Narrative:

In cruise flight; we received east(1) hyd low 1 EICAS message. Noted and monitored hydraulic level. Level decreased as flight continued to destination. EICAS message east(1) hyd fail received after requesting vectors for at least 10 miles final. Pressure in hydraulic system 1 was approaching close to 0 psi. Crew briefing initiated from captain; starting from receiving the initial advisory EICAS message leading to the requested vectors for an extended final; and what course of action we should perform in the event of hydraulic 1 failure at each stage of the approach. As briefed we lowered the landing gear; the hydraulic 1 fail message disappeared momentarily during landing gear extension; but soon returned within 15-30 seconds after extension and the decision; as we had briefed; to abort the landing attempt and divert to a nearby airport which we had briefed as a suitable alternate was initiated. During the go around; and appropriate call outs; gear retraction was attempted and the EICAS message lg disagree was received; and the gear remained in the extended position. The crew decided in the event of hydraulic 1 failure to cancel landing intentions and divert because ZZZ had runway construction; night conditions; non-standard runway markings; and was not grooved. ZZZ1 was a close alternate that provided adequate runway length; was not under construction; and had appropriate facilities; VFR conditions. We flew to ZZZ1 after initiating the go around procedure and radar vectors; flying at 200 KIAS or less and landed after declaring an emergency; and were towed to the gate. Enroute multiple crew briefings were performed to prepare both crew and passengers; and adequate time was allotted for both pilots and crew to complete briefings and prepare for landing. Appropriate QRH performed for hydraulic sys 1 fail; as well as precautionary emergency gear extend QRH performed. After landing; maintenance did find a leak in the hydraulic line on the first officer side main gear. Some overlapping of roles and communications; but ensured everything was covered. Overall I believe crew was briefed as soon as possible and kept updated with all information as it became available. Some duties were overlapped; but overall; we ensured everything was completed. All crew members verbally acknowledged they had completed appropriate briefings and tasks in preparation for landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 flight crew experiences a HYD 1 LOW QTY EICAS during cruise with normal pressure and elects to continue to destination. During approach after gear extension the system fails and the crew diverts to a nearby airport with longer and wider runways. An uneventful landing ensues and the aircraft is towed to the gate.

Narrative: In cruise flight; we received E(1) Hyd Low 1 EICAS message. Noted and monitored Hydraulic level. Level decreased as flight continued to destination. EICAS message E(1) Hyd Fail received after requesting vectors for at least 10 miles final. Pressure in HYD system 1 was approaching close to 0 psi. Crew briefing initiated from Captain; starting from receiving the initial advisory EICAS message leading to the requested vectors for an extended final; and what course of action we should perform in the event of hydraulic 1 failure at each stage of the approach. As briefed we lowered the landing gear; the HYD 1 FAIL message disappeared momentarily during landing gear extension; but soon returned within 15-30 seconds after extension and the decision; as we had briefed; to abort the landing attempt and divert to a nearby airport which we had briefed as a suitable alternate was initiated. During the go around; and appropriate call outs; gear retraction was attempted and the EICAS message LG Disagree was received; and the gear remained in the extended position. The crew decided in the event of HYD 1 failure to cancel landing intentions and divert because ZZZ had runway construction; night conditions; non-standard runway markings; and was not grooved. ZZZ1 was a close alternate that provided adequate runway length; was not under construction; and had appropriate facilities; VFR conditions. We flew to ZZZ1 after initiating the go around procedure and radar vectors; flying at 200 KIAS or less and landed after declaring an emergency; and were towed to the gate. Enroute multiple crew briefings were performed to prepare both crew and passengers; and adequate time was allotted for both pilots and crew to complete briefings and prepare for landing. Appropriate QRH performed for HYD Sys 1 Fail; as well as precautionary Emergency gear extend QRH performed. After landing; Maintenance did find a leak in the hydraulic line on the First Officer side main gear. Some overlapping of roles and communications; but ensured everything was covered. Overall I believe crew was briefed as soon as possible and kept updated with all information as it became available. Some duties were overlapped; but overall; we ensured everything was completed. All crew members verbally acknowledged they had completed appropriate briefings and tasks in preparation for landing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.