Narrative:

Departed atl at xa and was given clearance to 10000' by atl departure. While passing through 5800' I noticed the red master caution cap panel lights flashing accompanied by the left on #1 engine red oil pressure light. (Oil pressure under 50 psi.) I then cancelled the red master warning lights. I notified the first officer of our conditions. I then looked at the #1 engine oil pressure gauge and saw 30 psi. The first officer concurred with me on the 30 psi reading on the #1 engine oil pressure gauge. I then called for the abnormal engine indication checklist. Meanwhile, I glanced at the #1 engine oil pressure gauge and saw 0 psi. All other engine indications appeared normal. We had already advised ATC that we had a problem and he leveled at 6000'. The first officer accomplished the abnormal engine indication checklist and as per that checklist I called for a precautionary engine shutdown for #1 engine. I then advised ATC that we had an emergency and did declare an emergency. ATC vectored us for the ILS 9R atl and we landed west/O further incident. This situation turned out well for us and our passenger because the first officer and I worked as a team. We verified all that was seen on the cap panel and on the left engine oil pressure gauge. I flew the airplane and he accomplished the checklists as well as working with approach and tower. What I am trying to say is that crew concept really works. I am glad that my instrs at the commuter I work for stressed crew coordination to me during upgrade training. I feel it was worth its weight. When we got to the ramp and unloaded the passenger, a mechanic met us at the airplane. I explained what had happened and he uncowled the left or #1 engine. He checked the oil and it was full I then wrote the engine up as I have done in the first part of this report noting the oil pressure readings on the #1 engine gauge. The mechanic could not see anything that looked out of place. He then started the engine up and could not duplicate an oil pressure problem. The aircraft was taken to a blast pad and ran at 100% RPM and 95% torque for an hour still west/O any oil pressure problem. Another captain was asked to fly it as a test flight to an out station and back. He did so west/O a problem. So the aircraft was returned to service. Now I am also a licensed airframe and power plant mechanic and have 5 yrs of maintenance experience. I have learned that this type of problem does not just fix itself. I am told by some maintenance people where I work that the oil pump must have cavitated for a bit. I disagree! I feel that there is a piece of dirt running around inside the engine that will surface again. The engine should be worked on a little more in depth than just taking a look inside the cowling and running it up and test flying. The whole oil system should have been checked out. The whole point is that I feel that FAA should be looking for the way that maintenance crews find easy ways to get out of what really should be done rather than just signing something off as 'could not duplicate.' thank you.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PRECAUTIONARY SHUTDOWN OF #1 ENGINE DUE TO INDICATION OF LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE.

Narrative: DEPARTED ATL AT XA AND WAS GIVEN CLRNC TO 10000' BY ATL DEP. WHILE PASSING THROUGH 5800' I NOTICED THE RED MASTER CAUTION CAP PANEL LIGHTS FLASHING ACCOMPANIED BY THE LEFT ON #1 ENG RED OIL PRESSURE LIGHT. (OIL PRESSURE UNDER 50 PSI.) I THEN CANCELLED THE RED MASTER WARNING LIGHTS. I NOTIFIED THE F/O OF OUR CONDITIONS. I THEN LOOKED AT THE #1 ENG OIL PRESSURE GAUGE AND SAW 30 PSI. THE F/O CONCURRED WITH ME ON THE 30 PSI READING ON THE #1 ENG OIL PRESSURE GAUGE. I THEN CALLED FOR THE ABNORMAL ENG INDICATION CHKLIST. MEANWHILE, I GLANCED AT THE #1 ENG OIL PRESSURE GAUGE AND SAW 0 PSI. ALL OTHER ENG INDICATIONS APPEARED NORMAL. WE HAD ALREADY ADVISED ATC THAT WE HAD A PROB AND HE LEVELED AT 6000'. THE F/O ACCOMPLISHED THE ABNORMAL ENG INDICATION CHKLIST AND AS PER THAT CHKLIST I CALLED FOR A PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN FOR #1 ENG. I THEN ADVISED ATC THAT WE HAD AN EMER AND DID DECLARE AN EMER. ATC VECTORED US FOR THE ILS 9R ATL AND WE LANDED W/O FURTHER INCIDENT. THIS SITUATION TURNED OUT WELL FOR US AND OUR PAX BECAUSE THE F/O AND I WORKED AS A TEAM. WE VERIFIED ALL THAT WAS SEEN ON THE CAP PANEL AND ON THE LEFT ENG OIL PRESSURE GAUGE. I FLEW THE AIRPLANE AND HE ACCOMPLISHED THE CHKLISTS AS WELL AS WORKING WITH APCH AND TWR. WHAT I AM TRYING TO SAY IS THAT CREW CONCEPT REALLY WORKS. I AM GLAD THAT MY INSTRS AT THE COMMUTER I WORK FOR STRESSED CREW COORD TO ME DURING UPGRADE TRNING. I FEEL IT WAS WORTH ITS WEIGHT. WHEN WE GOT TO THE RAMP AND UNLOADED THE PAX, A MECH MET US AT THE AIRPLANE. I EXPLAINED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND HE UNCOWLED THE LEFT OR #1 ENG. HE CHKED THE OIL AND IT WAS FULL I THEN WROTE THE ENG UP AS I HAVE DONE IN THE FIRST PART OF THIS RPT NOTING THE OIL PRESSURE READINGS ON THE #1 ENG GAUGE. THE MECH COULD NOT SEE ANYTHING THAT LOOKED OUT OF PLACE. HE THEN STARTED THE ENG UP AND COULD NOT DUPLICATE AN OIL PRESSURE PROB. THE ACFT WAS TAKEN TO A BLAST PAD AND RAN AT 100% RPM AND 95% TORQUE FOR AN HR STILL W/O ANY OIL PRESSURE PROB. ANOTHER CAPT WAS ASKED TO FLY IT AS A TEST FLT TO AN OUT STATION AND BACK. HE DID SO W/O A PROB. SO THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC. NOW I AM ALSO A LICENSED AIRFRAME AND POWER PLANT MECH AND HAVE 5 YRS OF MAINT EXPERIENCE. I HAVE LEARNED THAT THIS TYPE OF PROB DOES NOT JUST FIX ITSELF. I AM TOLD BY SOME MAINT PEOPLE WHERE I WORK THAT THE OIL PUMP MUST HAVE CAVITATED FOR A BIT. I DISAGREE! I FEEL THAT THERE IS A PIECE OF DIRT RUNNING AROUND INSIDE THE ENG THAT WILL SURFACE AGAIN. THE ENG SHOULD BE WORKED ON A LITTLE MORE IN DEPTH THAN JUST TAKING A LOOK INSIDE THE COWLING AND RUNNING IT UP AND TEST FLYING. THE WHOLE OIL SYS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHKED OUT. THE WHOLE POINT IS THAT I FEEL THAT FAA SHOULD BE LOOKING FOR THE WAY THAT MAINT CREWS FIND EASY WAYS TO GET OUT OF WHAT REALLY SHOULD BE DONE RATHER THAN JUST SIGNING SOMETHING OFF AS 'COULD NOT DUPLICATE.' THANK YOU.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.