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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1066161 |
Time | |
Date | 201301 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Emergency Exit |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I was advised by the 'gate keeper' after the fact that we had flown an airbus aircraft from a maintenance facility with the overwing exits not armed. I do not recall anything abnormal on that flight. There was no indication of an unarmed door. There was no ECAM alerts. It was a busy flight with last minute calls for catering and two jump seaters. We were concerned that the tug; without chains; would be able to push us on a solid sheet of ice. Planned; briefed; and executed de/anti ice. Since maintenance had worked on the overwing exits; it would be nice to know that procedure had been done. Sort of like gear pin write ups. You don't rely on the writeup to check for gear pins; but you do double check that the gear pins have been removed! Maintenance did some work on the overwing exits but failed to re-arm the exits. As pilots we have learned to look primarily for ecams and pulsating amber indications. It is easy to overlook something that is just not where it usually is; that is part of human nature. Similar to a pilot doing a gear check and thinking he is seeing three green lights; when in fact he only sees two greens. He has seen and said; 'down and three green' for so many times he says; 'down and three green' again. We did not see anything to draw our attention to the lack of an armed slide; and we proceeded to fly the flight. I suggest three things; all are barrier builders: first; if an over wing exit is going to be disarmed and then rearmed by maintenance; then; before the fact; a log book entry is made; similar to gear pins installed; that an overwing exit is being disarmed. Followed by a log book entry; that the overwing exit is confirmed rearmed. The second thing that can be done; if maintenance does not want to do the above; maintenance should confirm on the doors page that the overwing exit is showing armed after they worked on it. The third thing; suggest to airbus that an amber indication shows on the doors page that an over wing exit is not armed when it should be. Now; we only get an amber indication if the over wing is actually opened.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A320 flight crew reported departing on a ferry flight with the overwing emergency exits not armed by Maintenance personnel prior to flight.
Narrative: I was advised by the 'gate keeper' after the fact that we had flown an Airbus aircraft from a Maintenance facility with the overwing exits not armed. I do not recall anything abnormal on that flight. There was no indication of an unarmed door. There was no ECAM alerts. It was a busy flight with last minute calls for catering and two jump seaters. We were concerned that the tug; without chains; would be able to push us on a solid sheet of ice. Planned; briefed; and executed De/Anti Ice. Since Maintenance had worked on the overwing exits; it would be nice to know that procedure had been done. Sort of like gear pin write ups. You don't rely on the writeup to check for gear pins; but you do double check that the gear pins have been removed! Maintenance did some work on the overwing exits but failed to re-arm the exits. As pilots we have learned to look primarily for ECAMs and pulsating amber indications. It is easy to overlook something that is just not where it usually is; that is part of human nature. Similar to a pilot doing a gear check and thinking he is seeing three green lights; when in fact he only sees two greens. He has seen and said; 'Down and three green' for so many times he says; 'Down and three green' again. We did not see anything to draw our attention to the lack of an armed slide; and we proceeded to fly the flight. I suggest three things; all are barrier builders: First; if an over wing exit is going to be disarmed and then rearmed by maintenance; then; before the fact; a log book entry is made; similar to Gear pins installed; that an overwing exit is being disarmed. Followed by a log book entry; that the overwing exit is confirmed rearmed. The second thing that can be done; if Maintenance does not want to do the above; Maintenance should confirm on the Doors Page that the overwing exit is showing armed after they worked on it. The third thing; suggest to Airbus that an amber indication shows on the doors page that an over wing exit is NOT ARMED when it should be. Now; we only get an amber indication if the over wing is actually opened.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.