Narrative:

An LJ25 was requesting to land ZZZ. Weather was BKN005; OVC010 below runway xx minimums. An aircraft ahead of the LJ25 tried the runway xx approach and went missed approach. The supervisor in the area told the controllers to tell the LJ25 to 'expect a 30 minute delay for runway xx departures'. The tower had already taxied many airplanes out to runway xx for departure; and didn't want to change to runway yy. The tmu and the supervisor decided to 'run departures off runway xx and hold any arrivals. The LJ25 advised he only had 45 minutes of fuel and needed to land somewhere. The pilot decided to try and land at a nearby airport even though weather there was well below minimums. The LJ25 made a missed approach and reported 30 minutes of fuel; needing to land at their destination. Ten minutes later; the west radar and hand off controllers had to disobey the supervisors orders and tell tower to stop departures and allow this low-fuel aircraft to land runway yy. This pilot's safety was put at an unnecessary risk in an effort by the supervisor; the tmu; and the tower to not delay any departures. [If] the LJ25 had to make a missed approach off runway yy he would have had 15 minutes of fuel and no VFR airports within an hour of his position. Tower supervisors and controllers; tmu; and area supervisor need to be re-trained so they no longer think that risking 1 -5 lives in a LJ25 is not worth 'missing flow windows for departures' or 'having reportable departure delays' or 'having to re-read departure clearances to taxi to a different runway'. This is due to a 'culture of laziness' instead of 'safety first'.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRACON Controller voiced concern regarding the decision made by the TMU and Supervisors in giving departures priority over inbound aircraft; one experiencing minimum fuel issues.

Narrative: An LJ25 was requesting to land ZZZ. Weather was BKN005; OVC010 below Runway XX minimums. An aircraft ahead of the LJ25 tried the Runway XX approach and went missed approach. The Supervisor in the area told the controllers to tell the LJ25 to 'expect a 30 minute delay for Runway XX departures'. The Tower had already taxied many airplanes out to Runway XX for departure; and didn't want to change to Runway YY. The TMU and the Supervisor decided to 'run departures off Runway XX and hold any arrivals. The LJ25 advised he only had 45 minutes of fuel and needed to land somewhere. The pilot decided to try and land at a nearby airport even though weather there was well below minimums. The LJ25 made a missed approach and reported 30 minutes of fuel; needing to land at their destination. Ten minutes later; the West RADAR and Hand Off controllers had to disobey the Supervisors orders and tell Tower to stop departures and allow this low-fuel aircraft to land Runway YY. This pilot's safety was put at an unnecessary risk in an effort by the Supervisor; the TMU; and the Tower to not delay any departures. [If] the LJ25 had to make a missed approach off Runway YY he would have had 15 minutes of fuel and no VFR airports within an hour of his position. Tower Supervisors and controllers; TMU; and area Supervisor need to be re-trained so they no longer think that risking 1 -5 lives in a LJ25 is not worth 'missing flow windows for departures' or 'having reportable departure delays' or 'having to re-read departure clearances to taxi to a different runway'. This is due to a 'culture of laziness' instead of 'safety first'.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.