Narrative:

I was conducting on the job training on final center with all finals combined to that position. The trainee has approximately 15 hours on that position. The weather was BKN023 and it was hazy. The trainee cleared aircraft Y for the ILS 26L approach approximately 30 miles east of iah on a heading to intercept the final approach course approximately 15 miles east of iah at 4;000. I told the trainee that 4;000 was not the best altitude to use and to comply with normal crossing altitudes on the approach in the future (i.e. Assign 5;000 at grieg). The trainee then descended air carrier X; in the south downwind; assigned ILS 27; approximately 8 miles southeast of iah to 2;000 ft and issued a speed of 210 KTS; complying with the local directives. When the trainee based air carrier X; the aircraft's speed was still indicating over 250 KTS (although 210 KTS was assigned; there was a 30 KT wind out of the southwest) and it appeared the aircraft would end up adjacent to aircraft Y on the straight in approach to runway 26L. I instructed the trainee to turn aircraft Y right to ensure lateral spacing. The trainee apparently did not hear my instructions and questioned 'to the left?' I reiterated the right turn; the trainee instructed aircraft Y to turn right heading 270 and also issued air carrier X traffic 3 miles off their left. During this time; I placed a '*T' between the 2 aircraft and witnessed the nearest proximity of the two aircraft at 2.72 miles. I then took the position from the trainee; turned aircraft Y to the north and resequenced him in the downwind. After we were relieved from position; I was informed that an operational error had taken place and was allowed to review the occurrence in the quality assurance office. At no time did I feel this was an unsafe event and I believe the data I had displayed on my scope at the time of the incident was the best indicator for me to use while conducting training.instead of allowing the trainee to issue the turn; I should have overrode the trainee and issued the turn slightly earlier. Also; I am hesitant to rely on the tools to indicate spacing i.e. J rings; bats; *T if the 'official' measurements in the quality assurance office are the determining factor in errors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: I90 Instructor Controller describes a loss of separation event that occurred during training of a developmental.

Narrative: I was conducting on the job training on Final Center with all finals combined to that position. The trainee has approximately 15 hours on that position. The weather was BKN023 and it was hazy. The trainee cleared Aircraft Y for the ILS 26L approach approximately 30 miles east of IAH on a heading to intercept the final approach course approximately 15 miles east of IAH at 4;000. I told the trainee that 4;000 was not the best altitude to use and to comply with normal crossing altitudes on the approach in the future (i.e. assign 5;000 at GRIEG). The trainee then descended Air Carrier X; in the south downwind; assigned ILS 27; approximately 8 miles southeast of IAH to 2;000 FT and issued a speed of 210 KTS; complying with the local directives. When the trainee based Air Carrier X; the aircraft's speed was still indicating over 250 KTS (although 210 KTS was assigned; there was a 30 KT wind out of the southwest) and it appeared the aircraft would end up adjacent to Aircraft Y on the straight in approach to Runway 26L. I instructed the trainee to turn Aircraft Y right to ensure lateral spacing. The trainee apparently did not hear my instructions and questioned 'to the left?' I reiterated the RIGHT turn; the trainee instructed Aircraft Y to turn right heading 270 and also issued Air Carrier X traffic 3 miles off their left. During this time; I placed a '*T' between the 2 aircraft and witnessed the nearest proximity of the two aircraft at 2.72 miles. I then took the position from the trainee; turned Aircraft Y to the north and resequenced him in the downwind. After we were relieved from position; I was informed that an operational error had taken place and was allowed to review the occurrence in the Quality Assurance office. At no time did I feel this was an unsafe event and I believe the data I had displayed on my scope at the time of the incident was the best indicator for me to use while conducting training.Instead of allowing the trainee to issue the turn; I should have overrode the trainee and issued the turn slightly earlier. Also; I am hesitant to rely on the tools to indicate spacing i.e. J rings; BATS; *T if the 'official' measurements in the Quality Assurance office are the determining factor in errors.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.