Narrative:

On diverting to an alternate; I received the ATIS; and was being vectored and cleared for the ILS runway 23 to tri. After receiving the clearance; the controller came back to me and explained that he had just 'come on' and was not aware that the glideslope was out of service. He apologized; and amended my approach clearance to the localizer runway 23. I don't remember the specific ceiling being reported; but I asked if anyone had got in on the localizer thinking that the weather was too low. He checked with the tower; and replied 'yes.' I remember the surface winds being reported as 'calm' and inquired about the ILS runway 5. I accepted the clearance for localizer runway 23; but with all the radio transmissions going on (cockpit distractions); I never gave myself time to 'brief the approach.' as soon as I was established; I started down to my first step down fix. Problem was I was still outside the FAF. I never received a taws alert; but realized my mistake when I received a terrain alert from my number 2 nav comm (GNS430.) I arrested my descent; and in doing so the alert went away; and I had that 'holy crap' moment realizing what I had done and my potentially fatal CFIT situation. At that point I continued on the approach; and being in 'shock' over the mistake I just made; missed my next and final step down fix to MDA. As I continued to map there was a small break in the overcast; but being high and in no place to make a stabilized approach to landing; I executed and reported 'missed approach' to the tower. They handed me back to TRACON and I was vectored to the ILS runway 5 approach which concluded in a normal approach and landing. While I found no unusual hazards in my preflight risk assessment; it is apparent that my lack of familiarity with my destination airport combined with the lack of time for an approach briefing led to a lack of situational awareness in the approach procedure. In hindsight; better CRM may have included asking for vectors to come around again to intercept the final approach course which would have allowed time for an appropriate approach briefing. What a trap! Never again!

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A pilot flying the TRI Runway 23 LOC approach had a CFIT when he descended early below the FAF crossing altitude because he failed to debrief the approach after being told the ILS was out of service.

Narrative: On diverting to an alternate; I received the ATIS; and was being vectored and cleared for the ILS Runway 23 to TRI. After receiving the clearance; the Controller came back to me and explained that he had just 'come on' and was not aware that the glideslope was out of service. He apologized; and amended my approach clearance to the LOC Runway 23. I don't remember the specific ceiling being reported; but I asked if anyone had got in on the localizer thinking that the weather was too low. He checked with the Tower; and replied 'yes.' I remember the surface winds being reported as 'calm' and inquired about the ILS Runway 5. I accepted the clearance for LOC Runway 23; but with all the radio transmissions going on (cockpit distractions); I never gave myself time to 'brief the approach.' As soon as I was established; I started down to my first step down fix. Problem was I was still outside the FAF. I never received a TAWS alert; but realized my mistake when I received a terrain alert from my Number 2 Nav Comm (GNS430.) I arrested my descent; and in doing so the alert went away; and I had that 'holy crap' moment realizing what I had done and my potentially fatal CFIT situation. At that point I continued on the approach; and being in 'shock' over the mistake I just made; missed my next and final step down fix to MDA. As I continued to MAP there was a small break in the overcast; but being high and in no place to make a stabilized approach to landing; I executed and reported 'missed approach' to the Tower. They handed me back to TRACON and I was vectored to the ILS Runway 5 approach which concluded in a normal approach and landing. While I found no unusual hazards in my Preflight Risk Assessment; it is apparent that my lack of familiarity with my destination airport combined with the lack of time for an approach briefing led to a lack of situational awareness in the approach procedure. In hindsight; better CRM may have included asking for vectors to come around again to intercept the final approach course which would have allowed time for an appropriate approach briefing. What a trap! Never again!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.