Narrative:

I was told by another captain that this aircraft had multiple MEL items and that he had been flying west/O steering several days. I asked if there was another aircraft available. I was told 'no.' I voiced my concern to maintenance stating that I felt the aircraft should remain in nashville for maintenance. I was told they were working on the steering and that if they could, they would have the steering repaired. I asked that they take a delay on departure and be sure the repairs were completed. At this time I was told that this could be done, but the delay code would be 60. This repair and test was completed approximately 10 mins prior to departure. After this aircraft was signed ready for service, I accepted it. During taxi I did a steering test and had an amber steering fail light, but I had no erratic steering deviations. I positioned the aircraft out of the traffic flow and called ground and then company. I explained my problem in detail to maintenance. They told me that it was a MEL item, and that I could render the system inoperative and go at my discretion. I inquired, 'how?' I was told 'pull the breaker and position arming switch to off.' I asked what they could do if I brought it back in and was told the same thing. Maintenance assured me the light was just a malfunctioning pressure switch. Based on my conversation with the previous captain, the fact that I had no hard steering changes and maintenance assurance, I elected to complete the trip west/O steering. After takeoff I still had some concern about my situation, so I again talked to maintenance by radio asking about the odds of having a hardover after inopping the system in this manner. I was told 'slim.' upon landing at pah at nose wheel T/D, the aircraft veered violently to the left. I applied full right rudder and full right reverse. We stopped approximately 50' from the runway in the mud. Passenger were properly evacuated and taken to station management. I then communicated with proper officials in nashville. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reference to delay code #60 was management way of taking coercive action against the flight crew. #60 would be charged as a flight crew delay and the captain would be accountable. An FAA review was conducted and maintenance now changes the entire 3 part nose wheel steering control instead of just the pressure switch. Captain says he has no problem accepting the aircraft with a castering nose wheel but now insists the hydraulic pressure be disconnected from the nose wheel along with the associated electrical power. In this incident the electrical warning system was disconnected but not the hydraulic actuating pressure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER SMT LOSS OF ACFT CONTROL ON LNDG DUE NOSE WHEEL STEERING DEACTIVATED PLUS HYDRAULIC SYSTEM CONTROL VALVE FAILURE.

Narrative: I WAS TOLD BY ANOTHER CAPT THAT THIS ACFT HAD MULTIPLE MEL ITEMS AND THAT HE HAD BEEN FLYING W/O STEERING SEVERAL DAYS. I ASKED IF THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT AVAILABLE. I WAS TOLD 'NO.' I VOICED MY CONCERN TO MAINT STATING THAT I FELT THE ACFT SHOULD REMAIN IN NASHVILLE FOR MAINT. I WAS TOLD THEY WERE WORKING ON THE STEERING AND THAT IF THEY COULD, THEY WOULD HAVE THE STEERING REPAIRED. I ASKED THAT THEY TAKE A DELAY ON DEP AND BE SURE THE REPAIRS WERE COMPLETED. AT THIS TIME I WAS TOLD THAT THIS COULD BE DONE, BUT THE DELAY CODE WOULD BE 60. THIS REPAIR AND TEST WAS COMPLETED APPROX 10 MINS PRIOR TO DEP. AFTER THIS ACFT WAS SIGNED READY FOR SVC, I ACCEPTED IT. DURING TAXI I DID A STEERING TEST AND HAD AN AMBER STEERING FAIL LIGHT, BUT I HAD NO ERRATIC STEERING DEVIATIONS. I POSITIONED THE ACFT OUT OF THE TFC FLOW AND CALLED GND AND THEN COMPANY. I EXPLAINED MY PROB IN DETAIL TO MAINT. THEY TOLD ME THAT IT WAS A MEL ITEM, AND THAT I COULD RENDER THE SYS INOP AND GO AT MY DISCRETION. I INQUIRED, 'HOW?' I WAS TOLD 'PULL THE BREAKER AND POS ARMING SWITCH TO OFF.' I ASKED WHAT THEY COULD DO IF I BROUGHT IT BACK IN AND WAS TOLD THE SAME THING. MAINT ASSURED ME THE LIGHT WAS JUST A MALFUNCTIONING PRESSURE SWITCH. BASED ON MY CONVERSATION WITH THE PREVIOUS CAPT, THE FACT THAT I HAD NO HARD STEERING CHANGES AND MAINT ASSURANCE, I ELECTED TO COMPLETE THE TRIP W/O STEERING. AFTER TKOF I STILL HAD SOME CONCERN ABOUT MY SITUATION, SO I AGAIN TALKED TO MAINT BY RADIO ASKING ABOUT THE ODDS OF HAVING A HARDOVER AFTER INOPPING THE SYS IN THIS MANNER. I WAS TOLD 'SLIM.' UPON LNDG AT PAH AT NOSE WHEEL T/D, THE ACFT VEERED VIOLENTLY TO THE LEFT. I APPLIED FULL RIGHT RUDDER AND FULL RIGHT REVERSE. WE STOPPED APPROX 50' FROM THE RWY IN THE MUD. PAX WERE PROPERLY EVACUATED AND TAKEN TO STATION MGMNT. I THEN COMMUNICATED WITH PROPER OFFICIALS IN NASHVILLE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: REF TO DELAY CODE #60 WAS MGMNT WAY OF TAKING COERCIVE ACTION AGAINST THE FLT CREW. #60 WOULD BE CHARGED AS A FLT CREW DELAY AND THE CAPT WOULD BE ACCOUNTABLE. AN FAA REVIEW WAS CONDUCTED AND MAINT NOW CHANGES THE ENTIRE 3 PART NOSE WHEEL STEERING CTL INSTEAD OF JUST THE PRESSURE SWITCH. CAPT SAYS HE HAS NO PROB ACCEPTING THE ACFT WITH A CASTERING NOSE WHEEL BUT NOW INSISTS THE HYD PRESSURE BE DISCONNECTED FROM THE NOSE WHEEL ALONG WITH THE ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL PWR. IN THIS INCIDENT THE ELECTRICAL WARNING SYS WAS DISCONNECTED BUT NOT THE HYD ACTUATING PRESSURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.