Narrative:

I was captain on flight xx from ont to san in an large transport. I was flying this leg and departure and climb out were uneventful. At approximately 7500' an extremely loud internal 'bang' was heard and felt adjacent to the first officer's feet. Instruments and systems showed no abnormalities. We continued to san and began preparations for a landing to the west (ATIS confirmed runway 27, 190, 10, 60 degrees, wind 180/8). We were cleared from cruise to 10000' and completed the descent checklist. Outside swatt intersection we were cleared to descend to 4000'. The approach checklist was completed,automatic brakes were selected to '2.' approach control then instructed xx to 'turn right to 250 degrees, intercept the localizer, descend to 3800'.' I was late leaving 3800' to cross reebo at 2000'. I instructed the first officer to put down the flaps as speed permitted. He mentioned that we could cross reebo at 2000' and that he thought we'd be about 1500' high at reebo. I increased the rate of descent, called for 'gear down, bug me right back to vref before landing checklist.' we crossed reebo at about 2200'. At 2000' we broke out of the overcast high and fast. In an effort to slow down and get down, I deployed the speed brakes about half way. Speed brakes were retracted at about 400' and rearmed. PAPI confirmed a high approach. Landing was long (about half way down the runway) and fast (KIAS +/- - vref was 115 KTS, gross weight 155000#). At no time did I consider the approach unsafe. Even thought I landed long I had confidence that the aircraft would stop easily. I selected reverse thrust; the levers would not move. I got on the brakes immediately and felt no response. The first officer was now on the brakes with me and we re applying maximum pressure. As the aircraft approached the overrun, both reverse thrust and brakes 'came in.' the aircraft stopped on the south side of the overrun with only the nose gear off the pavement. No damage or injury occurred. Had either the thrust reverse system or the brake system worked normally, no incident would have occurred. Supplemental information from acn 108847: I also feel that a contributing factors to this sloppy approach was the captain's misuse/lack of understanding of the FMS system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT LANDED VERY LONG AND FAST, WHICH RESULTED IN THE ACFT BEING UNABLE TO STOP WITHIN THE REMAINING RWY LENGTH.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT ON FLT XX FROM ONT TO SAN IN AN LGT. I WAS FLYING THIS LEG AND DEP AND CLBOUT WERE UNEVENTFUL. AT APPROX 7500' AN EXTREMELY LOUD INTERNAL 'BANG' WAS HEARD AND FELT ADJACENT TO THE F/O'S FEET. INSTRUMENTS AND SYSTEMS SHOWED NO ABNORMALITIES. WE CONTINUED TO SAN AND BEGAN PREPARATIONS FOR A LNDG TO THE W (ATIS CONFIRMED RWY 27, 190, 10, 60 DEGS, WIND 180/8). WE WERE CLRED FROM CRUISE TO 10000' AND COMPLETED THE DSCNT CHKLIST. OUTSIDE SWATT INTXN WE WERE CLRED TO DSND TO 4000'. THE APCH CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED,AUTO BRAKES WERE SELECTED TO '2.' APCH CTL THEN INSTRUCTED XX TO 'TURN RIGHT TO 250 DEGS, INTERCEPT THE LOC, DSND TO 3800'.' I WAS LATE LEAVING 3800' TO CROSS REEBO AT 2000'. I INSTRUCTED THE F/O TO PUT DOWN THE FLAPS AS SPD PERMITTED. HE MENTIONED THAT WE COULD CROSS REEBO AT 2000' AND THAT HE THOUGHT WE'D BE ABOUT 1500' HIGH AT REEBO. I INCREASED THE RATE OF DSCNT, CALLED FOR 'GEAR DOWN, BUG ME RIGHT BACK TO VREF BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST.' WE CROSSED REEBO AT ABOUT 2200'. AT 2000' WE BROKE OUT OF THE OVCST HIGH AND FAST. IN AN EFFORT TO SLOW DOWN AND GET DOWN, I DEPLOYED THE SPD BRAKES ABOUT HALF WAY. SPD BRAKES WERE RETRACTED AT ABOUT 400' AND REARMED. PAPI CONFIRMED A HIGH APCH. LNDG WAS LONG (ABOUT HALF WAY DOWN THE RWY) AND FAST (KIAS +/- - VREF WAS 115 KTS, GROSS WT 155000#). AT NO TIME DID I CONSIDER THE APCH UNSAFE. EVEN THOUGHT I LANDED LONG I HAD CONFIDENCE THAT THE ACFT WOULD STOP EASILY. I SELECTED REVERSE THRUST; THE LEVERS WOULD NOT MOVE. I GOT ON THE BRAKES IMMEDIATELY AND FELT NO RESPONSE. THE F/O WAS NOW ON THE BRAKES WITH ME AND WE RE APPLYING MAX PRESSURE. AS THE ACFT APCHED THE OVERRUN, BOTH REVERSE THRUST AND BRAKES 'CAME IN.' THE ACFT STOPPED ON THE S SIDE OF THE OVERRUN WITH ONLY THE NOSE GEAR OFF THE PAVEMENT. NO DAMAGE OR INJURY OCCURRED. HAD EITHER THE THRUST REVERSE SYS OR THE BRAKE SYS WORKED NORMALLY, NO INCIDENT WOULD HAVE OCCURRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 108847: I ALSO FEEL THAT A CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS SLOPPY APCH WAS THE CAPT'S MISUSE/LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE FMS SYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.