Narrative:

Although I was scheduled as the relief pilot on the flight; I was in the right seat acting as the first officer so as to update my landing currency. On takeoff; at rotation after V1; both myself and the captain noticed a large 'crow' type bird flying low over the runway in line with the left engine. I even commented 'there is a bird'. Rotation and liftoff felt normal; I paid special attention to the left engine and didn't notice any fluctuations; but had most of my attention on flying the airplane. We could smell the result of the bird being ingested by the engine. On the departure; we noticed that the indicated fan vibration was high over 4 with the highest observed of 4.2; and the egt temperature and N2 indications higher than the right engine. Max egt on climb-out I observed was 790. Elected to level off at FL240 to check things out; in level flight; indications were only slightly above normal with the power reduced. I flew and handled radio calls from ATC while the captain and first officer referenced checklists and manuals for applicable items. I made a radio call to tower and told them of a possible bird strike. Captain used sat phone and contacted dispatch and maintenance control. After relaying our situation; the smell; and engine indications; the person at maintenance control stated that engine would require a 'core inspection' after landing; but we should continue our flight. At the time; I found this advice made me very nervous. We discussed the situation in the cockpit and decided that we did not feel comfortable taking an airplane across the atlantic with a known engine problem. We were informed by ATC that they had found bird parts after a runway inspection at the departure airport. [We elected to divert] after declaring an emergency with ATC. Accomplished appropriate checklists in route and made a normal landing with clear skies and 10 knots of crosswind. After landing; cleared the runway and told the arff chief via radio that we no longer required their services. Taxied to the hard stand uneventfully. After landing; the maintenance personal were immediately examining the engine; they found a significant amount of bird parts in the engine and a large dent in the lower left of the engine cowling. After seeing the bird parts; and engine damage I became very angry that after contacting the so-called 'experts' at maintenance control; the man actually suggested more than once that we should take an airplane full of passengers over 3;000 miles across the north atlantic with known engine damage. He felt the damage was 'within limits'. Action should be taken to correct this situation from occurring in the future; and to determine if this 'take chances and press on' attitude is a problem only with this individual; or system wide at maintenance control. I will now forever be skeptical of their advice.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 flight crew reports a bird strike at rotation that results in a smell in the cockpit and N1 vibration of 4.2. After discussion with Maintenance Control; who suggests continuing to destination across the North Atlantic; the crew elects to divert to a suitable alternate. Damage to the left engine cowl is apparent on post flight.

Narrative: Although I was scheduled as the relief pilot on the flight; I was in the right seat acting as the First Officer so as to update my landing currency. On takeoff; at rotation after V1; both myself and the Captain noticed a large 'crow' type bird flying low over the runway in line with the left engine. I even commented 'there is a bird'. Rotation and liftoff felt normal; I paid special attention to the left engine and didn't notice any fluctuations; but had most of my attention on flying the airplane. We could smell the result of the bird being ingested by the engine. On the departure; we noticed that the indicated fan vibration was high over 4 with the highest observed of 4.2; and the EGT temperature and N2 indications higher than the right engine. Max EGT on climb-out I observed was 790. Elected to level off at FL240 to check things out; in level flight; indications were only slightly above normal with the power reduced. I flew and handled radio calls from ATC while the Captain and First Officer referenced checklists and manuals for applicable items. I made a radio call to Tower and told them of a possible bird strike. Captain used SAT phone and contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control. After relaying our situation; the smell; and engine indications; the person at Maintenance Control stated that engine would require a 'core inspection' after landing; but we should continue our flight. At the time; I found this advice made me very nervous. We discussed the situation in the cockpit and decided that we did not feel comfortable taking an airplane across the Atlantic with a known engine problem. We were informed by ATC that they had found bird parts after a runway inspection at the departure airport. [We elected to divert] after declaring an Emergency with ATC. Accomplished appropriate checklists in route and made a normal landing with clear skies and 10 knots of crosswind. After landing; cleared the runway and told the ARFF chief via radio that we no longer required their services. Taxied to the hard stand uneventfully. After landing; the maintenance personal were immediately examining the engine; they found a significant amount of bird parts in the engine and a large dent in the lower left of the engine cowling. After seeing the bird parts; and engine damage I became very angry that after contacting the so-called 'experts' at Maintenance Control; the man actually suggested more than once that we should take an airplane full of passengers over 3;000 miles across the North Atlantic with known engine damage. He felt the damage was 'within limits'. Action should be taken to correct this situation from occurring in the future; and to determine if this 'take chances and press on' attitude is a problem only with this individual; or system wide at Maintenance Control. I will now forever be skeptical of their advice.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.