Narrative:

WX at apa was reported as 700' overcast with 4 mi visibility, in light rain and fog. I work for a company that produces aviation training materials and was asked by my employer to fly with a photographer in an small aircraft aircraft and film the final approach course point of view as we break out of the clouds on an ILS approach (for use in video productions). I filed an IFR flight plan for vectors after departure for the ILS runway 35R approach at apa. I switched the #1 communication radio to clearance delivery (128.6), and received my clearance. After setting my navigation radios (#1 to 111.3, apa runway 35R ILS; #2 to 117.0, den VORTAC for position reference and missed approach navigation and holding information at frisk intersection; the ADF to 260-casse LOM; DME to den VORTAC 117.0). After starting the engine I switched the #1 communication radio T ground control, and received taxi instructions. With the taxi instructions, the controller requested that I 'hold short of the ILS critical area.' by definition, this would be the first set of taxiway hold lines for runway 35R. When I reached the end of runway 35R, I found that there is no run up area, so I stayed clear of the hold lines and completed my preflight run-up. (I was unaware of the lack of a run-up area at the approach end of 35R. With the pretkof checks complete, I switched my #2 communication radio to apa tower (118.9), and contacted them for departure. After 2 attempts, failed to get a response, I switched the #1 communication radio from den approach control (119.3) to apa tower (118.9), and switched the audio control console to the #1 radio, and contacted the tower. Their reply was, 'small aircraft aircraft 1, how do you read?' I replied, 'loud and clear.' I found that I had not been receiving any communications through my #2 communication radio. In the process of taxiing, I had taxied beyond the actual ILS critical area west/O realizing that it existed along the alpha parallel taxiway (approximately 1000' from the approach end of 35R) not at the end of the runway, where I expected it to exist. The tower then told me to taxi back to parking, and stated that it would be at least 45 mins before I would be able to depart, since my action of taxiing beyond the critical area had delayed inbound arrs. I then taxied to the closest run-up area and attempted to troubleshoot the #2 radio, but could not receive xmissions either through my headphones or the overhead speaker. With the radio not working properly, I told the ground controller that I would not be able to continue the flight, taxied back to parking, and shut the airplane down.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF SMA INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF ILS CRITICAL AREA. TAXIED BEYOND SIGN INDICATING THE AREA AND INTO THE ILS CRITICAL AREA. RADIO FAILURE PREVENTED TWR GND CTLR FROM COMMUNICATING WITH THE ACFT.

Narrative: WX AT APA WAS RPTED AS 700' OVCST WITH 4 MI VISIBILITY, IN LIGHT RAIN AND FOG. I WORK FOR A COMPANY THAT PRODUCES AVIATION TRNING MATERIALS AND WAS ASKED BY MY EMPLOYER TO FLY WITH A PHOTOGRAPHER IN AN SMA ACFT AND FILM THE FINAL APCH COURSE POINT OF VIEW AS WE BREAK OUT OF THE CLOUDS ON AN ILS APCH (FOR USE IN VIDEO PRODUCTIONS). I FILED AN IFR FLT PLAN FOR VECTORS AFTER DEP FOR THE ILS RWY 35R APCH AT APA. I SWITCHED THE #1 COM RADIO TO CLRNC DELIVERY (128.6), AND RECEIVED MY CLRNC. AFTER SETTING MY NAV RADIOS (#1 TO 111.3, APA RWY 35R ILS; #2 TO 117.0, DEN VORTAC FOR POS REF AND MISSED APCH NAV AND HOLDING INFO AT FRISK INTERSECTION; THE ADF TO 260-CASSE LOM; DME TO DEN VORTAC 117.0). AFTER STARTING THE ENG I SWITCHED THE #1 COM RADIO T GND CTL, AND RECEIVED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. WITH THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, THE CTLR REQUESTED THAT I 'HOLD SHORT OF THE ILS CRITICAL AREA.' BY DEFINITION, THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST SET OF TXWY HOLD LINES FOR RWY 35R. WHEN I REACHED THE END OF RWY 35R, I FOUND THAT THERE IS NO RUN UP AREA, SO I STAYED CLR OF THE HOLD LINES AND COMPLETED MY PREFLT RUN-UP. (I WAS UNAWARE OF THE LACK OF A RUN-UP AREA AT THE APCH END OF 35R. WITH THE PRETKOF CHKS COMPLETE, I SWITCHED MY #2 COM RADIO TO APA TWR (118.9), AND CONTACTED THEM FOR DEP. AFTER 2 ATTEMPTS, FAILED TO GET A RESPONSE, I SWITCHED THE #1 COM RADIO FROM DEN APCH CTL (119.3) TO APA TWR (118.9), AND SWITCHED THE AUDIO CTL CONSOLE TO THE #1 RADIO, AND CONTACTED THE TWR. THEIR REPLY WAS, 'SMA ACFT 1, HOW DO YOU READ?' I REPLIED, 'LOUD AND CLEAR.' I FOUND THAT I HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVING ANY COMS THROUGH MY #2 COM RADIO. IN THE PROCESS OF TAXIING, I HAD TAXIED BEYOND THE ACTUAL ILS CRITICAL AREA W/O REALIZING THAT IT EXISTED ALONG THE ALPHA PARALLEL TXWY (APPROX 1000' FROM THE APCH END OF 35R) NOT AT THE END OF THE RWY, WHERE I EXPECTED IT TO EXIST. THE TWR THEN TOLD ME TO TAXI BACK TO PARKING, AND STATED THAT IT WOULD BE AT LEAST 45 MINS BEFORE I WOULD BE ABLE TO DEPART, SINCE MY ACTION OF TAXIING BEYOND THE CRITICAL AREA HAD DELAYED INBND ARRS. I THEN TAXIED TO THE CLOSEST RUN-UP AREA AND ATTEMPTED TO TROUBLESHOOT THE #2 RADIO, BUT COULD NOT RECEIVE XMISSIONS EITHER THROUGH MY HEADPHONES OR THE OVERHEAD SPEAKER. WITH THE RADIO NOT WORKING PROPERLY, I TOLD THE GND CTLR THAT I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THE FLT, TAXIED BACK TO PARKING, AND SHUT THE AIRPLANE DOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.