Narrative:

While providing OJT instruction to a developmental controller at jfk departure control I was involved in an operational error. At XX33 local, small aircraft initiated radio contact with our position. The aircraft was over dpk VOR on an IFR flight plan, wbound on V16, level at 6000'. Approximately 1 min later atx called jfk departure control after making a right turnout off runway 31L at jfk. This aircraft was on an IFR flight plan, nebnd, requesting 8000'. The developmental controller radar idented atx, verified mode C altitude, and turned the aircraft from initial heading of 090 degrees, left to 060 degrees. Atx was instructed to climb and maintain 5000'. At the time, I assumed that atx was issued 5000' to ensure sep from small aircraft opp direction at 6000'. Based upon the climb rate of atx (leaving 3400' 5 NM from jfk), distance aircraft were from each other (more than 20 NM), and closure rate, I felt that stopping atx at 5000' was an overly conservative control instruction. I did not express this to the developmental for a number of reasons: first, his progress to date had been less than satisfactory. (It had been recommended the previous day that his training be terminated. I was aware of this fact and had discussed the matter immediately prior to the start of the training session with my first line supervisor.) second, based upon my previous experiences with this developmental, I felt that it was better for him to be 'safe than sorry,' by being ultra-conservative. Third, I did not want to undermine the developmental's confidence by criticizing him for an action that was, although certainly not the best available, basically sound. Fourth, perhaps most important of all, I felt that the developmental's days at the TRACON were numbered anyway; it didn't make any difference--as long as the aircraft were separated, I could live with it. At XX38, when atx and small aircraft were about 2 NM apart on converging headings, the developmental instructed atx (now level at 5000') to climb, maintain 8000'. I immediately observed atx leave 5000'. 4 seconds later I issued traffic to atx as '2 O'clock and 2 mi, wbound at 6000'.' (atx was now out of 5300' and the beacon slashes of both aircraft were touching.) I immediately notified my supervisor that I believed I had been involved in an operational error. I was relieved of my position at XX44. A data reduction revealed the aircraft passed within 700' vertical and 1 1/4 NM horizontal. I am currently decertified awaiting testing and recertification.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATX WAS ISSUED A CLIMB THROUGH ALT OF ANOTHER ACFT.

Narrative: WHILE PROVIDING OJT INSTRUCTION TO A DEVELOPMENTAL CTLR AT JFK DEP CTL I WAS INVOLVED IN AN OPERROR. AT XX33 LCL, SMA INITIATED RADIO CONTACT WITH OUR POS. THE ACFT WAS OVER DPK VOR ON AN IFR FLT PLAN, WBOUND ON V16, LEVEL AT 6000'. APPROX 1 MIN LATER ATX CALLED JFK DEP CTL AFTER MAKING A RIGHT TURNOUT OFF RWY 31L AT JFK. THIS ACFT WAS ON AN IFR FLT PLAN, NEBND, REQUESTING 8000'. THE DEVELOPMENTAL CTLR RADAR IDENTED ATX, VERIFIED MODE C ALT, AND TURNED THE ACFT FROM INITIAL HDG OF 090 DEGS, LEFT TO 060 DEGS. ATX WAS INSTRUCTED TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 5000'. AT THE TIME, I ASSUMED THAT ATX WAS ISSUED 5000' TO ENSURE SEP FROM SMA OPP DIRECTION AT 6000'. BASED UPON THE CLB RATE OF ATX (LEAVING 3400' 5 NM FROM JFK), DISTANCE ACFT WERE FROM EACH OTHER (MORE THAN 20 NM), AND CLOSURE RATE, I FELT THAT STOPPING ATX AT 5000' WAS AN OVERLY CONSERVATIVE CTL INSTRUCTION. I DID NOT EXPRESS THIS TO THE DEVELOPMENTAL FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS: FIRST, HIS PROGRESS TO DATE HAD BEEN LESS THAN SATISFACTORY. (IT HAD BEEN RECOMMENDED THE PREVIOUS DAY THAT HIS TRNING BE TERMINATED. I WAS AWARE OF THIS FACT AND HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE START OF THE TRNING SESSION WITH MY FIRST LINE SUPVR.) SECOND, BASED UPON MY PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES WITH THIS DEVELOPMENTAL, I FELT THAT IT WAS BETTER FOR HIM TO BE 'SAFE THAN SORRY,' BY BEING ULTRA-CONSERVATIVE. THIRD, I DID NOT WANT TO UNDERMINE THE DEVELOPMENTAL'S CONFIDENCE BY CRITICIZING HIM FOR AN ACTION THAT WAS, ALTHOUGH CERTAINLY NOT THE BEST AVAILABLE, BASICALLY SOUND. FOURTH, PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, I FELT THAT THE DEVELOPMENTAL'S DAYS AT THE TRACON WERE NUMBERED ANYWAY; IT DIDN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE--AS LONG AS THE ACFT WERE SEPARATED, I COULD LIVE WITH IT. AT XX38, WHEN ATX AND SMA WERE ABOUT 2 NM APART ON CONVERGING HDGS, THE DEVELOPMENTAL INSTRUCTED ATX (NOW LEVEL AT 5000') TO CLB, MAINTAIN 8000'. I IMMEDIATELY OBSERVED ATX LEAVE 5000'. 4 SECS LATER I ISSUED TFC TO ATX AS '2 O'CLOCK AND 2 MI, WBOUND AT 6000'.' (ATX WAS NOW OUT OF 5300' AND THE BEACON SLASHES OF BOTH ACFT WERE TOUCHING.) I IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED MY SUPVR THAT I BELIEVED I HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN AN OPERROR. I WAS RELIEVED OF MY POS AT XX44. A DATA REDUCTION REVEALED THE ACFT PASSED WITHIN 700' VERT AND 1 1/4 NM HORIZ. I AM CURRENTLY DECERTIFIED AWAITING TESTING AND RECERTIFICATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.