Narrative:

Enroute at 4;500 ft we were 15 NM south of 2b1 when we heard jump plane announce to cape approach that he was climbing out of 1;700 to 9;000 for a jump run. The first officer and I discussed the threat. We determined that our closest point of approach to 2b1 would be 5-6 NM west of the field. With northeast winds that would be more than sufficient clearance. Nevertheless; we planned to alter course even more to the west to avoid the area by a wider margin.eight miles south of the field approximately over peake intersection; we saw the plane; in a climb; at our altitude. He passed off our left by about 250 ft laterally at the same altitude. After we were passed the C182 popped up on our traffic display behind us. That was his first electronic appearance to either us or cape approach. Although we had a traffic display; we were not relying on it. As a garmin tis; it piggybacks off cape approach's radar; and their radar had been unreliable over nantucket sound. That may not have been the problem; though. Other targets appeared. After landing I spoke with the assistant airport manager. I told him how surprised I was to see the plane so far south and downwind of the airport. He explained that first; the plane's transponder had been intermittent last week. It had been fixed. Secondly; the reason why the jump plane was flying such a wide pattern was due to vociferous noise complaints from airport neighbors. The jump plane has been flying a couple of different wide teardrop patterns over the mid-cape area to spread the noise. Without prior knowledge of his noise abatement strategy; our ability to avoid the jump plane was hampered.our pilots should be advised of the jump plane's non-standard climbout patterns. Avoiding 2b1 by even 8 miles may not be enough. A direct line overhead coast guard air station (fmh) or hyannis (hya) may be required. Also; I would hope that the mechanical contributing factors could be addressed. We don't know if it was cape approach's radar outage or the jump plane's intermittent transponder that hampered cape's ability to issue traffic advisories. Ultimately; we must of course understand that ATC's prime directive is the separation of IFR traffic. The responsibility to see and avoid VFR traffic rests with all of us.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C182 jump aircraft near 2B1 was not detected on a small transport aircraft TIS and they had a near miss as the C-182 climbed over PEAKE Intersection.

Narrative: Enroute at 4;500 FT we were 15 NM south of 2B1 when we heard jump plane announce to Cape Approach that he was climbing out of 1;700 to 9;000 for a jump run. The First Officer and I discussed the threat. We determined that our closest point of approach to 2B1 would be 5-6 NM west of the field. With northeast winds that would be more than sufficient clearance. Nevertheless; we planned to alter course even more to the west to avoid the area by a wider margin.Eight miles south of the field approximately over PEAKE Intersection; we saw the plane; in a climb; at our altitude. He passed off our left by about 250 FT laterally at the same altitude. After we were passed the C182 popped up on our traffic display behind us. That was his first electronic appearance to either us or Cape Approach. Although we had a traffic display; we were not relying on it. As a Garmin TIS; it piggybacks off Cape Approach's radar; and their radar had been unreliable over Nantucket Sound. That may not have been the problem; though. Other targets appeared. After landing I spoke with the Assistant Airport Manager. I told him how surprised I was to see the plane so far south and downwind of the airport. He explained that first; the plane's transponder had been intermittent last week. It had been fixed. Secondly; the reason why the jump plane was flying such a wide pattern was due to vociferous noise complaints from airport neighbors. The jump plane has been flying a couple of different wide teardrop patterns over the mid-Cape area to spread the noise. Without prior knowledge of his noise abatement strategy; our ability to avoid the jump plane was hampered.Our pilots should be advised of the jump plane's non-standard climbout patterns. Avoiding 2B1 by even 8 miles may not be enough. A direct line overhead Coast Guard Air Station (FMH) or Hyannis (HYA) may be required. Also; I would hope that the mechanical contributing factors could be addressed. We don't know if it was Cape Approach's radar outage or the jump plane's intermittent transponder that hampered Cape's ability to issue traffic advisories. Ultimately; we must of course understand that ATC's prime directive is the separation of IFR traffic. The responsibility to see and avoid VFR traffic rests with all of us.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.