Narrative:

While descending into an uncontrolled airport the captain called it insight. We were on an IFR flight plan, VFR conditions. I was flying the plane,but did not have the airport in sight. It was sat and there were at least 3 aircraft in the pattern. When we called the field in sight, we 'expected' to get a clearance for a visibility approach, however we were only cleared down to 4000'. The captain said I was high and needed to keep my descent going. After a short period of time, we were cleared for the visibility approach. However, the controller came back and said he had only cleared us to 4000' before clearing us for the visibility. It was a period of high concentration and divided attention, but I thought we were at or above 4000' when cleared for the visibility. This incident should just emphasize the importance of extra vigilance both outside and inside the cockpit while operating in a low altitude environment condition. Also, I was flying with a captain who was using nonstandard company calls. During the whole 2 day trip he never made any altitude calls, not one. Never called for any checklist except the after start. When I made an attempt to do the items or call for a checklist, he said 'spare me the stuff, I know what they are.' even after this possible deviation he still never made the calls or acknowledged me when I made them for him. If he had given me those calls while descending into killeen and my attention was outside the aircraft trying to find the airport and the traffic, this incident might have been avoided. As a first officer who is exposed to many different capts, I know that I must adapt my style and manner to that of the captain's, to a point. Capts must remember that they set the tempo in the cockpit and that they are ultimately responsible for aircraft operations, its passenger and its crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALT DEVIATION ON DESCENT TO UNCONTROLLED ARPT.

Narrative: WHILE DSNDING INTO AN UNCONTROLLED ARPT THE CAPT CALLED IT INSIGHT. WE WERE ON AN IFR FLT PLAN, VFR CONDITIONS. I WAS FLYING THE PLANE,BUT DID NOT HAVE THE ARPT IN SIGHT. IT WAS SAT AND THERE WERE AT LEAST 3 ACFT IN THE PATTERN. WHEN WE CALLED THE FIELD IN SIGHT, WE 'EXPECTED' TO GET A CLRNC FOR A VIS APCH, HOWEVER WE WERE ONLY CLRED DOWN TO 4000'. THE CAPT SAID I WAS HIGH AND NEEDED TO KEEP MY DSCNT GOING. AFTER A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VIS APCH. HOWEVER, THE CTLR CAME BACK AND SAID HE HAD ONLY CLRED US TO 4000' BEFORE CLEARING US FOR THE VIS. IT WAS A PERIOD OF HIGH CONCENTRATION AND DIVIDED ATTN, BUT I THOUGHT WE WERE AT OR ABOVE 4000' WHEN CLRED FOR THE VIS. THIS INCIDENT SHOULD JUST EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF EXTRA VIGILANCE BOTH OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE COCKPIT WHILE OPERATING IN A LOW ALT ENVIRONMENT CONDITION. ALSO, I WAS FLYING WITH A CAPT WHO WAS USING NONSTANDARD COMPANY CALLS. DURING THE WHOLE 2 DAY TRIP HE NEVER MADE ANY ALT CALLS, NOT ONE. NEVER CALLED FOR ANY CHKLIST EXCEPT THE AFTER START. WHEN I MADE AN ATTEMPT TO DO THE ITEMS OR CALL FOR A CHKLIST, HE SAID 'SPARE ME THE STUFF, I KNOW WHAT THEY ARE.' EVEN AFTER THIS POSSIBLE DEVIATION HE STILL NEVER MADE THE CALLS OR ACKNOWLEDGED ME WHEN I MADE THEM FOR HIM. IF HE HAD GIVEN ME THOSE CALLS WHILE DSNDING INTO KILLEEN AND MY ATTN WAS OUTSIDE THE ACFT TRYING TO FIND THE ARPT AND THE TFC, THIS INCIDENT MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. AS A F/O WHO IS EXPOSED TO MANY DIFFERENT CAPTS, I KNOW THAT I MUST ADAPT MY STYLE AND MANNER TO THAT OF THE CAPT'S, TO A POINT. CAPTS MUST REMEMBER THAT THEY SET THE TEMPO IN THE COCKPIT AND THAT THEY ARE ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ACFT OPS, ITS PAX AND ITS CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.