Narrative:

I was working R2 and R8 sectors combined with an average amount of traffic and training was taking place on the D2/D8 position. Air carrier Y was level at FL090 inbound to tkpn over gabar and had been coordinated at FL050. The restriction was issued in the vicinity of the dande intersection; unaware that a tkpk departure air carrier X had been approved non-radar over the same fix climbing to FL140. Air carrier X reported passing gabar at FL060 to which I immediately stopped the inbound at FL070 thinking the other aircraft was maintaining FL060. I noticed air carrier X strip showed the aircraft climbing to which I inquired and aircraft confirmed leaving 075; at this point already above the inbound. Air carrier Y confirmed passing below the climbing aircraft and air carrier X finally tagged up approximately 25 miles east of dande leaving FL105. Non-radar separation was lost when the aircraft was approved climbing to FL140 and a combination of factors contributed to this loss of non-radar separation including communication within the radar team; training session in progress combined with the limited radar coverage in this area. Recommendation; first and most important; non-radar separation should have been ensured when estimate was approved by the d-side trainee. On the other hand a quick scan of the non-radar traffic in this bay should have been done on my behalf as an r-side before assigning a restriction to the inbound given the fact that this is a non-radar 'hot spot' due to the poor radar and radio communication coverage. Airspace and equipment: many changes have occurred within the ZSU airspace in over a decade and the effectiveness of the design has not been evaluated. This specific airway G633 and its proximity to tncm approach becomes challenging when weather and deviations are occurring as we live a daily struggle with ecar/meva/shout lines being OTS and limits the operation to commercial lines for coordination and passing traffic information to other facilities. Radar coverage and frequencies are also obstacles in this and other areas as aircraft departing tkpk or at low altitudes are unable to contact ZSU. Transmissions are unreadable and do aircraft do not tag up on the radar until approximately 20 miles inside of our airspace limiting the safe and expeditious flow of traffic. Recommend: airspace design analysis. Equipment update in general. We need reliable lines (shout/ecar/meva) to coordinate and frequencies that work.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZSU Controller described an unsafe situation listing problematic airspace design/s and several equipment issues.

Narrative: I was working R2 and R8 Sectors combined with an average amount of traffic and training was taking place on the D2/D8 position. Air Carrier Y was level at FL090 inbound to TKPN over GABAR and had been coordinated at FL050. The restriction was issued in the vicinity of the DANDE intersection; unaware that a TKPK departure Air Carrier X had been approved non-RADAR over the same fix climbing to FL140. Air Carrier X reported passing GABAR at FL060 to which I immediately stopped the inbound at FL070 thinking the other aircraft was maintaining FL060. I noticed Air Carrier X strip showed the aircraft climbing to which I inquired and aircraft confirmed leaving 075; at this point already above the inbound. Air Carrier Y confirmed passing below the climbing aircraft and Air Carrier X finally tagged up approximately 25 miles East of DANDE leaving FL105. Non-RADAR separation was lost when the aircraft was approved climbing to FL140 and a combination of factors contributed to this loss of non-RADAR separation including communication within the RADAR team; training session in progress combined with the limited RADAR coverage in this area. Recommendation; first and most important; non-RADAR separation should have been ensured when estimate was approved by the D-Side trainee. On the other hand a quick scan of the non-RADAR traffic in this bay should have been done on my behalf as an R-Side before assigning a restriction to the inbound given the fact that this is a non-RADAR 'hot spot' due to the poor RADAR and radio communication coverage. Airspace and Equipment: Many changes have occurred within the ZSU airspace in over a decade and the effectiveness of the design has not been evaluated. This specific airway G633 and its proximity to TNCM approach becomes challenging when weather and deviations are occurring as we live a daily struggle with ECAR/MEVA/SHOUT lines being OTS and limits the operation to commercial lines for coordination and passing traffic information to other facilities. RADAR coverage and FREQUENCIES are also obstacles in this and other areas as aircraft departing TKPK or at low altitudes are unable to contact ZSU. Transmissions are unreadable and do aircraft do not tag up on the RADAR until approximately 20 miles inside of our airspace limiting the safe and expeditious flow of traffic. Recommend: airspace design analysis. Equipment update in general. We need RELIABLE LINES (shout/ecar/meva) to coordinate and FREQUENCIES that work.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.