Narrative:

The flight proceeded west/O incident until the return to ith. Bgm approach control terminated flight following approximately 15 mi southeast of ith. They recommended contact with ith tower, indicating to me that no coordination had been made with approach control, who controls the approachs into ith. Contact was immediately established with the tower, advising them of our position and intention (full stop landing upon completion of the ILS 32 straight in). We were sequenced #1 for arrival. Moments later an small aircraft Y reported 7 mi out for a right base entry to the same runway. The small aircraft Y was sequenced #2 by the tower. We immediately spotted the aircraft, assessed that there existed no conflict and continued while maintaining visibility sep with the small aircraft Y. When we were approximately 7 mi from the airport, we heard another small aircraft Z report 12 mi southeast for landing. The tower responded with landing information as well as advisories of the traffic, including ourselves as another same type reported 15 mi southeast for a practice ILS approximately 3 mins ago. I immediately scanned for this additional traffic, but spotted nothing. It was my perception that based on reported position and aircraft type (same) no conflict existed. I did however maintain a scan for this traffic should his position report not be accurate. Passing the OM I saw the other small aircraft Z pass immediately off our left and slightly above our altitude. As he passed us I instinctively assumed control of the aircraft although no time existed for evasion and no maneuver was made. At this same time the other aircraft, which in fact was a faster type, called the traffic in sight. The greater approach speed being used by small aircraft Z provided adequate sep after his overtaking us. The aircraft passed in such close proximity to ourselves that I was able to identify one of the passenger in the FBO lobby, by her looks and the clothes that she was wearing. The tower changed sequencing to allow the small aircraft Y to be #1 for arrival, the small aircraft Z #2 and ourselves #3. The small aircraft Z continued at such a speed as to reduce spacing between itself and the small aircraft Y to a point where the local controller had to initiate a go around for the small aircraft Z. After landing I asked the PIC of the other aircraft if he felt sep was adequate, and when he actually saw us during the previously described incident. He responded that he felt there was adequate sep, although he offered no direct response as to when he saw us, even though I asked him several times. In response to an inquiry of his approach speed, he answered 140 KTS. When asked if he thought that was prudent considering he was sequenced #3 behind us, small aircraft X last reported only 3 mi ahead of him, he again responded yes. He also stated that he was aware that the typical approach speed of our aircraft was 90 KTS as he previously owned such an aircraft. The pilot felt that it was proper to call himself an small aircraft Y same type as small aircraft X. Further discussion revealed that he was also aware of the fact that over 90% of the small aircraft X aircraft are in fact older models,not his type. Both pilots are aware of the performance differences of the aircraft involved. I believe that several factors led to this incident: 1) the incorrect identify of the small aircraft Z as an older model. 2) imprudent selection of approach speed by the small aircraft Z. 3) improper lookout by the small aircraft Z. 4) improper overtaking of the small aircraft X by the small aircraft Z. 5) improper handling of both flts by bgm approach. The small aircraft Z indicated that he too was handled by bgm approach but not advised of the small aircraft X as possible traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLOSE PROX GA-SMA GA-SMA IN TRAFFIC AT ITH.

