Narrative:

The aircraft experienced a loss of the green hydraulic system quantity. ECAM alerted crew to the failure. We were climbing through FL200 toward level off at FL230. Captain was the pilot flying; first officer was pilot monitoring. We completed the ECAM directed items and coordinated a return to the departure airport. The captain declared an emergency. The crew completed the QRH procedures to configure the aircraft for landing and completed the in range; approach; and before landing checklists. Approach and landing was normal. The aircraft was stopped on the runway centerline and was met by airport emergency crews. The flight time was just 33 minutes. The APU was started; the aircraft remained illuminated while on the runway and emergency crews checked the aircraft. The emergency crews reported hydraulic fluid leaking from the landing gear area with no other problems. The emergency was terminated. The crew requested a maintenance tow in from the runway. After approximately 30 minutes on deck; maintenance arrived at the aircraft and towed the aircraft as directed by ramp control; emergency crews; and ground. This was a 'repeat' loss of the green hydraulic system fluid (complete according to the cockpit indications). Two previous write-ups regarding the slats in that they had required recycling the slat/flaps handle to operate properly. To mitigate the possible threat of a slat problem we configured early for the approach to the airport. With the green hydraulic problem slats and flaps are slow to operate anyway so the early configuration strategy worked well for the crew. Throughout the event; I thought our CRM was excellent. The first officer did an excellent job with the ECAM/QRH and alternate gear extension as well as the many other support details I requested of him. Coordination with the company was excellent. (It does take a while to get a tug out to the runway; but that was expected and no problem with ATC.) a minor navigation error was made after requesting direct to IAF for the approach; the pilot flying (captain) apparently failed to select the navigation button on the fcp. As we were direct to the airport at the time of the request we ended up .3 NM left of the direct to IAF course indicated on the nd. This error was captured by the crew and navigation was selected without prompt from ATC. Shortly thereafter we requested direct to FAF on the approach and clearance for the approach was received. Possible error - we called the QRH procedure 'complete' at the moment in flight we did in fact complete it. I directed that we briefly review it 'complete' again approximately 20 miles out as we were slowed and configured with the normal checklists completed. There is nothing in the QRH that directs that the landing gear be pinned after landing. As the captain; I failed to address my concern (after review of the QRH) about the issue with maintenance. The maintenance crew from the tug did not ask for our gear pins from the cockpit. If the gear is in fact supposed to be pinned and we; the crew; and maintenance missed it; I think it should be addressed in a note in the QRH. In hindsight; I would have requested to have the gear pinned. My main concern is that it was a 'repeat' failure of the green hydraulic system. Maintenance signed it off a couple of days earlier with a damaged packing replaced; a loose fitting found; and a gear swing. As the crew; we could not have prevented the failure; but maintenance I am sure (hope) will analyze this 'repeat' failure of the green hydraulic system; and the material and procedures used to repair and sign off the discrepancy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A310 Captain describes a return to base after losing the Green Hydraulic System due to fluid loss during climb. The failure was a repeat of the same anomaly; which had occurred a couple of days earlier.

Narrative: The aircraft experienced a loss of the Green Hydraulic System quantity. ECAM alerted crew to the failure. We were climbing through FL200 toward level off at FL230. Captain was the Pilot Flying; First officer was Pilot Monitoring. We completed the ECAM directed items and coordinated a return to the departure airport. The Captain declared an emergency. The crew completed the QRH procedures to configure the aircraft for landing and completed the IN RANGE; APPROACH; and BEFORE LANDING checklists. Approach and landing was normal. The aircraft was stopped on the runway centerline and was met by airport emergency crews. The flight time was just 33 minutes. The APU was started; the aircraft remained illuminated while on the runway and emergency crews checked the aircraft. The emergency crews reported hydraulic fluid leaking from the landing gear area with no other problems. The emergency was terminated. The crew requested a Maintenance tow in from the runway. After approximately 30 minutes on deck; Maintenance arrived at the aircraft and towed the aircraft as directed by Ramp Control; emergency crews; and Ground. This was a 'repeat' loss of the Green Hydraulic System fluid (complete according to the cockpit indications). Two previous write-ups regarding the Slats in that they had required recycling the Slat/Flaps handle to operate properly. To mitigate the possible threat of a slat problem we configured early for the approach to the airport. With the Green Hydraulic problem slats and flaps are slow to operate anyway so the early configuration strategy worked well for the crew. Throughout the event; I thought our CRM was excellent. The First Officer did an excellent job with the ECAM/QRH and alternate gear extension as well as the many other support details I requested of him. Coordination with the company was excellent. (It does take a while to get a tug out to the runway; but that was expected and no problem with ATC.) A minor navigation error was made after requesting direct to IAF for the approach; the pilot flying (Captain) apparently failed to select the NAV button on the FCP. As we were direct to the airport at the time of the request we ended up .3 NM left of the direct to IAF course indicated on the ND. This error was captured by the crew and NAV was selected without prompt from ATC. Shortly thereafter we requested direct to FAF on the approach and clearance for the approach was received. Possible Error - We called the QRH procedure 'complete' at the moment in flight we did in fact complete it. I directed that we briefly review it 'complete' again approximately 20 miles out as we were slowed and configured with the normal checklists completed. There is nothing in the QRH that directs that the Landing Gear be pinned after landing. As the Captain; I failed to address my concern (after review of the QRH) about the issue with Maintenance. The maintenance crew from the tug did not ask for our gear pins from the cockpit. If the gear is in fact supposed to be pinned and we; the crew; and Maintenance missed it; I think it should be addressed in a note in the QRH. In hindsight; I would have requested to have the gear pinned. My main concern is that it was a 'repeat' failure of the Green Hydraulic System. Maintenance signed it off a couple of days earlier with a damaged packing replaced; a loose fitting found; and a gear swing. As the crew; we could not have prevented the failure; but Maintenance I am sure (hope) will analyze this 'repeat' failure of the Green Hydraulic System; and the material and procedures used to repair and sign off the discrepancy.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.