Narrative:

Approaching lit from north at 4000', we saw the airport and requested a visibility approach to runway 4, the active runway (winds 350 degrees at 11 KTS). Approach control cleared us a visibility and switched us to tower where we were 'cleared to land.' first officer was flying the leg and was establishing himself on downwind, right traffic, south of the field while I tuned both navigation receivers to the ILS. We began configuring the aircraft for landing as the first officer began his turn to final and called for the checklist. I looked up and saw that we were high and slightly overshooting final. Because of the steep approach, I suggested flaps 40 degrees and the first officer agreed and called for them. At approximately 1000' AGL, we were slightly left of the runway, on speed but slightly high (while on white VASI). At 500' AGL we were on speed, on glide path and power was being added to stabilize the approach. Landing was on speed, 1000' down the runway. Normal reversing was used, but at 100 KTS the end of the runway was closer than it should have been. I called '80 KTS,' and first officer braked the aircraft smoothly to a safe taxi speed about 500-700' from the end of the runway while I looked outside and realized nothing looked familiar. My first thought was that we had landed at the wrong airport, but then I looked at the heading indicator and saw we were heading 360 degrees instead of 040 degrees. We had landed on the wrong runway! Tower, who had said nothing during the approach and landing, said 'turn right on runway 14 and back-taxi to the gate.' no comments were made on tower frequency from either party re: the landing. Once in the terminal, I phoned the tower controller and apologized for the confusion. The controller said he was distracted and did not notice we were on the wrong runway until we were in the flare. He was working alone in the tower and there were no other aircraft in the pattern. While we were legal to use runway 36 (we have landing data and were within weight limits), it would have been imprudent to use the 5124' runway when runway 4 was the active (7173') and was the intended runway of landing. Contributing factors: rushed, angling steep approach induced by first officer flying too tight a pattern, which caused the crew to focus all attention outside the cockpit. Right traffic pattern (tightly flown) did not allow the captain a view of the runway until final turn rollout. Inadequate monitoring of the available navaids by the captain and first officer. Inattn of tower controller, working alone. Corrective actions: slow down and take time to setup a pattern where all attention does not have to be focused on visually flying the approach and wondering if we'll be spooled up at 500'. Use the navaids that you took the time to tune in. Watch the other guy and assume no one knows what they are doing--they may not.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG LANDED ON WRONG RWY.

Narrative: APCHING LIT FROM N AT 4000', WE SAW THE ARPT AND REQUESTED A VIS APCH TO RWY 4, THE ACTIVE RWY (WINDS 350 DEGS AT 11 KTS). APCH CTL CLRED US A VIS AND SWITCHED US TO TWR WHERE WE WERE 'CLRED TO LAND.' F/O WAS FLYING THE LEG AND WAS ESTABLISHING HIMSELF ON DOWNWIND, RIGHT TFC, S OF THE FIELD WHILE I TUNED BOTH NAV RECEIVERS TO THE ILS. WE BEGAN CONFIGURING THE ACFT FOR LNDG AS THE F/O BEGAN HIS TURN TO FINAL AND CALLED FOR THE CHKLIST. I LOOKED UP AND SAW THAT WE WERE HIGH AND SLIGHTLY OVERSHOOTING FINAL. BECAUSE OF THE STEEP APCH, I SUGGESTED FLAPS 40 DEGS AND THE F/O AGREED AND CALLED FOR THEM. AT APPROX 1000' AGL, WE WERE SLIGHTLY LEFT OF THE RWY, ON SPD BUT SLIGHTLY HIGH (WHILE ON WHITE VASI). AT 500' AGL WE WERE ON SPD, ON GLIDE PATH AND PWR WAS BEING ADDED TO STABILIZE THE APCH. LNDG WAS ON SPD, 1000' DOWN THE RWY. NORMAL REVERSING WAS USED, BUT AT 100 KTS THE END OF THE RWY WAS CLOSER THAN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. I CALLED '80 KTS,' AND F/O BRAKED THE ACFT SMOOTHLY TO A SAFE TAXI SPD ABOUT 500-700' FROM THE END OF THE RWY WHILE I LOOKED OUTSIDE AND REALIZED NOTHING LOOKED FAMILIAR. MY FIRST THOUGHT WAS THAT WE HAD LANDED AT THE WRONG ARPT, BUT THEN I LOOKED AT THE HDG INDICATOR AND SAW WE WERE HDG 360 DEGS INSTEAD OF 040 DEGS. WE HAD LANDED ON THE WRONG RWY! TWR, WHO HAD SAID NOTHING DURING THE APCH AND LNDG, SAID 'TURN RIGHT ON RWY 14 AND BACK-TAXI TO THE GATE.' NO COMMENTS WERE MADE ON TWR FREQ FROM EITHER PARTY RE: THE LNDG. ONCE IN THE TERMINAL, I PHONED THE TWR CTLR AND APOLOGIZED FOR THE CONFUSION. THE CTLR SAID HE WAS DISTRACTED AND DID NOT NOTICE WE WERE ON THE WRONG RWY UNTIL WE WERE IN THE FLARE. HE WAS WORKING ALONE IN THE TWR AND THERE WERE NO OTHER ACFT IN THE PATTERN. WHILE WE WERE LEGAL TO USE RWY 36 (WE HAVE LNDG DATA AND WERE WITHIN WT LIMITS), IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPRUDENT TO USE THE 5124' RWY WHEN RWY 4 WAS THE ACTIVE (7173') AND WAS THE INTENDED RWY OF LNDG. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: RUSHED, ANGLING STEEP APCH INDUCED BY F/O FLYING TOO TIGHT A PATTERN, WHICH CAUSED THE CREW TO FOCUS ALL ATTN OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT. RIGHT TFC PATTERN (TIGHTLY FLOWN) DID NOT ALLOW THE CAPT A VIEW OF THE RWY UNTIL FINAL TURN ROLLOUT. INADEQUATE MONITORING OF THE AVAILABLE NAVAIDS BY THE CAPT AND F/O. INATTN OF TWR CTLR, WORKING ALONE. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: SLOW DOWN AND TAKE TIME TO SETUP A PATTERN WHERE ALL ATTN DOES NOT HAVE TO BE FOCUSED ON VISUALLY FLYING THE APCH AND WONDERING IF WE'LL BE SPOOLED UP AT 500'. USE THE NAVAIDS THAT YOU TOOK THE TIME TO TUNE IN. WATCH THE OTHER GUY AND ASSUME NO ONE KNOWS WHAT THEY ARE DOING--THEY MAY NOT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.