Narrative:

On takeoff roll the nose gear steering linkage pin failed and the torque arm contacted the nose tires, thereby delaminating and deflating them. The ensuing abort was sudden, violent and very frightening to the passenger. I had preflted the aircraft myself earlier in the day and seen no visibility indication of a possible failure. There was no indication of wear or damage prior to failure of the part. There was also no way for me to visually determine whether a part had been improperly serviced or installed. Today's airlines have very narrow operating margins and use every asset to the limit of its performance in search of a profit (and rightfully so). When we identify a problem we do everything possible to correct it. But aircraft are built from thousands of moving parts and today's technical knowledge does not yet know the limits of every one. Air crews are finding out the hard way during in flight failures of rivets, bolts and pins. Government't and industry must redouble their efforts to predict and prevent material failure. We need more not less 'fatigue' theory development and more non-destructive testing. The administrator should determine service limits for structural components and enforce them conservatively. These early retirements of parts should be borne as a cost of doing business and passed on to the consumer, the one most concerned with flying safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG NOSE GEAR STEERING LINK FAILURE ON TKOF.

Narrative: ON TKOF ROLL THE NOSE GEAR STEERING LINKAGE PIN FAILED AND THE TORQUE ARM CONTACTED THE NOSE TIRES, THEREBY DELAMINATING AND DEFLATING THEM. THE ENSUING ABORT WAS SUDDEN, VIOLENT AND VERY FRIGHTENING TO THE PAX. I HAD PREFLTED THE ACFT MYSELF EARLIER IN THE DAY AND SEEN NO VIS INDICATION OF A POSSIBLE FAILURE. THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF WEAR OR DAMAGE PRIOR TO FAILURE OF THE PART. THERE WAS ALSO NO WAY FOR ME TO VISUALLY DETERMINE WHETHER A PART HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY SERVICED OR INSTALLED. TODAY'S AIRLINES HAVE VERY NARROW OPERATING MARGINS AND USE EVERY ASSET TO THE LIMIT OF ITS PERFORMANCE IN SEARCH OF A PROFIT (AND RIGHTFULLY SO). WHEN WE IDENT A PROB WE DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO CORRECT IT. BUT ACFT ARE BUILT FROM THOUSANDS OF MOVING PARTS AND TODAY'S TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE DOES NOT YET KNOW THE LIMITS OF EVERY ONE. AIR CREWS ARE FINDING OUT THE HARD WAY DURING IN FLT FAILURES OF RIVETS, BOLTS AND PINS. GOV'T AND INDUSTRY MUST REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO PREDICT AND PREVENT MATERIAL FAILURE. WE NEED MORE NOT LESS 'FATIGUE' THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND MORE NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING. THE ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD DETERMINE SERVICE LIMITS FOR STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS AND ENFORCE THEM CONSERVATIVELY. THESE EARLY RETIREMENTS OF PARTS SHOULD BE BORNE AS A COST OF DOING BUSINESS AND PASSED ON TO THE CONSUMER, THE ONE MOST CONCERNED WITH FLYING SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.