Narrative:

Pilot instrument trnee/instrument working with columbus oh approach control on a practice ILS approach penetrated the 2i4 air traffic area while still on approach control frequency when approach control failed to handoff to 2i4 tower frequency. The pilot-owned aircraft in use was equipped with only 1 microphone jack which was connected to the pilot's push-to-talk microphone/earphone. The instrument could only listen on speaker and relay any communications instructions to the pilot trnee. When traffic was observed opp direction at 12 O'clock less than 1 mi. The instrument/observer took control of the aircraft momentarily and made a slight right turn resulting in a miss of approximately 800'. The pilot trnee announced a missed approach and advised approach control that they had failed to handoff to tower frequency. Initial communications with approach control got off to a bad start. The flight training lesson plan was to proceed to a point 20 mi southwest of columbus, practice turns and speed changes and then practice holding and ILS approachs at bolton field. The controller intimidated in his remarks a situation developed where the pilot was reluctant to speak for fear of saying the wrong thing. The controller did not perceive that instrument flying is 50% communications--the quality of human performance fell apart in communications. Procedures and phraseology in aim/controller handbook 7110.65 were not closely followed. After the first approach the instrument's judgement was to continue for a second and third practice ILS approach so as to give the controller and pilot an opportunity to work out the problems and perform correctly in accordance with aim/controller handbook procedures and phraseology. On these 2 practice approachs, the handoff was made just before the LOM and the tower was well coordinated with by approach control, giving the flight headings to 3000' outside the air traffic area after each missed approach, then handing the flight back to approach control. Both pilot and controller's worked well together. Safety questions arise?? How could the system break down on a clear sat afternoon and place a flight in the untenable situation of flying into the air traffic area not in communication with the control tower? How can the pilot be assured that communication is coordinated?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA ENCOUNTERED OPPOSITE DIRECTION TRAFFIC WHILE ON 3 MILE FINAL AND STILL ON APCH FREQ. NO TRAFFIC ISSUED.

Narrative: PLT INSTRUMENT TRNEE/INSTR WORKING WITH COLUMBUS OH APCH CTL ON A PRACTICE ILS APCH PENETRATED THE 2I4 ATA WHILE STILL ON APCH CTL FREQ WHEN APCH CTL FAILED TO HDOF TO 2I4 TWR FREQ. THE PLT-OWNED ACFT IN USE WAS EQUIPPED WITH ONLY 1 MIC JACK WHICH WAS CONNECTED TO THE PLT'S PUSH-TO-TALK MIC/EARPHONE. THE INSTR COULD ONLY LISTEN ON SPEAKER AND RELAY ANY COMS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PLT TRNEE. WHEN TFC WAS OBSERVED OPP DIRECTION AT 12 O'CLOCK LESS THAN 1 MI. THE INSTR/OBSERVER TOOK CONTROL OF THE ACFT MOMENTARILY AND MADE A SLIGHT RIGHT TURN RESULTING IN A MISS OF APPROX 800'. THE PLT TRNEE ANNOUNCED A MISSED APCH AND ADVISED APCH CTL THAT THEY HAD FAILED TO HDOF TO TWR FREQ. INITIAL COMS WITH APCH CTL GOT OFF TO A BAD START. THE FLT TRNING LESSON PLAN WAS TO PROCEED TO A POINT 20 MI SW OF COLUMBUS, PRACTICE TURNS AND SPD CHANGES AND THEN PRACTICE HOLDING AND ILS APCHS AT BOLTON FIELD. THE CTLR INTIMIDATED IN HIS REMARKS A SITUATION DEVELOPED WHERE THE PLT WAS RELUCTANT TO SPEAK FOR FEAR OF SAYING THE WRONG THING. THE CTLR DID NOT PERCEIVE THAT INSTRUMENT FLYING IS 50% COMS--THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE FELL APART IN COMS. PROCS AND PHRASEOLOGY IN AIM/CTLR HANDBOOK 7110.65 WERE NOT CLOSELY FOLLOWED. AFTER THE FIRST APCH THE INSTR'S JUDGEMENT WAS TO CONTINUE FOR A SECOND AND THIRD PRACTICE ILS APCH SO AS TO GIVE THE CTLR AND PLT AN OPPORTUNITY TO WORK OUT THE PROBS AND PERFORM CORRECTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH AIM/CTLR HANDBOOK PROCS AND PHRASEOLOGY. ON THESE 2 PRACTICE APCHS, THE HDOF WAS MADE JUST BEFORE THE LOM AND THE TWR WAS WELL COORDINATED WITH BY APCH CTL, GIVING THE FLT HDGS TO 3000' OUTSIDE THE ATA AFTER EACH MISSED APCH, THEN HANDING THE FLT BACK TO APCH CTL. BOTH PLT AND CTLR'S WORKED WELL TOGETHER. SAFETY QUESTIONS ARISE?? HOW COULD THE SYS BREAK DOWN ON A CLR SAT AFTERNOON AND PLACE A FLT IN THE UNTENABLE SITUATION OF FLYING INTO THE ATA NOT IN COM WITH THE CTL TWR? HOW CAN THE PLT BE ASSURED THAT COM IS COORDINATED?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.