Narrative:

November 2012; my first officer (first officer) and I reported to the gate at ZZZ1 to conduct a revenue flight. Upon arrival we were informed the inbound crew (from ZZZ) had found a fuel leak; and that the aircraft had just gotten out of maintenance for a [fuel] booster pump replacement. We inspected the aircraft and saw the leak; from the wheel well area of the right main gear. It was collecting on the bottom of the fairing at the edge; and dripping from three areas at a combined rate of approximately four very large drops a second. A short time later the mechanic said he had found the leak and would attempt to tighten the connection. When he did this; the leak worsened. A short time later; I was then called by scheduling and informed we were to ferry the plane to ZZZ. I called maintenance control and was told the mechanic would drain the center tank; seal the barrel connector and we could ferry. I contacted the base chief pilot (C/P) to review this procedure; and then trainer X in the training department. Both felt it was safe as described; although trainer X made it clear there should be absolutely no fluid of any kind dripping before the flight was initiated. At approximately xa:30am local; the first officer was checking the plane while the flight attendant (F/a) and I got lunch. He texted me that the fuel was pooling on the ground; and he initiated the fuel containment through the proper channels which was accomplished. Two additional bags of containment sand were left; approximately 50 lbs. Each. A few hours later we sat under the plane with the mechanic and he showed us where the fuel was running down and pooling in the wheel well before running over the side of the fairing. He stated he had drained the tank; and the fuel could not be coming from the tank as any small residual fuel would have been exhausted. He also had informed my first officer that the specified sealant could not be found; so he had used a different sealant. Subsequently; the leak was not stopped; and for the remainder of the day I exchanged updates with the ZZZ2 base cp via text. At no time did I feel the cp was pressuring me to do anything I thought unsafe; and in fact a few times iterated that I should not do anything I thought unsafe. Scheduling called sometime late afternoon and said we were to taxi the plane to the hangar (as our operations part of our air carrier [parent company] did not have a tug sufficient to pull the plane there). I informed them that the fuel leak would have to be stopped first. The ZZZ2 cp supported my decision; although it was clear that moving the plane without taxi would be extremely difficult to coordinate. This was early evening local; and my first officer and I then waited for scheduling to call with our subsequent assignment; or hotel. Approximately 90-minutes later; I received at text from cp that he was contacting someone in training to see if they thought taxi with the leak was safe. Within a couple minutes I received a call from scheduling directing us again to taxi the aircraft to the hangar. I then called trainer X again; and he said the training department's position was as follows: I should not do anything I felt unsafe; and that a leak of even a very small magnitude was grounds for not taxiing the aircraft. He was very emphatic about this; and I relayed to the cp and that I would not taxi the plane. Approximately 90-minutes later; we were still awaiting a call from scheduling; and I contacted the cp and he was briefing operations director X. Approximately twenty minutes later we received a text from the cp that the operations director X had accepted my decision; and approximately 30-minutes later we got a hotel from scheduling; with a 9-hour rest period. The next morning we reported at xa:15am. I called maintenance control to find out the status and location of the aircraft. They said the aircraft had been repaired; and was at the hangar. I requested a van from the gate area. When I arrived at the gate area the aircraft was there. The leak was still present; and now flowing at just short of a stream. It also appeared from the fuel containment material around the wheel that neither the aircraft had been moved nor had any work done - the material was soaked; but undisturbed. Also the mechanic had stated there were three mechanics at the base; one had called out sick and he; the mechanic; was working a double shift ending later that night. The third mechanic was coming on that morning. I relayed this status to maintenance control. They called back 10-minutes later and asked that I power the aircraft and give them the center fuel tank reading. I stated that while I wanted to help; the mechanic the prior day had directed us not to power the plane at all; and that I would leave any work to the mechanic on site due to the dangerous nature of the fuel leak and the source not being known. When the new mechanic arrived; he decided the sealant had not been done with a dry surface; and he re-initiated the process with the proper sealant. He did not address the fact that the main tank had been drained over 16-hours prior; and the leak was still aggressive; indicative of the leak coming from a different location. The first officer and I got something to eat. When we returned to the aircraft; the APU was running. The first officer went into the plane while I inspected the leak again. We met a minute later and started to discuss the leak. After approximately two minutes; the first officer asked where the mechanic was; and I replied I had assumed he was on the aircraft. We walked around the plane; and at that time the mechanic pulled up in the company vehicle. It was clear he had left the aircraft unattended; with the APU running; and an active fuel leak. It should be noted that this area is a high traffic area where passengers come within 20-50 feet of this aircraft while they board other aircraft; which are also within 20-feet of this aircraft. Scheduling subsequently called and requested we taxi the aircraft to the hangar. I told them of the prior days events; and that I would not operate the aircraft in any manner as long as the fuel leak was present. We were then scheduled for a deadhead flight to ZZZ2. Before departing; we talked to a different crew that had been asked to taxi the aircraft to the hangar on their three hour layover; but had found the fuel leak themselves and declined the taxi. Threats [were] fire due to fuel leak during taxi. Either because of acceptance of the risk or because a subsequent crew was not aware of the risk. Fire; due to fuel leak and aircraft left unattended by maintenance with the APU operating.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Captain reports about their Scheduling Department's effort to have him taxi their CRJ-200 aircraft to a company hangar with a running fuel leak from the right inboard wing area near the aircraft's main wheel well.

