NEW SPD/ALT RESTRICTION. THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED MY COMMENTS BUT DID LITTLE INITIALLY TO INCREASE THE RATE OF DSCNT. ONLY AFTER SEVERAL SECS DID HE DEPLOY SPEED BRAKES AND INCREASE THE RATE OF DSCNT. AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, WE WERE HOPELESSLY BEHIND THE CORRECT DSCNT PROFILE. I THEN ASKED THE CAPT, AT BOTH 8 DME AND 5 DME FROM THE FIX, IF HE WOULD LIKE ME TO ADVISE ATC OF OUR INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH THE RESTRICTION. BOTH QUERIES WERE MET WITH A NEGATIVE RESPONSE AND WE CROSSED THE FIX 40 KIAS FAST AND APPROX 2000' HIGH. ATC MADE NO COMMENTS TO US AT ANY TIME THAT WE DID NOT MEET THEIR RESTRICTION. ACTIONS BY THE CAPT DURING THE REST OF THE TRIP, NOT WAKING IN THE MORNING FOR THE NEXT DAY'S DEPS UNTIL CALLED BY A FELLOW CREW MEMBER, AND OTHER LAPSES IN PERFORMANCE, LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT PERHAPS THE CAPT WAS TROUBLED BY PROBS OUTSIDE HIS JOB AND WAS NOT MENTALLY INVOLVED IN HIS PRESENT TASKS. IN MY OPINION, THE USE OF SICK TIME BY A PLT IS QUITE APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE, OR WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE HAD THE CAPT CHOSEN TO USE IT. BESIDES THE OBVIOUS DANGERS OF FLYING WHEN BOTH A PHYSICAL AND MENTALLY FIT CONDITION CANNOT BE MET, THE NOT SO OBVIOUS PROB IS THE INCREASED WORKLOAD THAT AN ALREADY BUSY PLT ON A 2-M ACFT MUST NOW ABSORB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THIS WAS FIRST TRIP WITH THIS PIC AND THE PNF WAS RELUCTANT TO BE MORE ASSERTIVE NOT REALLY KNOWING THE MAN. FINALLY BY THE END OF THE TRIP HE REALIZED ALL WAS NOT NORMAL AND HAS CONTACTED THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS COMMITTEE WHICH WAS WORKED WITH THE PIC AND THE FACTORS WHICH WERE AFFECTING HIS PERFORMANCE WERE FACED AND ARE BEING REMEDIED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.