Narrative:

I was working sder providing sequencing to san runway 27. A B737 was on a downwind being sequenced behind an A320 already on the final. A B757 was inbound from the east straight-in sequenced behind the B737. I turned the B737 to a heading of 180 to follow the A320 and I once again called the traffic to follow. He reported the traffic in sight and I instructed him to follow the traffic; maintain visual separation and maintain 5;000. The B757 reported the B737 in sight and I instructed him to follow and maintain visual separation. I could not clear either for the visual approach due to an aircraft crossing under the 8 NM final at san landing at sdm but they were cleared to follow and fully acknowledged the clearances. I observed a normal rate of turn from the B737 from the downwind to base at a high indicated airspeed. I judged the turn rate to be nominal and acceptable if he had kept turning to follow the A320. I advised him of the preceding A320's airspeed (180 KT) and he acknowledged. I advised him that I would be restricting him to at least 3;800 MSL due to the previously mentioned aircraft crossing under his final but for now maintain 5;000 MSL. He acknowledged. He appeared to slow his turn rate. I instructed him to try not to cross the localizer due to para jumping just south of the localizer. He acknowledged. I instructed him to expedite his turn to H290 to avoid jumpers. He acknowledged. I told him to turn immediately to H330. He acknowledged. The B757 became confused on which aircraft to follow because the B737 was flying south. I had already expedited the B737's turn to the north so turning the B757 to the north to follow would not have been feasibly at this point. I instructed the B757 to turn south to follow the B737 and expect to turn back north follow. Both aircraft were vectored through the jump zone. Jumpers were in the air at the time the B737 was in the area. Jumpers were held prior to the B757 entering the airspace. Upon review of the radar data; it appears to me that the B737 never turned towards the traffic to follow as assigned. Although I had approved an automated point out from sdzr who was working the jump aircraft and airspace; I did not expect any of my aircraft to perform in a manner that would have put them in conflict with the jump zone. I could have turned the B737 towards the runway prior to the jump zone. I relied on history trails which indicated to me that had he kept his turn going towards the aircraft to follow as instructed he would not have crossed the localizer. I also believe the sdm VOR'-a approach is unsafe because of the workload it places on the controllers and aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SCT Controller described a conflict between an Air Carrier arrival to SAN and parachute operations near the localizer; the Controller indicating the clearance issued to the aircraft was not followed.

Narrative: I was working SDER providing sequencing to SAN Runway 27. A B737 was on a downwind being sequenced behind an A320 already on the final. A B757 was inbound from the east straight-in sequenced behind the B737. I turned the B737 to a heading of 180 to follow the A320 and I once again called the traffic to follow. He reported the traffic in sight and I instructed him to follow the traffic; maintain visual separation and maintain 5;000. The B757 reported the B737 in sight and I instructed him to follow and maintain visual separation. I could not clear either for the visual approach due to an aircraft crossing under the 8 NM final at SAN landing at SDM but they were cleared to follow and fully acknowledged the clearances. I observed a normal rate of turn from the B737 from the downwind to base at a high indicated airspeed. I judged the turn rate to be nominal and acceptable if he had kept turning to follow the A320. I advised him of the preceding A320's airspeed (180 KT) and he acknowledged. I advised him that I would be restricting him to at least 3;800 MSL due to the previously mentioned aircraft crossing under his final but for now maintain 5;000 MSL. He acknowledged. He appeared to slow his turn rate. I instructed him to try not to cross the localizer due to para jumping just south of the localizer. He acknowledged. I instructed him to expedite his turn to H290 to avoid jumpers. He acknowledged. I told him to turn immediately to H330. He acknowledged. The B757 became confused on which aircraft to follow because the B737 was flying south. I had already expedited the B737's turn to the north so turning the B757 to the north to follow would not have been feasibly at this point. I instructed the B757 to turn south to follow the B737 and expect to turn back north follow. Both aircraft were vectored through the jump zone. Jumpers were in the air at the time the B737 was in the area. Jumpers were held prior to the B757 entering the airspace. Upon review of the RADAR data; it appears to me that the B737 never turned towards the traffic to follow as assigned. Although I had approved an automated point out from SDZR who was working the jump aircraft and airspace; I did not expect any of my aircraft to perform in a manner that would have put them in conflict with the jump zone. I could have turned the B737 towards the runway prior to the jump zone. I relied on history trails which indicated to me that had he kept his turn going towards the aircraft to follow as instructed he would not have crossed the localizer. I also believe the SDM VOR'-A approach is unsafe because of the workload it places on the controllers and aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.