Narrative:

I was filling in for another cfii that was on vacation. I was scheduled to fly with one of his students who I had not flown with before. We received clearance for touch and goes on runway 7. Runway 4 was in use for commercial traffic. Runway 10 was not in use. I was handling all communications with the tower as well as providing normal instructional communications with the student while in traffic pattern. This resulted in a high level of communication between us as I coached him in normal pattern operations, approach to lndgs and follow through to the next takeoff. After several touch and goes I received a clearance to land and hold on the runway to allow opp direction traffic to complete a low approach to runway 28 (runway 28 approach path crosses the departure path of runway 7). I acknowledged the clearance to land and hold. After the landing we proceeded to takeoff contrary to the clearance received. The tower requested that the traffic on low approach to execute the missed approach and turned us to the crosswind. Tower asked if I had received the clearance to land and hold. I responded in the affirmative and added that I had no excuse for my action. The routine of touch and goes coupled with instruction being concentrated, at the time, on ground control after T/D and subsequent smooth transition to the takeoff roll during touch and goes I believe were the major causes of distraction that led to my allowing the takeoff to occur. The fact that the full stop clearance was issued to accommodate opp direction traffic, inbound to a runway conflicting with the one that I was operating on, may have added to the distraction in that this type operation is atypical. As a means of preventing this from ever happening again I can only offer the following. Given that touch and goes in a training environment are very repetitious, it may make sense for the tower controller to verify non standard clrncs on short final. This I'm sure would increase the workload on the controllers. In any event, it remains that the pilot is responsible for properly responding to clrncs received. This situation has reinforced my belief that any clearance received must be read back to the controller as a means of mutual verification. A clearance readback is much less likely to mis-understood or confused, but as this case has demonstrated to me is not an absolute guarantee that the clearance will always be properly acted upon. Human error will invade any people oriented system. Therefore each individual must be as vigilant as possible to avoid confusion and mistakes. I can offer no further observations on this matter other than to say that it has reinforced to me that distrs must be kept to a minimum to ensure clrncs are complied with.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR PLT CONDUCTING FLT TRAINING (TOUCH AND GOES) EXECTUES TOUCH AND GO AFTER RECEIVING AND ACKNOWLEDGING CLRNC FOR FULL STOP LNDG.

Narrative: I WAS FILLING IN FOR ANOTHER CFII THAT WAS ON VACATION. I WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY WITH ONE OF HIS STUDENTS WHO I HAD NOT FLOWN WITH BEFORE. WE RECEIVED CLRNC FOR TOUCH AND GOES ON RWY 7. RWY 4 WAS IN USE FOR COMMERCIAL TFC. RWY 10 WAS NOT IN USE. I WAS HANDLING ALL COMS WITH THE TWR AS WELL AS PROVIDING NORMAL INSTRUCTIONAL COMS WITH THE STUDENT WHILE IN TFC PATTERN. THIS RESULTED IN A HIGH LEVEL OF COM BTWN US AS I COACHED HIM IN NORMAL PATTERN OPS, APCH TO LNDGS AND FOLLOW THROUGH TO THE NEXT TKOF. AFTER SEVERAL TOUCH AND GOES I RECEIVED A CLRNC TO LAND AND HOLD ON THE RWY TO ALLOW OPP DIRECTION TFC TO COMPLETE A LOW APCH TO RWY 28 (RWY 28 APCH PATH CROSSES THE DEP PATH OF RWY 7). I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC TO LAND AND HOLD. AFTER THE LNDG WE PROCEEDED TO TKOF CONTRARY TO THE CLRNC RECEIVED. THE TWR REQUESTED THAT THE TFC ON LOW APCH TO EXECUTE THE MISSED APCH AND TURNED US TO THE XWIND. TWR ASKED IF I HAD RECEIVED THE CLRNC TO LAND AND HOLD. I RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AND ADDED THAT I HAD NO EXCUSE FOR MY ACTION. THE ROUTINE OF TOUCH AND GOES COUPLED WITH INSTRUCTION BEING CONCENTRATED, AT THE TIME, ON GND CTL AFTER T/D AND SUBSEQUENT SMOOTH TRANSITION TO THE TKOF ROLL DURING TOUCH AND GOES I BELIEVE WERE THE MAJOR CAUSES OF DISTR THAT LED TO MY ALLOWING THE TKOF TO OCCUR. THE FACT THAT THE FULL STOP CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO ACCOMMODATE OPP DIRECTION TFC, INBND TO A RWY CONFLICTING WITH THE ONE THAT I WAS OPERATING ON, MAY HAVE ADDED TO THE DISTR IN THAT THIS TYPE OPERATION IS ATYPICAL. AS A MEANS OF PREVENTING THIS FROM EVER HAPPENING AGAIN I CAN ONLY OFFER THE FOLLOWING. GIVEN THAT TOUCH AND GOES IN A TRNING ENVIRONMENT ARE VERY REPETITIOUS, IT MAY MAKE SENSE FOR THE TWR CTLR TO VERIFY NON STANDARD CLRNCS ON SHORT FINAL. THIS I'M SURE WOULD INCREASE THE WORKLOAD ON THE CTLRS. IN ANY EVENT, IT REMAINS THAT THE PLT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROPERLY RESPONDING TO CLRNCS RECEIVED. THIS SITUATION HAS REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT ANY CLRNC RECEIVED MUST BE READ BACK TO THE CTLR AS A MEANS OF MUTUAL VERIFICATION. A CLRNC READBACK IS MUCH LESS LIKELY TO MIS-UNDERSTOOD OR CONFUSED, BUT AS THIS CASE HAS DEMONSTRATED TO ME IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE GUARANTEE THAT THE CLRNC WILL ALWAYS BE PROPERLY ACTED UPON. HUMAN ERROR WILL INVADE ANY PEOPLE ORIENTED SYS. THEREFORE EACH INDIVIDUAL MUST BE AS VIGILANT AS POSSIBLE TO AVOID CONFUSION AND MISTAKES. I CAN OFFER NO FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THIS MATTER OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT IT HAS REINFORCED TO ME THAT DISTRS MUST BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM TO ENSURE CLRNCS ARE COMPLIED WITH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.