ZBW controller described an unsafe condition when traffic being transferred to his/her frequency con...

Narrative:

B737-700's data block showed he was at FL230 with a clearance to descend to FL190; when I accepted the hand off from sector 22. Shortly after; conflict alert activated; showing ERJ175 climbing to FL230 in direct confliction with B737-700. As it worked out; B737-700 was stopped above ERJ175; but the transferring controller did not show it in the data block; nor did he/she call the receiving controller. When B737-700 checked on my frequency; showing he had a clearance to FL190; the aircraft checked in level at FL230. I asked him to verify his assigned altitude and he verified he was level at FL230. This situation is a reoccurring event and must be addressed. The data block should always indicate what the aircraft is doing; per the 7110.65. If procedures are in place that makes this impossible; then procedures need to be changed. In this case; the transferring controller should have called the receiving controller. This habit of 'pre-loading' data blocks is unsafe and must be stopped.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZBW Controller described an unsafe condition when traffic being transferred to his/her frequency contained inaccurate data block information activating a false 'Conflict Alert'.

Narrative: B737-700's data block showed he was at FL230 with a clearance to descend to FL190; when I accepted the hand off from Sector 22. Shortly after; Conflict Alert activated; showing ERJ175 climbing to FL230 in direct confliction with B737-700. As it worked out; B737-700 was stopped above ERJ175; but the transferring Controller did not show it in the data block; nor did he/she call the receiving Controller. When B737-700 checked on my frequency; showing he had a clearance to FL190; the aircraft checked in level at FL230. I asked him to verify his assigned altitude and he verified he was level at FL230. This situation is a reoccurring event and must be addressed. The data block should always indicate what the aircraft is doing; per the 7110.65. If procedures are in place that makes this impossible; then procedures need to be changed. In this case; the transferring Controller should have called the receiving Controller. This habit of 'pre-loading' data blocks is unsafe and must be stopped.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1089364
Time
Date	201305
Local Time Of Day	0001-0600
Place
Locale Reference	ZBW.ARTCC
State Reference	NH
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Descent
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Make Model Name	EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Climb
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Function	Enroute
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Events
Anomaly	Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ZBW controller described an unsafe condition when traffic being transferred to his/her frequency contained inaccurate data block information activating a false 'conflict alert'.