Narrative:

I was working the listed sectors combined as the r-side controller. Traffic was light and conditions were VFR. I had somewhere around 6-7 aircraft in a combination of point outs; leaving the airspace off frequency; and in the airspace on frequency. Birmingham approach had a B737-800 departing the airport and executing a right hand turn off of runway 6 and climbing to proceed southbound. There were 3-4 VFR targets in bhm approach airspace that were to the south of the B737-800 flight as it was climbing. At least two of them were on discreet beacon codes; but the aircraft in question was squawking 1200 and its altitude indicated 096 also southbound. As the B737-800 flight continued to climb it was apparent that it was going to overtake the target of the 1200 code and the targets were likely to merge. As the B737-800 flight mode C indicated 093 the B737-800 flight then checked on 'at 10.' I then immediately cleared the B737-800 to climb and maintain FL230. I then called the VFR traffic to the B737-800 pilot as 12 o'clock and 2-3 miles; southbound; altitude indicating 096 unverified. The pilot then advised that he had the aircraft on TCAS but no visual. The next update on the mode C of the B737-800 indicated 096. This read out was before my traffic call. As the B737-800 flight mode C indicated 106 and one mile south of the aircraft; I again called the traffic and advised that it should be no factor. The pilot then advised again that he did not have the aircraft in sight. I advised the B737-800 flight that they were cleared to deviate left or right to avoid the VFR target if needed. The pilot advised that was not necessary. The pilot then stated; 'I don't know what was going on back there but we sure would have liked some earlier heads up about the traffic.' I advised the pilot that bhm approach should have called the traffic and possibly coordinated a higher altitude or another form of assistance to the B737-800. The pilot then stated that he felt there was not sufficient warning about the VFR aircraft and that he was concerned because there was no way to verify that the altitude was correct. At some point the pilot also stated that he was not going to file a report but wanted attention brought to/about the situation. I advised him that is true and that I didn't know the circumstances or what actions bhm approach had taken. I also advised the pilot that I felt it was not a safe situation and that I would advise my supervisor to see what had happened. This of course is paraphrased from the recording on falcon that I requested. I felt that the situation was unsafe based on the information that I had available but probably didn't have to state that to the pilot on the frequency but hindsight is 20/20. I did confirm from mgm approach that they were not in communication with the VFR aircraft as it proceeded into their airspace. I did not call bhm approach to check. I feel that the controller in bhm approach could have either placed the B737-800 flight on a vector to avoid the targets merging; or requested a higher altitude from my sector to keep the B737-800 flight climbing rather than risking the flight leveling so close to an unverified altitude from mode C along with the targets merging.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZTL Controller described a conflict event between an IFR departure and VFR traffic occurring shortly after a handoff was received from BHM TRACON. The reporter believes the TRACON Controller was remiss in not provided better traffic advisories.

Narrative: I was working the listed sectors combined as the R-Side Controller. Traffic was light and conditions were VFR. I had somewhere around 6-7 aircraft in a combination of point outs; leaving the airspace off frequency; and in the airspace on frequency. Birmingham Approach had a B737-800 departing the airport and executing a right hand turn off of Runway 6 and climbing to proceed southbound. There were 3-4 VFR targets in BHM Approach airspace that were to the south of the B737-800 flight as it was climbing. At least two of them were on discreet beacon codes; but the aircraft in question was squawking 1200 and its altitude indicated 096 also southbound. As the B737-800 flight continued to climb it was apparent that it was going to overtake the target of the 1200 code and the targets were likely to merge. As the B737-800 flight Mode C indicated 093 the B737-800 flight then checked on 'at 10.' I then immediately cleared the B737-800 to climb and maintain FL230. I then called the VFR traffic to the B737-800 pilot as 12 o'clock and 2-3 miles; southbound; altitude indicating 096 unverified. The pilot then advised that he had the aircraft on TCAS but no visual. The next update on the Mode C of the B737-800 indicated 096. This read out was before my traffic call. As the B737-800 flight Mode C indicated 106 and one mile south of the aircraft; I again called the traffic and advised that it should be no factor. The pilot then advised again that he did not have the aircraft in sight. I advised the B737-800 flight that they were cleared to deviate left or right to avoid the VFR target if needed. The pilot advised that was not necessary. The pilot then stated; 'I don't know what was going on back there but we sure would have liked some earlier heads up about the traffic.' I advised the pilot that BHM Approach should have called the traffic and possibly coordinated a higher altitude or another form of assistance to the B737-800. The pilot then stated that he felt there was not sufficient warning about the VFR aircraft and that he was concerned because there was no way to verify that the altitude was correct. At some point the pilot also stated that he was not going to file a report but wanted attention brought to/about the situation. I advised him that is true and that I didn't know the circumstances or what actions BHM Approach had taken. I also advised the pilot that I felt it was not a safe situation and that I would advise my Supervisor to see what had happened. This of course is paraphrased from the recording on FALCON that I requested. I felt that the situation was unsafe based on the information that I had available but probably didn't have to state that to the pilot on the frequency but hindsight is 20/20. I did confirm from MGM Approach that they were not in communication with the VFR aircraft as it proceeded into their airspace. I did not call BHM Approach to check. I feel that the Controller in BHM Approach could have either placed the B737-800 flight on a vector to avoid the targets merging; or requested a higher altitude from my sector to keep the B737-800 flight climbing rather than risking the flight leveling so close to an unverified altitude from Mode C along with the targets merging.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.