37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1092436 |
Time | |
Date | 201306 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZJX.ARTCC |
State Reference | FL |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Altimeter |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
Cleared to FL240; we were climbing through 15;000 feet and realized that there was some convective weather in front of us. Requested deviation to the left or direct to szw that would keep us out of the weather. ATC said that they could give us direct szw if we expedited the climb through FL230; which we agreed to. First officer increased vertical speed and I set the heading towards szw for an initial turn; then adjusted power in FMS to mct limits to provide more thrust. I then entered direct to szw in the FMS. Passing FL210; I realized that we had not reset the altimeters to 29.92. We immediately corrected this and resumed the climb. No deviations occurred.recently the checklist was revised to remove the 'below the line' item of altimeters; ostensibly due to the need to standardize with the 777. While the previous procedure for setting altimeters when cleared above/below transition was rescinded due to more altitude errors (more likely due to lack of training the procedure than a problem with the procedure itself; as the procedure has been that way for international for many years without issue); the removal of the checklist item removes the ability of the checklist to capture the error. A recent [company bulletin] discussed the need to pay more attention to detail; and then listed a number of items that appear to be things that would be categorized as 'errors.' I believe the policies and procedures are failing us. While there may be a technological fix to the altimeter problem; right now we have a problem with our policies and procedures that are leading to these types of errors and setting up the scenario where an error is highly probable. Eliminating an error control--such as a checklist item--does not help. In the past; I would have had the checklist on my lap (which is my habit) until it was complete. I believe [such a procedure as policy] may have increased the probability of capturing the altimeter change. Perhaps better policies or procedures can be developed to better mitigate these issues; but removing it from the checklist does not appear to be a solution.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: After a lapse in resetting the altimeter passing the transition altitude the Captain opined that a change in company SOP regarding checklists was a contributing factor.
Narrative: Cleared to FL240; we were climbing through 15;000 feet and realized that there was some convective weather in front of us. Requested deviation to the left or direct to SZW that would keep us out of the weather. ATC said that they could give us direct SZW if we expedited the climb through FL230; which we agreed to. F/O increased vertical speed and I set the heading towards SZW for an initial turn; then adjusted power in FMS to MCT limits to provide more thrust. I then entered direct to SZW in the FMS. Passing FL210; I realized that we had not reset the altimeters to 29.92. We immediately corrected this and resumed the climb. No deviations occurred.Recently the checklist was revised to remove the 'below the line' item of altimeters; ostensibly due to the need to standardize with the 777. While the previous procedure for setting altimeters when cleared above/below transition was rescinded due to more altitude errors (more likely due to lack of training the procedure than a problem with the procedure itself; as the procedure has been that way for international for many years without issue); the removal of the checklist item removes the ability of the checklist to capture the error. A recent [company bulletin] discussed the need to pay more attention to detail; and then listed a number of items that appear to be things that would be categorized as 'errors.' I believe the policies and procedures are failing us. While there may be a technological fix to the altimeter problem; right now we have a problem with our policies and procedures that are leading to these types of errors and setting up the scenario where an error is highly probable. Eliminating an error control--such as a checklist item--does not help. In the past; I would have had the checklist on my lap (which is my habit) until it was complete. I believe [such a procedure as policy] may have increased the probability of capturing the altimeter change. Perhaps better policies or procedures can be developed to better mitigate these issues; but removing it from the checklist does not appear to be a solution.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.