N90 controller described a TCAS RA event while vectoring an IFR aircraft to hpn; the reporter noting...

Narrative:

While working 3 positions combined (haarp; nobbi; & nyack) air carrier X was on radar vectors for a visual approach to runway 34 at hpn; 7 miles west of hpn; on a southeast bound heading level at 2;000 ft; which is the MVA in that area. I pointed out a VFR aircraft on a converging course that was level at 1;500 ft indicated while they were 7 or 8 miles apart. After making a few transmissions to other aircraft on my frequency; I noticed the VFR was now 1 mile away from air carrier X and indicating 1;800 ft. I issued the traffic alert and turned air carrier X further right to avoid the traffic. Air carrier X responded to an RA and climbed to about 2;300 ft. When air carrier X responded to the RA and climbed; he entered the departure path off of hpn. Luckily there were no departures at this time. This event occurred because of the dangerous airspace design surrounding hpn. There are too many IFR operations in and out of hpn to have such a limited class D surrounding the airport. The only way to prevent a re-occurrence of this event is to expand the controlled airspace around hpn. To allow VFR's to fly at any altitude around hpn and force IFR flights to respond to RA's 7 miles from the landing airport is dangerous. The airspace is too complex as is with ewr; lga; jfk; and teb all within 20 miles of it. I suggest [lowering] the ny class B floor to a minimum of 1;500 ft or expanding the class D around hpn to a class C with a minimum of 10 DME around the airport from 1;500 ft to 3;000 ft.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: N90 Controller described a TCAS RA event while vectoring an IFR aircraft to HPN; the reporter noting that current airspace design is problematic and should be changed to prevent future occurrences.

Narrative: While working 3 positions combined (HAARP; NOBBI; & NYACK) Air Carrier X was on RADAR vectors for a visual approach to Runway 34 at HPN; 7 miles West of HPN; on a southeast bound heading level at 2;000 FT; which is the MVA in that area. I pointed out a VFR aircraft on a converging course that was level at 1;500 FT indicated while they were 7 or 8 miles apart. After making a few transmissions to other aircraft on my frequency; I noticed the VFR was now 1 mile away from Air Carrier X and indicating 1;800 FT. I issued the traffic alert and turned Air Carrier X further right to avoid the traffic. Air Carrier X responded to an RA and climbed to about 2;300 FT. When Air Carrier X responded to the RA and climbed; he entered the departure path off of HPN. Luckily there were no departures at this time. This event occurred because of the dangerous airspace design surrounding HPN. There are too many IFR operations in and out of HPN to have such a limited Class D surrounding the airport. The only way to prevent a re-occurrence of this event is to expand the controlled airspace around HPN. To allow VFR's to fly at any altitude around HPN and force IFR flights to respond to RA's 7 miles from the landing airport is dangerous. The airspace is too complex as is with EWR; LGA; JFK; and TEB all within 20 miles of it. I suggest [lowering] the NY Class B floor to a minimum of 1;500 FT or expanding the Class D around HPN to a Class C with a minimum of 10 DME around the airport from 1;500 FT to 3;000 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1099150
Time
Date	201307
Local Time Of Day	1201-1800
Place
Locale Reference	N90.TRACON
State Reference	NY
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	Dash 8-200
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Cruise
Route In Use	Vectors
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Function	Approach Departure
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Events
Anomaly	ATC Issue All Types

N90 controller described a TCAS RA event while vectoring an IFR aircraft to hpn; the reporter noting that current airspace design is problematic and should be changed to prevent future occurrences.