Narrative:

The ATIS at lga, as well as ZNY, informed us to expect the visual approach to runway 4. At this time we were about 30 mins out. At 15 mins out approach told us to expect the 'river visual to 13...due to runway switching at this time'. We were at 10,000' and I had attempted to call our company of our ETA, which was now, 15 mins out. The captain was flying and following what I thought was the river visual. I had never flown this approach before, but it looked as though he was doing it correctly, so I did not query him and neither did new york approach when they handed us off to the tower. The captain pointed our maspeth tanks in line with runway 4. When the captain made a right turn from the river and started aligning himself with what looked like to me, and in fact was, runway 4, I asked him and showed him the plate. Meanwhile, lga tower cleared us to land runway 4. On the ground we were told contact the tower via phone. First, we were cleared for the river visual to runway 13 not the visual runway 4 as previously cleared. Second mistake was me not speaking up if it didn't look correct even though I had never flown it - ask! Third, the approach should have been briefed. Finally, the main cause was a breakdown of crew coordination. I thought the captain got a new clearance, or I missed something and did not pursue my question I had in mind. The captain became mind set on runway 4 instead of 31. By the time we left the river it was too late. To prevent something like this again falls on the crew. Better communication was all that was needed. In the future good crew concepts and coordination (cockpit resource management) must be used or more incidents or accident, and eventually, a serious one will happen.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG CLEARED FOR RIVER VISUAL TO RWY 13 AT LGA MADE A VISUAL APCH LNDG ON RWY 4. TWR SAW THE ERROR ON APCH AND AMENDED RWY ASSIGNMENT.

Narrative: THE ATIS AT LGA, AS WELL AS ZNY, INFORMED US TO EXPECT THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 4. AT THIS TIME WE WERE ABOUT 30 MINS OUT. AT 15 MINS OUT APCH TOLD US TO EXPECT THE 'RIVER VISUAL TO 13...DUE TO RWY SWITCHING AT THIS TIME'. WE WERE AT 10,000' AND I HAD ATTEMPTED TO CALL OUR COMPANY OF OUR ETA, WHICH WAS NOW, 15 MINS OUT. THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND FOLLOWING WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE RIVER VISUAL. I HAD NEVER FLOWN THIS APCH BEFORE, BUT IT LOOKED AS THOUGH HE WAS DOING IT CORRECTLY, SO I DID NOT QUERY HIM AND NEITHER DID NEW YORK APCH WHEN THEY HANDED US OFF TO THE TWR. THE CAPT POINTED OUR MASPETH TANKS IN LINE WITH RWY 4. WHEN THE CAPT MADE A RIGHT TURN FROM THE RIVER AND STARTED ALIGNING HIMSELF WITH WHAT LOOKED LIKE TO ME, AND IN FACT WAS, RWY 4, I ASKED HIM AND SHOWED HIM THE PLATE. MEANWHILE, LGA TWR CLRED US TO LAND RWY 4. ON THE GND WE WERE TOLD CONTACT THE TWR VIA PHONE. FIRST, WE WERE CLRED FOR THE RIVER VISUAL TO RWY 13 NOT THE VISUAL RWY 4 AS PREVIOUSLY CLRED. SECOND MISTAKE WAS ME NOT SPEAKING UP IF IT DIDN'T LOOK CORRECT EVEN THOUGH I HAD NEVER FLOWN IT - ASK! THIRD, THE APCH SHOULD HAVE BEEN BRIEFED. FINALLY, THE MAIN CAUSE WAS A BREAKDOWN OF CREW COORD. I THOUGHT THE CAPT GOT A NEW CLRNC, OR I MISSED SOMETHING AND DID NOT PURSUE MY QUESTION I HAD IN MIND. THE CAPT BECAME MIND SET ON RWY 4 INSTEAD OF 31. BY THE TIME WE LEFT THE RIVER IT WAS TOO LATE. TO PREVENT SOMETHING LIKE THIS AGAIN FALLS ON THE CREW. BETTER COM WAS ALL THAT WAS NEEDED. IN THE FUTURE GOOD CREW CONCEPTS AND COORD (COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT) MUST BE USED OR MORE INCIDENTS OR ACCIDENT, AND EVENTUALLY, A SERIOUS ONE WILL HAPPEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.