Narrative:

This scenario started developing with ny approach. WX was poor on the east coast, the controllers were very busy, the first officer was new (10-12 hours) and I relied too much on the information in the FMC. We were vectored off the arrival toward the final approach for runway 04 at lga, WX 4 overcast, 1 mi, light rain, wind 0615. The shorter distance caught me high and fast and I referred to the FMC vertical offset. The first officer extended the final approach course from the outer marker, however the altitude was for an intersection 4.5 mi outside the marker. This resulted in a high, fast and unstabilized approach. A go around was made and another approach was undertaken. It wasn't until I was establishing myself on final for this approach that I realized what had caused the problem on the first approach. At about 1000' my glide slope indicator went full scale up and down. Tower confirmed a normal signal so a second go around was made. This appeared like an aircraft had taxied through the signal path. A third approach was made but no contact at minimums so another go around was accomplished. At 3000' on downwind northwest of the airport we were cleared to climb to 5000' for holding. The first officer set this in the altitude window then got busy getting WX for jfk. I missed the clearance to climb because I was preoccupied with fuel and alternate considerations. The controller called us back and told us he needed us out of 3000' at that time. The correct altitude was set in but the altitude hold mode of the autoplt had not been cancelled so we were late in climbing to 5000'. Holding was established at 5000' at that time I requested an approach to runway 13 at lga. They were reluctant to approve that request. After 15-20 min they did allow me to make that approach. We broke out at about 300' and landed. During deplaning, a passenger stated that he had seen an aircraft within 500' of us in the holding pattern. Since we were in the WX I thought that it might have been another aircraft in the holding pattern 1000' above us. Later I considered the time he had spotted the aircraft and it could have been when we delayed our climb to 5000'. We did not see anything and the controller never said anything about conflicting traffic. Recommendations: 1) information stored in VMC's should be checked and corrected because pilots do rely on this information at critical times. The computer is the backup in place of the third pilot on the new 2-MAN aircraft. 2) controllers should slow down, allowing more space for aircraft to maneuver, this may reduce the stress on controllers, reduce miscoms particularly when the WX is marginal. There are many inexperienced controllers and pilots in the system today. 3) reinforce the requirement for taxiing aircraft to stay away from ILS transmitters during marginal WX. 4) request that airports change apches as soon as possible after one becomes unusable. The controllers were very professional during this entire time but it was very apparent that they were under a great deal of stress and our flight created considerable additional work for them that might have been eliminated if they had told me early of their intention to bring me in fast and close.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW FAILED TO COMMENCE CLIMB TO NEW CLEARED ALT IN A TIMELY MANNER. FLT CREW WORKLOAD AT CRITICAL POINT.

Narrative: THIS SCENARIO STARTED DEVELOPING WITH NY APCH. WX WAS POOR ON THE EAST COAST, THE CTLRS WERE VERY BUSY, THE F/O WAS NEW (10-12 HRS) AND I RELIED TOO MUCH ON THE INFO IN THE FMC. WE WERE VECTORED OFF THE ARR TOWARD THE FINAL APCH FOR RWY 04 AT LGA, WX 4 OVCST, 1 MI, LIGHT RAIN, WIND 0615. THE SHORTER DISTANCE CAUGHT ME HIGH AND FAST AND I REFERRED TO THE FMC VERTICAL OFFSET. THE F/O EXTENDED THE FINAL APCH COURSE FROM THE OUTER MARKER, HOWEVER THE ALT WAS FOR AN INTXN 4.5 MI OUTSIDE THE MARKER. THIS RESULTED IN A HIGH, FAST AND UNSTABILIZED APCH. A GO AROUND WAS MADE AND ANOTHER APCH WAS UNDERTAKEN. IT WASN'T UNTIL I WAS ESTABLISHING MYSELF ON FINAL FOR THIS APCH THAT I REALIZED WHAT HAD CAUSED THE PROBLEM ON THE FIRST APCH. AT ABOUT 1000' MY GLIDE SLOPE INDICATOR WENT FULL SCALE UP AND DOWN. TWR CONFIRMED A NORMAL SIGNAL SO A SECOND GO AROUND WAS MADE. THIS APPEARED LIKE AN ACFT HAD TAXIED THROUGH THE SIGNAL PATH. A THIRD APCH WAS MADE BUT NO CONTACT AT MINIMUMS SO ANOTHER GO AROUND WAS ACCOMPLISHED. AT 3000' ON DOWNWIND NW OF THE ARPT WE WERE CLRED TO CLIMB TO 5000' FOR HOLDING. THE F/O SET THIS IN THE ALT WINDOW THEN GOT BUSY GETTING WX FOR JFK. I MISSED THE CLRNC TO CLIMB BECAUSE I WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH FUEL AND ALTERNATE CONSIDERATIONS. THE CTLR CALLED US BACK AND TOLD US HE NEEDED US OUT OF 3000' AT THAT TIME. THE CORRECT ALT WAS SET IN BUT THE ALT HOLD MODE OF THE AUTOPLT HAD NOT BEEN CANCELLED SO WE WERE LATE IN CLIMBING TO 5000'. HOLDING WAS ESTABLISHED AT 5000' AT THAT TIME I REQUESTED AN APCH TO RWY 13 AT LGA. THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO APPROVE THAT REQUEST. AFTER 15-20 MIN THEY DID ALLOW ME TO MAKE THAT APCH. WE BROKE OUT AT ABOUT 300' AND LANDED. DURING DEPLANING, A PAX STATED THAT HE HAD SEEN AN ACFT WITHIN 500' OF US IN THE HOLDING PATTERN. SINCE WE WERE IN THE WX I THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN ANOTHER ACFT IN THE HOLDING PATTERN 1000' ABOVE US. LATER I CONSIDERED THE TIME HE HAD SPOTTED THE ACFT AND IT COULD HAVE BEEN WHEN WE DELAYED OUR CLIMB TO 5000'. WE DID NOT SEE ANYTHING AND THE CTLR NEVER SAID ANYTHING ABOUT CONFLICTING TFC. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) INFO STORED IN VMC'S SHOULD BE CHECKED AND CORRECTED BECAUSE PLTS DO RELY ON THIS INFO AT CRITICAL TIMES. THE COMPUTER IS THE BACKUP IN PLACE OF THE THIRD PLT ON THE NEW 2-MAN ACFT. 2) CTLRS SHOULD SLOW DOWN, ALLOWING MORE SPACE FOR ACFT TO MANEUVER, THIS MAY REDUCE THE STRESS ON CTLRS, REDUCE MISCOMS PARTICULARLY WHEN THE WX IS MARGINAL. THERE ARE MANY INEXPERIENCED CTLRS AND PLTS IN THE SYSTEM TODAY. 3) REINFORCE THE REQUIREMENT FOR TAXIING ACFT TO STAY AWAY FROM ILS TRANSMITTERS DURING MARGINAL WX. 4) REQUEST THAT ARPTS CHANGE APCHES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER ONE BECOMES UNUSABLE. THE CTLRS WERE VERY PROFESSIONAL DURING THIS ENTIRE TIME BUT IT WAS VERY APPARENT THAT THEY WERE UNDER A GREAT DEAL OF STRESS AND OUR FLT CREATED CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONAL WORK FOR THEM THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED IF THEY HAD TOLD ME EARLY OF THEIR INTENTION TO BRING ME IN FAST AND CLOSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.