Narrative: THE FLT PROCEEDED W/O INCIDENT UNTIL THE RETURN TO ITH. BGM APCH CTL TERMINATED FLT FOLLOWING APPROX 15 MI SE OF ITH. THEY RECOMMENDED CONTACT WITH ITH TWR, INDICATING TO ME THAT NO COORD HAD BEEN MADE WITH APCH CTL, WHO CTLS THE APCHS INTO ITH. CONTACT WAS IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISHED WITH THE TWR, ADVISING THEM OF OUR POS AND INTENTION (FULL STOP LNDG UPON COMPLETION OF THE ILS 32 STRAIGHT IN). WE WERE SEQUENCED #1 FOR ARR. MOMENTS LATER AN SMA Y RPTED 7 MI OUT FOR A RIGHT BASE ENTRY TO THE SAME RWY. THE SMA Y WAS SEQUENCED #2 BY THE TWR. WE IMMEDIATELY SPOTTED THE ACFT, ASSESSED THAT THERE EXISTED NO CONFLICT AND CONTINUED WHILE MAINTAINING VIS SEP WITH THE SMA Y. WHEN WE WERE APPROX 7 MI FROM THE ARPT, WE HEARD ANOTHER SMA Z RPT 12 MI SE FOR LNDG. THE TWR RESPONDED WITH LNDG INFO AS WELL AS ADVISORIES OF THE TFC, INCLUDING OURSELVES AS ANOTHER SAME TYPE RPTED 15 MI SE FOR A PRACTICE ILS APPROX 3 MINS AGO. I IMMEDIATELY SCANNED FOR THIS ADDITIONAL TFC, BUT SPOTTED NOTHING. IT WAS MY PERCEPTION THAT BASED ON RPTED POS AND ACFT TYPE (SAME) NO CONFLICT EXISTED. I DID HOWEVER MAINTAIN A SCAN FOR THIS TFC SHOULD HIS POS RPT NOT BE ACCURATE. PASSING THE OM I SAW THE OTHER SMA Z PASS IMMEDIATELY OFF OUR LEFT AND SLIGHTLY ABOVE OUR ALT. AS HE PASSED US I INSTINCTIVELY ASSUMED CTL OF THE ACFT ALTHOUGH NO TIME EXISTED FOR EVASION AND NO MANEUVER WAS MADE. AT THIS SAME TIME THE OTHER ACFT, WHICH IN FACT WAS A FASTER TYPE, CALLED THE TFC IN SIGHT. THE GREATER APCH SPD BEING USED BY SMA Z PROVIDED ADEQUATE SEP AFTER HIS OVERTAKING US. THE ACFT PASSED IN SUCH CLOSE PROX TO OURSELVES THAT I WAS ABLE TO IDENT ONE OF THE PAX IN THE FBO LOBBY, BY HER LOOKS AND THE CLOTHES THAT SHE WAS WEARING. THE TWR CHANGED SEQUENCING TO ALLOW THE SMA Y TO BE #1 FOR ARR, THE SMA Z #2 AND OURSELVES #3. THE SMA Z CONTINUED AT SUCH A SPD AS TO REDUCE SPACING BTWN ITSELF AND THE SMA Y TO A POINT WHERE THE LCL CTLR HAD TO INITIATE A GAR FOR THE SMA Z. AFTER LNDG I ASKED THE PIC OF THE OTHER ACFT IF HE FELT SEP WAS ADEQUATE, AND WHEN HE ACTUALLY SAW US DURING THE PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED INCIDENT. HE RESPONDED THAT HE FELT THERE WAS ADEQUATE SEP, ALTHOUGH HE OFFERED NO DIRECT RESPONSE AS TO WHEN HE SAW US, EVEN THOUGH I ASKED HIM SEVERAL TIMES. IN RESPONSE TO AN INQUIRY OF HIS APCH SPD, HE ANSWERED 140 KTS. WHEN ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THAT WAS PRUDENT CONSIDERING HE WAS SEQUENCED #3 BEHIND US, SMA X LAST RPTED ONLY 3 MI AHEAD OF HIM, HE AGAIN RESPONDED YES. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE WAS AWARE THAT THE TYPICAL APCH SPD OF OUR ACFT WAS 90 KTS AS HE PREVIOUSLY OWNED SUCH AN ACFT. THE PLT FELT THAT IT WAS PROPER TO CALL HIMSELF AN SMA Y SAME TYPE AS SMA X. FURTHER DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT HE WAS ALSO AWARE OF THE FACT THAT OVER 90% OF THE SMA X ACFT ARE IN FACT OLDER MODELS,NOT HIS TYPE. BOTH PLTS ARE AWARE OF THE PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES OF THE ACFT INVOLVED. I BELIEVE THAT SEVERAL FACTORS LED TO THIS INCIDENT: 1) THE INCORRECT IDENT OF THE SMA Z AS AN OLDER MODEL. 2) IMPRUDENT SELECTION OF APCH SPD BY THE SMA Z. 3) IMPROPER LOOKOUT BY THE SMA Z. 4) IMPROPER OVERTAKING OF THE SMA X BY THE SMA Z. 5) IMPROPER HANDLING OF BOTH FLTS BY BGM APCH. THE SMA Z INDICATED THAT HE TOO WAS HANDLED BY BGM APCH BUT NOT ADVISED OF THE SMA X AS POSSIBLE TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.