Narrative:

We departed L65 with 11 jumpers. I contacted ont TRACON and told them we were climbing for a jump at 14000' MSL. I was squawking mode C although I didn't find out until later that the mode C wasn't working. I called ontario when we were 2 mins from jump. The frequency was congested and I heard a 'roger' which I believed to be for me. At this point the jumpers decide the best point to exit while I fly into the winds aloft, which were southwesterly at about 35 KTS. 3 mins into the jump run, no one had jumped. The controller asked me to give him a 1 min warning before jumping at 15000'. I reminded that we were less than a minute to jump at 14000' and that we weren't going to 15000'. He replied, 'hold your jumpers, I have traffic entering the jump zone...we'll keep it at 1 min.' I took this to mean that although there was traffic, it would be clear to jump in the 1 min prescribed. Our position by now was so far out from the jump zone center that I couldn't imagine the jumpers getting out. I was looking for the traffic and turned on the cabin speaker telling the jumpers not to jump. When I looked back in the cabin I realized that they hadn't heard me. Most of them were hanging outside the airframe and the rest were in a group by the door with helmets on and couldn't hear me over the roar of the engines. Not having resolved whether or not the jump was cleared and thinking that our jump run was too far upwind for an exit, I had let the jumpers catch me by surprise. I told ont that the 'jumpers are out of the plane!', meaning that they were hanging outside and about to jump. Seconds later they jumped. As I circled left to look for traffic, I saw an medium large transport about 3 mi northwest already climbing through my altitude. Clearly no factor. I wasn't aware of the second aircraft since I hadn't been given any advisory other than that there was traffic. The controller told me to turn to a heading of 180 degrees for traffic. The controller was more interested in having me copy a phone number than he was in providing traffic sep. The second aircraft, an light transport B, passed about a 1/2 mi in front of me from right to left. The pilot reported the light transport and the jumpers in sight. He told the controller he didn't like me getting so close. I think that in order to prevent a recurrence of this, a few reforms need to be made. First of all, a 2 min warning may be insufficient in a congested sector. It doesn't allow time for an abort. Secondly, pilots and controllers need to coordinate a glossary of terms (part 105 leaves very little to work with). Jump planes can carry lots of people and should be given the same traffic information that airliners get rather than being left in the dark. Finally, pilots and controllers must acknowledge xmissions properly and when a jump plane is cleared to jump, ATC should state so.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF A JUMP ACFT COMPLAINT ABOUT ATC COORD IN A JUMP AREA.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED L65 WITH 11 JUMPERS. I CONTACTED ONT TRACON AND TOLD THEM WE WERE CLBING FOR A JUMP AT 14000' MSL. I WAS SQUAWKING MODE C ALTHOUGH I DIDN'T FIND OUT UNTIL LATER THAT THE MODE C WASN'T WORKING. I CALLED ONTARIO WHEN WE WERE 2 MINS FROM JUMP. THE FREQ WAS CONGESTED AND I HEARD A 'ROGER' WHICH I BELIEVED TO BE FOR ME. AT THIS POINT THE JUMPERS DECIDE THE BEST POINT TO EXIT WHILE I FLY INTO THE WINDS ALOFT, WHICH WERE SOUTHWESTERLY AT ABOUT 35 KTS. 3 MINS INTO THE JUMP RUN, NO ONE HAD JUMPED. THE CTLR ASKED ME TO GIVE HIM A 1 MIN WARNING BEFORE JUMPING AT 15000'. I REMINDED THAT WE WERE LESS THAN A MINUTE TO JUMP AT 14000' AND THAT WE WEREN'T GOING TO 15000'. HE REPLIED, 'HOLD YOUR JUMPERS, I HAVE TFC ENTERING THE JUMP ZONE...WE'LL KEEP IT AT 1 MIN.' I TOOK THIS TO MEAN THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS TFC, IT WOULD BE CLR TO JUMP IN THE 1 MIN PRESCRIBED. OUR POS BY NOW WAS SO FAR OUT FROM THE JUMP ZONE CENTER THAT I COULDN'T IMAGINE THE JUMPERS GETTING OUT. I WAS LOOKING FOR THE TFC AND TURNED ON THE CABIN SPEAKER TELLING THE JUMPERS NOT TO JUMP. WHEN I LOOKED BACK IN THE CABIN I REALIZED THAT THEY HADN'T HEARD ME. MOST OF THEM WERE HANGING OUTSIDE THE AIRFRAME AND THE REST WERE IN A GROUP BY THE DOOR WITH HELMETS ON AND COULDN'T HEAR ME OVER THE ROAR OF THE ENGS. NOT HAVING RESOLVED WHETHER OR NOT THE JUMP WAS CLRED AND THINKING THAT OUR JUMP RUN WAS TOO FAR UPWIND FOR AN EXIT, I HAD LET THE JUMPERS CATCH ME BY SURPRISE. I TOLD ONT THAT THE 'JUMPERS ARE OUT OF THE PLANE!', MEANING THAT THEY WERE HANGING OUTSIDE AND ABOUT TO JUMP. SECS LATER THEY JUMPED. AS I CIRCLED LEFT TO LOOK FOR TFC, I SAW AN MLG ABOUT 3 MI NW ALREADY CLBING THROUGH MY ALT. CLEARLY NO FACTOR. I WASN'T AWARE OF THE SECOND ACFT SINCE I HADN'T BEEN GIVEN ANY ADVISORY OTHER THAN THAT THERE WAS TFC. THE CTLR TOLD ME TO TURN TO A HDG OF 180 DEGS FOR TFC. THE CTLR WAS MORE INTERESTED IN HAVING ME COPY A PHONE NUMBER THAN HE WAS IN PROVIDING TFC SEP. THE SECOND ACFT, AN LTT B, PASSED ABOUT A 1/2 MI IN FRONT OF ME FROM RIGHT TO LEFT. THE PLT RPTED THE LTT AND THE JUMPERS IN SIGHT. HE TOLD THE CTLR HE DIDN'T LIKE ME GETTING SO CLOSE. I THINK THAT IN ORDER TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THIS, A FEW REFORMS NEED TO BE MADE. FIRST OF ALL, A 2 MIN WARNING MAY BE INSUFFICIENT IN A CONGESTED SECTOR. IT DOESN'T ALLOW TIME FOR AN ABORT. SECONDLY, PLTS AND CTLRS NEED TO COORDINATE A GLOSSARY OF TERMS (PART 105 LEAVES VERY LITTLE TO WORK WITH). JUMP PLANES CAN CARRY LOTS OF PEOPLE AND SHOULD BE GIVEN THE SAME TFC INFO THAT AIRLINERS GET RATHER THAN BEING LEFT IN THE DARK. FINALLY, PLTS AND CTLRS MUST ACKNOWLEDGE XMISSIONS PROPERLY AND WHEN A JUMP PLANE IS CLRED TO JUMP, ATC SHOULD STATE SO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.