Narrative:

Just after departure we got a 'right aoa' caution message. We were in icing conditions; and I wanted to quickly resolve any anti-ice issues or leave icing conditions. I started running what I thought was the proper QRH checklist. I had begun running the left and right aoa heat message checklist instead of the left (right) aoa heat message QRH checklist. That checklist eventually said to avoid icing conditions. The meteorological conditions at that time favored an air return to the departure airport over the continuance of that flight to our filed destination. I decided that an air return was the safest option under the mistaken assumption that the aoa heat failure prohibited us from flying in known icing conditions. I told ATC we wanted to return to the departure airport; and I elected not to declare an emergency because once we made the turn west to the airport we quickly left icing conditions. We contacted dispatch and maintenance control and advised them of our intentions. Dispatch amended our release to put the departure airport as our new destination. The remainder of the flight was concluded normally. After landing; at the gate; I contacted dispatch and discovered my error. This mistake was caused by several factors. Once we received the caution message; I was immediately uncomfortable being in icing conditions. In fact; I was expecting the QRH to tell us to leave icing conditions and that the stall protection and windshear avoidance would be unreliable even before even I touched the checklist. That checklist had a conservative course of action; and avoiding icing was the safest possible option. In addition we were in turbulence and in a high workload environment at night. I looked up the page number for that procedure; and the left and right aoa heat message checklist just looked enticing in the middle of the page and highlighted by the chart light. Maintenance was contacted and I found out after the flight that they had questions as to whether or not we were doing the correct procedure. Their reluctance to query our decision to divert is understandable because we were taking a more conservative action.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-200 'R AOA' Caution Message alerted after takeoff; but the Captain mistakenly ran the L and R AOA HEAT which directed that the aircraft remain clear of icing so the flight returned to the departure airport.

Narrative: Just after departure we got a 'R AOA' Caution Message. We were in icing conditions; and I wanted to quickly resolve any anti-ice issues or leave icing conditions. I started running what I thought was the proper QRH checklist. I had begun running the L and R AOA HEAT MSG checklist instead of the L (R) AOA HEAT MSG QRH checklist. That checklist eventually said to avoid icing conditions. The meteorological conditions at that time favored an air return to the departure airport over the continuance of that flight to our filed destination. I decided that an air return was the safest option under the mistaken assumption that the AOA heat failure prohibited us from flying in known icing conditions. I told ATC we wanted to return to the departure airport; and I elected not to declare an emergency because once we made the turn west to the airport we quickly left icing conditions. We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and advised them of our intentions. Dispatch amended our release to put the departure airport as our new destination. The remainder of the flight was concluded normally. After landing; at the gate; I contacted Dispatch and discovered my error. This mistake was caused by several factors. Once we received the caution message; I was immediately uncomfortable being in icing conditions. In fact; I was expecting the QRH to tell us to leave icing conditions and that the stall protection and windshear avoidance would be unreliable even before even I touched the checklist. That checklist had a conservative course of action; and avoiding icing was the safest possible option. In addition we were in turbulence and in a high workload environment at night. I looked up the page number for that procedure; and the L and R AOA HEAT MSG checklist just looked enticing in the middle of the page and highlighted by the chart light. Maintenance was contacted and I found out after the flight that they had questions as to whether or not we were doing the correct procedure. Their reluctance to query our decision to divert is understandable because we were taking a more conservative action.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.