Narrative:

During preflight; 15 minutes before pushback; we were sent an ACARS message about using the fom section for dry ice; but there was no mention of the dry ice. After I called the dispatcher; I understood there was dry ice in the forward belly requiring the supplemental dry ice procedures; and forward lower compartment air conditioning. My first officer got the fom out and we started running through the procedures. I calculated the extra burn around 120 pounds. The dispatcher sent his calculations and they agreed. When I talked to the dispatcher; I asked when were they told about the dry ice addition in the forward lower belly and the dispatcher said he was just told. I asked the ramp agent and he said they told operation control over an hour before. The APU was not started and the packs were not turned on before we arrived at the aircraft. I do not know when the dry ice was loaded in the forward belly. I did turn on the APU and packs during my preflight due to cockpit temps. I called the dispatcher again as we went through the fom procedures to ensure maintenance would be available to 'catch' the aircraft upon arrival due to the APU being left on and the packs running per the procedures. I was told by my dispatcher that the 777 desk was told about the requirement. Upon arrival; maintenance did not know about the dry ice and the requirements. The load team did not vent the forward lower compartment prior to unloading. All in all; it seemed like there was little to no coordination pertaining to supplemental dry ice procedures for this flight.cause: it appears there was little to no coordination between the ramp agent/load team; maintenance and operations control while using the supplemental dry ice procedures to carry more dry ice in the forward lower belly.suggestions: early notification and compliance to fom supplemental dry ice procedures. The ramp; operational control and maintenance need to have a positive challenge and response set of procedures for events like this (I would like to see a checklist that is initialed by each responsible party for flights like this). Dry ice can kill in unvented compartments. The reason to have supplemental procedures is to keep people safe while carrying extra dry ice. If this becomes a procedure that is not followed precisely; people can be killed. Please keep from having this procedure diluted further.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B-777-200 Captain reported a communication breakdown between flight crew and three ground departments regarding Dry Ice Procedure requirements; specifically Ventilation.

Narrative: During preflight; 15 minutes before pushback; we were sent an ACARS message about using the FOM section for dry ice; but there was no mention of the dry ice. After I called the dispatcher; I understood there was dry ice in the forward belly requiring the supplemental dry ice procedures; and forward lower compartment air conditioning. My First Officer got the FOM out and we started running through the procedures. I calculated the extra burn around 120 pounds. The dispatcher sent his calculations and they agreed. When I talked to the dispatcher; I asked when were they told about the dry ice addition in the forward lower belly and the dispatcher said he was just told. I asked the ramp agent and he said they told Operation Control over an hour before. The APU was not started and the packs were not turned on before we arrived at the aircraft. I do not know when the dry ice was loaded in the forward belly. I did turn on the APU and packs during my preflight due to cockpit temps. I called the dispatcher again as we went through the FOM procedures to ensure Maintenance would be available to 'catch' the aircraft upon arrival due to the APU being left on and the packs running per the procedures. I was told by my dispatcher that the 777 desk was told about the requirement. Upon arrival; Maintenance did not know about the dry ice and the requirements. The load team did not vent the forward lower compartment prior to unloading. All in all; it seemed like there was little to no coordination pertaining to supplemental dry ice procedures for this flight.Cause: It appears there was little to no coordination between the ramp agent/load team; Maintenance and Operations Control while using the supplemental dry ice procedures to carry more dry ice in the forward lower belly.Suggestions: Early notification and compliance to FOM supplemental dry ice procedures. The ramp; Operational Control and Maintenance need to have a positive challenge and response set of procedures for events like this (I would like to see a checklist that is initialed by each responsible party for flights like this). Dry ice can kill in unvented compartments. The reason to have supplemental procedures is to keep people safe while carrying extra dry ice. If this becomes a procedure that is not followed precisely; people can be killed. Please keep from having this procedure diluted further.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.