Narrative:

Being vectored for left downwind; I (pilot flying) called for flaps 15. Plot monitoring selected flaps 15; but moments later; he said something and I looked over just as the hydraulic press light began to flash. The flaps were stuck at 7 and the hydraulics were still running. As I was saying something profound like; 'huh; the flaps aren't going down;' pm instinctively moved the flap handle back to 7 and the light extinguished. I didn't call for the flaps to be moved; but this is a 'technique' I've been taught as well. He tried to move the handle to 15 again to see if it would work; and I just said; 'let's get the checklist out.' we performed everything to the letter from that point; including division of duties; a diversion to a larger airport and declaring the emergency; but we both discussed later that no one should have touched that handle once the light began to flash.this was a very early morning for us and I certainly take a few hours to be on top of my game. I didn't intervene immediately when the pm started moving the flap lever; and I should have. Honestly; I think my recognition of the situation was behind his not only because of the early start; but also because I went from looking out the window to looking inside to analyze the situation after he already saw something was wrong. That gave him time to choose an action before I had even evaluated what was going on. I think when any lights flash; just immediately saying 'checklist' may be good practice so that we don't become armchair mechanics. Also; as I alluded in the event narrative; at flight safety; I have been shown this method of extinguishing the hydraulic press light when this situation arises. I should disregard the techniques that are obviously not in agreement with sops; no matter how much sense it makes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CE-560EP crew was unable to fully extend the flaps during landing; declared an emergency; and diverted to another airport; landing safely. The First Officer deviated from Company Policy by moving the flap handle to the previously selected position when the flaps did not position to Flaps 15 setting; and the Captain (PF) did not immediately object to the unauthorized action.

Narrative: Being vectored for left downwind; I (Pilot Flying) called for Flaps 15. Plot Monitoring selected Flaps 15; but moments later; he said something and I looked over just as the HYD PRESS light began to flash. The flaps were stuck at 7 and the hydraulics were still running. As I was saying something profound like; 'Huh; the flaps aren't going down;' PM instinctively moved the flap handle back to 7 and the light extinguished. I didn't call for the flaps to be moved; but this is a 'technique' I've been taught as well. He tried to move the handle to 15 again to see if it would work; and I just said; 'Let's get the checklist out.' We performed everything to the letter from that point; including division of duties; a diversion to a larger airport and declaring the emergency; but we both discussed later that no one should have touched that handle once the light began to flash.This was a very early morning for us and I certainly take a few hours to be on top of my game. I didn't intervene immediately when the PM started moving the flap lever; and I should have. Honestly; I think my recognition of the situation was behind his not only because of the early start; but also because I went from looking out the window to looking inside to analyze the situation after he already saw something was wrong. That gave him time to choose an action before I had even evaluated what was going on. I think when any lights flash; just immediately saying 'Checklist' may be good practice so that we don't become armchair mechanics. Also; as I alluded in the event narrative; at Flight Safety; I have been shown this method of extinguishing the HYD PRESS light when this situation arises. I should disregard the techniques that are obviously not in agreement with SOPs; no matter how much sense it makes.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.