Narrative: November 2012; my First Officer (F/O) and I reported to the gate at ZZZ1 to conduct a revenue flight. Upon arrival we were informed the inbound crew (from ZZZ) had found a fuel leak; and that the aircraft had just gotten out of maintenance for a [fuel] booster pump replacement. We inspected the aircraft and saw the leak; from the wheel well area of the right main gear. It was collecting on the bottom of the fairing at the edge; and dripping from three areas at a combined rate of approximately four very large drops a second. A short time later the Mechanic said he had found the leak and would attempt to tighten the connection. When he did this; the leak worsened. A short time later; I was then called by Scheduling and informed we were to ferry the plane to ZZZ. I called Maintenance Control and was told the Mechanic would drain the center tank; seal the barrel connector and we could ferry. I contacted the base Chief Pilot (C/P) to review this procedure; and then Trainer X in the Training department. Both felt it was safe as described; although Trainer X made it clear there should be absolutely no fluid of any kind dripping before the flight was initiated. At approximately XA:30am local; the First Officer was checking the plane while the Flight Attendant (F/A) and I got lunch. He texted me that the fuel was pooling on the ground; and he initiated the fuel containment through the proper channels which was accomplished. Two additional bags of containment sand were left; approximately 50 lbs. each. A few hours later we sat under the plane with the Mechanic and he showed us where the fuel was running down and pooling in the wheel well before running over the side of the fairing. He stated he had drained the tank; and the fuel could not be coming from the tank as any small residual fuel would have been exhausted. He also had informed my First Officer that the specified sealant could not be found; so he had used a different sealant. Subsequently; the leak was not stopped; and for the remainder of the day I exchanged updates with the ZZZ2 Base CP via text. At no time did I feel the CP was pressuring me to do anything I thought unsafe; and in fact a few times iterated that I should not do anything I thought unsafe. Scheduling called sometime late afternoon and said we were to taxi the plane to the hangar (as our operations part of our Air Carrier [parent company] did not have a tug sufficient to pull the plane there). I informed them that the fuel leak would have to be stopped first. The ZZZ2 CP supported my decision; although it was clear that moving the plane without taxi would be extremely difficult to coordinate. This was early evening local; and my First Officer and I then waited for Scheduling to call with our subsequent assignment; or hotel. Approximately 90-minutes later; I received at text from CP that he was contacting someone in training to see if they thought taxi with the leak was safe. Within a couple minutes I received a call from Scheduling directing us again to taxi the aircraft to the hangar. I then called Trainer X again; and he said the Training Department's position was as follows: I should not do anything I felt unsafe; and that a leak of even a very small magnitude was grounds for not taxiing the aircraft. He was very emphatic about this; and I relayed to the CP and that I would not taxi the plane. Approximately 90-minutes later; we were still awaiting a call from Scheduling; and I contacted the CP and he was briefing Operations Director X. Approximately twenty minutes later we received a text from the CP that the Operations Director X had accepted my decision; and approximately 30-minutes later we got a hotel from Scheduling; with a 9-hour rest period. The next morning we reported at XA:15am. I called Maintenance Control to find out the status and location of the aircraft. They said the aircraft had been repaired; and was at the hangar. I requested a van from the gate area. When I arrived at the gate area the aircraft was there. The leak was still present; and now flowing at just short of a stream. It also appeared from the fuel containment material around the wheel that neither the aircraft had been moved nor had any work done - the material was soaked; but undisturbed. Also the Mechanic had stated there were three mechanics at the Base; one had called out sick and he; the Mechanic; was working a double shift ending later that night. The third Mechanic was coming on that morning. I relayed this status to Maintenance Control. They called back 10-minutes later and asked that I power the aircraft and give them the center fuel tank reading. I stated that while I wanted to help; the Mechanic the prior day had directed us NOT to power the plane at all; and that I would leave any work to the Mechanic on site due to the dangerous nature of the fuel leak and the source not being known. When the new Mechanic arrived; he decided the sealant had not been done with a dry surface; and he re-initiated the process with the proper sealant. He did not address the fact that the main tank had been drained over 16-hours prior; and the leak was still aggressive; indicative of the leak coming from a different location. The First Officer and I got something to eat. When we returned to the aircraft; the APU was running. The First Officer went into the plane while I inspected the leak again. We met a minute later and started to discuss the leak. After approximately two minutes; the First Officer asked where the Mechanic was; and I replied I had assumed he was on the aircraft. We walked around the plane; and at that time the Mechanic pulled up in the company vehicle. It was clear he had left the aircraft unattended; with the APU running; and an active fuel leak. It should be noted that this area is a high traffic area where passengers come within 20-50 feet of this aircraft while they board other aircraft; which are also within 20-feet of this aircraft. Scheduling subsequently called and requested we taxi the aircraft to the hangar. I told them of the prior days events; and that I would not operate the aircraft in any manner as long as the fuel leak was present. We were then scheduled for a deadhead flight to ZZZ2. Before departing; we talked to a different crew that had been asked to taxi the aircraft to the hangar on their three hour layover; but had found the fuel leak themselves and declined the taxi. Threats [were] fire due to fuel leak during taxi. Either because of acceptance of the risk or because a subsequent crew was not aware of the risk. Fire; due to fuel leak and aircraft left unattended by Maintenance with the APU operating.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.