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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1052695 |
Time | |
Date | 201212 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Widebody Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Route In Use | None |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation |
Narrative:
Hazmat was improperly loaded in the aft belly (wet filled batteries with alkali). It was not blocked and braced nor was it in a position to prevent movement. As captain of the flight; I queried the ground side loading crew; the load supervisor and the belly load supervisor if the hazmat loaded in the aft belly was blocked and braced and both the load supervisor and the belly loading supervisor both stated that the 'packages were properly loaded'. I questioned it in the first place when I received the hazmat paperwork and the weight and balance and noticed that there was only 259 pounds of volume loose loaded in the compartment with hazmat. I requested to have a belt loader brought up to the compartment so I could inspect the packages as it is a sizable compartment with a small weight load inside. Upon entering the compartment I witnessed that the hazmat packages were loose on the floor of the compartment and not secured and in fact one of the packages had its orientation arrows already pointed horizontal and not vertical. I asked the belly load supervisor why he stated to me that the hazmat was 'blocked and braced' when I directly asked him when in fact the packages were not loaded properly. He indicated he did not load it and it was his crew that completed it. He acknowledged it was not properly loaded. The load supervisor who brought the paperwork to the cockpit said the same thing that 'he did not load it' but he insisted it was loaded properly when I questioned him and was reluctant to take a delay to have me inspect it. I believe there is a systemic problem and one I suspect that the load crews have been trained to answer a crew members question of the load with a 'blind' statement that the hazmat is properly loaded. Neither of these individuals had direct knowledge of whether the load was properly loaded but both of them replied it was. This is a major problem! I would much rather hear that they 'do not know' than to be misled that they had direct knowledge it was loaded properly when it was not. The belly load supervisor then corrected the problem and secured the volume between the parts for maintenance box and the separation curtain. It was loaded in a manner that would prevent any shifting. This was satisfactory in my opinion and compliant with our hazmat procedures. This was how it should have been loaded not how I initially observed the load when entering the compartment. After a mechanical delay we departed without incident. This is the third documented incident I have encountered with the same circumstances. All of these incidents occurred in four different gateways and in all of the cases when the load crews were questioned about it they all claimed the loads were 'properly loaded; blocked and braced' without first hand knowledge of any of the loading. In each case I inspected the load and found them to not be properly loaded despite the assurances of the load crews. This seriously shakes my trust in what they have been trained on with regards to hazmat loading procedures as well as potentially what they have been trained to tell crew members who question the loading; possibly to avoid delays. People's lives are at risk! It also is an integrity issue and brings into question the safety of the hazmat program and the safety of our airline. A danger goods manager responded to my comment: 'to answer your question regarding how a dangerous goods (dg) not secured in the loose belly was considered in compliance with our FAA approved hazmat program - - simply stated; it was not. Dg must be secured in a manner that will prevent shifting or any change in orientation. Our procedures specifically state; 'in the event that there is not enough cargo or freight to block and brace the dangerous goods packages to prevent movement in all directions (side to side; forward and aft); they must be either moved to another position on the aircraft where enough volume is available or they must be removed from the aircraft.' to your second question about why the load crew indicated the packages were loaded correctly when you asked them directly - - in my opinion; and from a review of the interviews conducted; the employee who loaded the packages in the belly felt she had loaded the package according to procedures based on her understanding of the requirement (she explained in detail how she had loaded the package in her interview). Unfortunately; she did not understand the package needed to be secured on all sides. The supervisors took the word of the loader that the packages were properly loaded.' I believe it should become one of our highest priorities; especially in light of the recent NTSB recommendations regarding aircraft fires; lithium batteries and possible hazardous material.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A cargo company Captain described a systemic disregard for properly securing HAZMAT in the aircraft cargo bay and a lack of supervisory accountability when errors are detected.
Narrative: HAZMAT was improperly loaded in the aft belly (wet filled batteries with Alkali). It was not blocked and braced nor was it in a position to prevent movement. As Captain of the flight; I queried the ground side loading crew; the load Supervisor and the belly load Supervisor if the HAZMAT loaded in the aft belly was blocked and braced and both the load Supervisor and the belly loading Supervisor both stated that the 'packages were properly loaded'. I questioned it in the first place when I received the HAZMAT paperwork and the Weight and Balance and noticed that there was only 259 LBS of volume loose loaded in the compartment with HAZMAT. I requested to have a belt loader brought up to the compartment so I could inspect the packages as it is a sizable compartment with a small weight load inside. Upon entering the compartment I witnessed that the HAZMAT packages were loose on the floor of the compartment and not secured and in fact one of the packages had its orientation arrows already pointed horizontal and not vertical. I asked the belly load Supervisor why he stated to me that the HAZMAT was 'blocked and braced' when I directly asked him when in fact the packages were not loaded properly. He indicated he did not load it and it was his crew that completed it. He acknowledged it was not properly loaded. The Load Supervisor who brought the paperwork to the cockpit said the same thing that 'he did not load it' but he insisted it was loaded properly when I questioned him and was reluctant to take a delay to have me inspect it. I believe there is a systemic problem and one I suspect that the load crews have been trained to answer a crew members question of the load with a 'blind' statement that the HAZMAT is properly loaded. Neither of these individuals had direct knowledge of whether the load was properly loaded but both of them replied it was. This is a major problem! I would much rather hear that they 'do not know' than to be misled that they had direct knowledge it was loaded properly when it was not. The belly load Supervisor then corrected the problem and secured the volume between the parts for maintenance box and the separation curtain. It was loaded in a manner that would prevent any shifting. This was satisfactory in my opinion and compliant with our HAZMAT procedures. This was how it should have been loaded not how I initially observed the load when entering the compartment. After a mechanical delay we departed without incident. This is the third documented incident I have encountered with the same circumstances. All of these incidents occurred in four different gateways and in all of the cases when the load crews were questioned about it they all claimed the loads were 'properly loaded; blocked and braced' without first hand knowledge of any of the loading. In each case I inspected the load and found them to not be properly loaded despite the assurances of the load crews. This seriously shakes my trust in what they have been trained on with regards to HAZMAT loading procedures as well as potentially what they have been trained to tell crew members who question the loading; possibly to avoid delays. People's lives are at risk! It also is an integrity issue and brings into question the safety of the HAZMAT program and the safety of our airline. A Danger Goods Manager responded to my comment: 'To answer your question regarding how a dangerous goods (DG) not secured in the loose belly was considered in compliance with our FAA Approved HAZMAT Program - - simply stated; it was not. DG must be secured in a manner that will prevent shifting or any change in orientation. Our procedures specifically state; 'In the event that there is not enough cargo or freight to block and brace the dangerous goods packages to prevent movement in all directions (side to side; forward and aft); they must be either moved to another position on the aircraft where enough volume is available or they must be removed from the aircraft.' To your second question about why the load crew indicated the packages were loaded correctly when you asked them directly - - in my opinion; and from a review of the interviews conducted; the employee who loaded the packages in the belly felt she had loaded the package according to procedures based on her understanding of the requirement (she explained in detail how she had loaded the package in her interview). Unfortunately; she did not understand the package needed to be secured on all sides. The supervisors took the word of the loader that the packages were properly loaded.' I believe it should become one of our highest priorities; especially in light of the recent NTSB recommendations regarding aircraft fires; lithium batteries and possible hazardous material.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.