Narrative:

Air carrier X was at FL320 requesting FL380. I was training the r-side during what was becoming an extremely busy session. Multiple warning areas were active; weather had developed in the middle of the sector; and tmu [traffic management unit] had re-routed many aircraft through our sector. Additionally; we had tmu initiative to obtain 40 mit for metro airports. Data blocks were overlapped; and the r-side was having trouble keeping the frequency. He/she first climbed air carrier X to FL340; then immediately gave a descent clearance to another aircraft in the sector. Air carrier X had opposite direction slightly offset at FL330. The subject aircraft reported their TCAS showed traffic underneath at 500 ft; and after the data block was separated; and the conflict alert went off; we saw that air carrier X and air carrier Y had lost separation but were not in immediate danger. I keyed up to turn air carrier Y 20 degrees right; realizing I could not 'save' the situation but wanted to obtain more separation given the situation. Both my focus and the r-side trainees' was on another situation; as well as our boundaries given the amount of handoffs to make or take. When air carrier X was climbed; both of us were also unaware of air carrier Y due to the amount of data blocks. We had an extremely difficult time working with the military. They were both not accepting any point-outs; even though it was commercial airliners that needed to deviate for weather. This presented not only an extremely complex workload; but compromised safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute Controller described a conflict event when the military was reluctant to allow entry into several restricted areas for air carrier deviation requests.

Narrative: Air Carrier X was at FL320 requesting FL380. I was training the R-Side during what was becoming an extremely busy session. Multiple warning areas were active; weather had developed in the middle of the sector; and TMU [Traffic Management Unit] had re-routed many aircraft through our sector. Additionally; we had TMU initiative to obtain 40 MIT for Metro airports. Data Blocks were overlapped; and the R-Side was having trouble keeping the frequency. He/She first climbed Air Carrier X to FL340; then immediately gave a descent clearance to another aircraft in the sector. Air Carrier X had opposite direction slightly offset at FL330. The subject aircraft reported their TCAS showed traffic underneath at 500 FT; and after the Data Block was separated; and the Conflict Alert went off; we saw that Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y had lost separation but were not in immediate danger. I keyed up to turn Air Carrier Y 20 degrees right; realizing I could not 'save' the situation but wanted to obtain more separation given the situation. Both my focus and the R-Side trainees' was on another situation; as well as our boundaries given the amount of handoffs to make or take. When Air Carrier X was climbed; both of us were also unaware of Air Carrier Y due to the amount of Data Blocks. We had an extremely difficult time working with the military. They were both not accepting any point-outs; even though it was commercial airliners that needed to deviate for weather. This presented not only an extremely complex workload; but compromised safety.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.