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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1038779 |
Time | |
Date | 201209 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Brake System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180 Flight Crew Total 23000 Flight Crew Type 3000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
MEL item brake temperature monitoring system; after reviewing the MEL item for brake indicator inoperative and the appropriate chart of the flight manual; and considering that the aircraft does a quick turnaround; my crew and I believed the temperature sensors should be fixed. We saw a B777 check captain in operations; who we consulted to make sure we were reading the charts correctly (we were). He called another B777 check captain and we all came to the same conclusion: fix the airplane. The brake cooling table referred to in the MEL shows that at 440;000 pounds flaps 30 auto brakes 2; we would be in the melt zone. According to the table; if we waited; did not use auto brakes; and delayed touching the brakes for 30 KTS after touchdown; we would still have at least 1 hour of cooling at a minimum. For such a seemingly small problem such as brake temp sensors; one would not think important issues such as melt zone would arise! I consulted the duty manager who told me that we should ask the destination station to put brake cooling fans on the airplane. My crew and I were trying to make the operation work; and to avoid any problems for ourselves and for the down line crews. I was disappointed that the duty manager did not understand the implications of taking this airplane. I had hoped that he would try to expedite our refusal; and the subsequent repair; of the aircraft; but he did not. I was; however; grateful to have an excellent crew who helped determine the ramifications of taking this airplane. Ultimately the repair took only 20 minutes; and the parts were in stock. My questions are: 1. Is it prudent to send an aircraft with a very restrictive MEL guidance (the table referred to in the MEL is very conservative) on such a flight with less than a two hour turn time? 2. If we had to use the brakes within 20 KTS of touchdown ground speed; we would have been in the melt zone (with a mandatory 1 hour before we could taxi or maintenance could even approach the main gear). What would be the implications to us; the crew; if we accepted this airplane? 3. There was enough ground time on this aircraft for this to have been fixed before we ever got the paperwork. Why did it take my refusal to get the airplane fixed? After all of our efforts to keep the operation going; the crew was charged with a delay. (We did; however; arrive one minute early!)
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B777 Captain refuses an aircraft when it is learned that the brake temperature system is MELed and the destination airport temperature is expected to be 118 degrees. After refusal the system is repaired in 20 minutes.
Narrative: MEL Item Brake Temperature Monitoring System; after reviewing the MEL item for brake indicator inoperative and the appropriate chart of the Flight Manual; and considering that the aircraft does a quick turnaround; my crew and I believed the temperature sensors should be fixed. We saw a B777 Check Captain in operations; who we consulted to make sure we were reading the charts correctly (we were). He called another B777 Check Captain and we all came to the same conclusion: fix the airplane. The brake cooling table referred to in the MEL shows that at 440;000 LBS flaps 30 auto brakes 2; we would be in the melt zone. According to the table; if we waited; did not use auto brakes; and delayed touching the brakes for 30 KTS after touchdown; we would still have at least 1 hour of cooling at a minimum. For such a seemingly small problem such as brake temp sensors; one would not think important issues such as melt zone would arise! I consulted the Duty Manager who told me that we should ask the destination station to put brake cooling fans on the airplane. My crew and I were trying to make the operation work; and to avoid any problems for ourselves and for the down line crews. I was disappointed that the Duty Manager did not understand the implications of taking this airplane. I had hoped that he would try to expedite our refusal; and the subsequent repair; of the aircraft; but he did not. I was; however; grateful to have an excellent crew who helped determine the ramifications of taking this airplane. Ultimately the repair took only 20 minutes; and the parts were in stock. My questions are: 1. Is it prudent to send an aircraft with a very restrictive MEL guidance (the table referred to in the MEL is very conservative) on such a flight with less than a two hour turn time? 2. If we had to use the brakes within 20 KTS of touchdown ground speed; we would have been in the melt zone (with a mandatory 1 hour before we could taxi or Maintenance could even approach the main gear). What would be the implications to us; the crew; if we accepted this airplane? 3. There was enough ground time on this aircraft for this to have been fixed before we ever got the paperwork. Why did it take my refusal to get the airplane fixed? After all of our efforts to keep the operation going; the crew was charged with a delay. (We did; however; arrive one minute early!)
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.