Narrative:

On approach to wheelless airport and in communication on the appropriate frequency (122.9 MHZ) as signage at the airport had indicated. On communication with the aircraft ready for departure who was also a company aircraft. I had communicated my intention to do a high speed pass at 90 degrees to the runway. The reason for this was a suspected gear clam shell door was thought to be coming open in-flight and the pass was to verify this so appropriate maintenance action could be taken. On approach to the air field through communication and visibility outlook there was no traffic. On pull-up, I immediately climbed to pattern. Altitude and entered a normal pattern and approach to land. With communication with the other company it was deemed that they would need additional time for departure due to the fact that the aircraft was on a maintenance test flight. I deemed it necessary to execute a missed approach; however, due obstructions and better visibility contact, the missed approach was on the left side of runway and over the ult runway where there was traffic. It was told to me later that the FAA had just approved an ult runway parallel to runway 25 on the grass just off the runway and that the ults were communicating on a frequency of 122.8 MHZ. All of this approval was done 1 week prior to the incident. There were no NOTAMS to this effect posted to FSS. Ults are very difficult to see, especially if they are where you don't expect to see them. The approval of a common frequency for al would be the best thing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CORP LIGHT TWIN PLT GUILTY OF UNCONTROLLED ARPT TRAFFIC PATTERN DEVIATION.

Narrative: ON APCH TO WHEELLESS ARPT AND IN COM ON THE APPROPRIATE FREQ (122.9 MHZ) AS SIGNAGE AT THE ARPT HAD INDICATED. ON COM WITH THE ACFT READY FOR DEP WHO WAS ALSO A COMPANY ACFT. I HAD COMMUNICATED MY INTENTION TO DO A HIGH SPD PASS AT 90 DEGS TO THE RWY. THE REASON FOR THIS WAS A SUSPECTED GEAR CLAM SHELL DOOR WAS THOUGHT TO BE COMING OPEN INFLT AND THE PASS WAS TO VERIFY THIS SO APPROPRIATE MAINT ACTION COULD BE TAKEN. ON APCH TO THE AIR FIELD THROUGH COM AND VIS OUTLOOK THERE WAS NO TFC. ON PULL-UP, I IMMEDIATELY CLBED TO PATTERN. ALT AND ENTERED A NORMAL PATTERN AND APCH TO LAND. WITH COM WITH THE OTHER COMPANY IT WAS DEEMED THAT THEY WOULD NEED ADDITIONAL TIME FOR DEP DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE ACFT WAS ON A MAINT TEST FLT. I DEEMED IT NECESSARY TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH; HOWEVER, DUE OBSTRUCTIONS AND BETTER VIS CONTACT, THE MISSED APCH WAS ON THE LEFT SIDE OF RWY AND OVER THE ULT RWY WHERE THERE WAS TFC. IT WAS TOLD TO ME LATER THAT THE FAA HAD JUST APPROVED AN ULT RWY PARALLEL TO RWY 25 ON THE GRASS JUST OFF THE RWY AND THAT THE ULTS WERE COMMUNICATING ON A FREQ OF 122.8 MHZ. ALL OF THIS APPROVAL WAS DONE 1 WK PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. THERE WERE NO NOTAMS TO THIS EFFECT POSTED TO FSS. ULTS ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE, ESPECIALLY IF THEY ARE WHERE YOU DON'T EXPECT TO SEE THEM. THE APPROVAL OF A COMMON FREQ FOR AL WOULD BE THE BEST THING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.